

*In the name of God*



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# Techné, Intentionality and Self- Interpretation

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## **Abstract**

*In this paper I propose to do the following: I will discuss the notions of intentionality and self-understanding of Dasein as developed in Heidegger's Basic Problems of Phenomenology. In doing so, I will try to show the interrelation of Dasein's always being intentionally directed towards something and its self-interpretation. As we will see, the everyday world has, for Heidegger, a character of "equipmental contexture." This means that Dasein returns to itself from out of things, equipment, tools, or-quite differently-the work of art. In a word, Dasein is mirrored back toward itself from the things made, from the products of techné.<sup>1</sup>*

*From this will follow the important distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. There is a sense in which the following pairings could be discerned: tools or pieces of equipment link up with inauthenticity, while the work of art links up with authenticity. I will say more on the subject of tools a bit later in the essay.*

*Both kinds of things are things insofar as they are entrenched in techné. The common root seems almost inexplicable in the light of the vast difference between tools and the artwork. Moreover, both Dasein and techné seem to have another equally enigmatic common root: that of temporality. Temporality is the essential bond between Dasein and the double sense of techné, which suggests the double-sidedness of temporality itself. It is precisely this doublesidedness that I would like to have as the backdrop to my discussion as a whole. Finally, I will turn to a few pages of Heidegger's Being and Time and Bernard Stiegler's book Technics and Time I in order to complicate this notion of the two senses of temporality, the owned and disowned, originary and everyday, and its relation to work and techné. The overarching question here will be: Can the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity be sustained?*

**Keywords:** *techné, being, authenticity, self- interpretation, intentionality, thing, Heidegger.*

By way of stage-setting, it is important to say a few words about the overarching theme of Section Fifteen of the *Basic Problems*, entitled "The fundamental problem of the multiplicity of ways of being and of the unity of the concept of being in general."<sup>2</sup> Heidegger points out the somewhat contradictory character of modern ontology by asking: If the being of the thinking subject

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(*res cogitans*) is radically different from the being of other things (*res extensa*), then is it possible to say that there is such a thing as being in general? Heidegger's concern here can be understood as follows: on the one

hand, he is being critical of modern ontology insofar as it understands the being of both *res cogitans* and *res extensa* as present-at-hand, which means that both have fundamentally the same way of being; on the other hand, he asks how it is possible to draw such a rigid distinction between the thinking subject and other beings and yet endorse a unitary concept of being. If the subject is indeed so different from other entities, then it must have a different mode of being. Thus, the radicalization of this very distinction between the different modes of being is called for.

In order to widen this gap between the being of the subject and the being of other beings, one needs to work out a more radical conception of the subject, which is to say that one needs to ask what Dasein or human existence<sup>3</sup> means. This is in fact what Heidegger proceeds to do in Section A by giving us the "initial preview of the existential constitution of the Dasein." (Heidegger, 1988, 154) In giving this preview, Heidegger exhibits "the being of *that* being to whose being (existence) *an understanding of being* belongs and *to the interpretation of which all the problems of ontology generally return.*" (*Ibid.*) The question following out from this statement is: how does Dasein understand itself? Heidegger then asserts that Dasein is ontically<sup>4</sup> nearest to itself because it *is* itself in each instance and yet ontologically furthest. (*Ibid.*, 155.) What this important statement refers to is the difficulty of Dasein's access to itself. Although we certainly do not mistake ourselves for somebody else in our everyday commerce with the world, the "da" of Dasein remains most hidden. Heidegger then says that "the Dasein's comportments have an *intentional character*" and that "on the basis of this intentionality the subject already stands in relation to things that it itself is not." (*Ibid.*) One could say then that Dasein's intentionality is relational dialectic with its world.

Yet this should not lead us to believe that Dasein is simply a subject because it is always characterized by intentionality, which means that perceiving is always the perception *of* something, thinking is always thinking *of* something. That is, every act of

Dasein is always a relating to something and in this sense there is no interiority in Dasein that underlies all relations. Relating belongs to the very ontological constitution of the subjective self. (*Ibid.*, 157) Dasein always exists in the presence of other beings and cannot therefore be isolated from them.

Heidegger further articulates precisely this point by saying that the everyday determination of Dasein as an ego is in and through this relational comportment or intentionality. (*Ibid.*, 158) This is not to be conflated with the idea that relational acts simply radiate from the self, that it is the given self who initiates these acts. The given ego is not the bearer of its own intentional acts because there is no given ego as such. It seems that Dasein does not underlie all its relational acts but rather *happens* in and through them. Human existence “stands out” (the literal sense of the verb “to exist”) by way of intentional acts and for that reason can never be separated from them.

Phenomenologically speaking, our dealings in the world and our understanding of ourselves as being-in-the-world are not marked by any sense of the ego. The question is then: How do we come to know and even experience ourselves as the ego? The multiple references to philosophical tradition in the chapter under consideration seem to suggest that the longestablished equation of Dasein with the isolated ego is perpetuated by the philosophical tradition itself.<sup>5</sup> According to Heidegger, the insertion of the ego is subsequent to the event of thought. The next question Heidegger goes on to ask is: How *do* we experience ourselves, in what way are we given to ourselves phenomenologically? The task for Heidegger is to find an adequate

interpretation of the phenomenal circumstances of Dasein, i.e., of Dasein in the facticity of its being. This means first and foremost taking into account the dictum of phenomenology, “to return to the things themselves,” by freeing ourselves to the extent that we can from our conceptual presuppositions.

But what might a phenomenologically accurate account of our self-experience be? With a view to this concern, Heidegger reaffirms that our understanding of ourselves does not arise out of a conscious discovery or thinking. As he puts it, “The self is there for the Dasein itself without reflection and without inner perception, *before* all reflection.” (*Ibid.*, 159) Dasein primarily

finds itself in the things themselves it is concerned with. (*Ibid.*) The self is neither a hidden interiority nor is it something existing in the background of all intentional acts. Dasein understands itself from out of things in the world, it is always in the midst of and assailed (*bedrängt*) by them, which leads to what Heidegger terms the “associated unveiling of the self.” (*Ibid.*, 158) “In everyday terms,” Heidegger continues, “we understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of.” (*Ibid.*, 159) Dasein’s coming back to itself from out of things brings us to the important notions of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) and inauthenticity. Everyday self-understanding is not authentic insofar as it does not arise from out of “the most proper and most extreme possibilities of our own existence.” (*Ibid.*, 160) For Heidegger, everydayness (*Altäglichkeit*) names a distinct way of existing—the one that is characterized first and foremost by pervasiveness and indifference.<sup>6</sup>

Although it is the most common way of Dasein’s being, the everyday Dasein becomes indistinguishable from its daily concerns. The self of such understanding dissolves into things. This inauthentic self-understanding, however, is neither unguine nor illusory. (*Ibid.*, 160) It is important to realize that inauthenticity and authenticity are modes of Dasein’s self-understanding. The former is Dasein’s interpreting itself from out of the being of those beings that are radically distinct from it or in terms of its absorbed involvement with those beings. It is also possible to say that Dasein perceives itself as ‘anyone,’ as the anonymous ‘they.’ The latter is interpreting itself in terms of its most proper being or its most proper possibilities of being. The latter (which will later be referred to as the being-towards-death) is what Heidegger understands by freedom. Inauthenticity is then about absorption (*Aufgehen*) or, according to the literal meaning of the German term, going up into things.<sup>7</sup> It is essentially characterized by lostness of the self. That is, our interpretative appropriation of ourselves is inauthentic or simply misguided; it is not ourselves in our most proper being that we appropriate *as* what we are. This does not mean that we do not have the authentic experience of ourselves in this self-absorption in things. It is rather the question of the disjunction between our experience of ourselves and our conceptual expression of it. It is this lack of a phenomenologically

suitable interpretation of ourselves that Heidegger draws our attention to.<sup>8</sup>

Heidegger's guiding concern here seems to be the horizon of our projection. Our understanding is, we recall, projecting ourselves upon a particular possibility of being. In the case of authentic and inauthentic existence there are two radically different horizons of projection: one is the projection upon this or that possibility as specified by one's role in life, by ontic determinations; and the other is the projection upon our existence as such, i.e., our finitude. For instance, when one chooses a certain profession, it is possible to fully identify with the chosen role and do everything for its sake, that is, to succeed in one's career as if it were an end in itself. What we have in this case is the projection onto one ontic determination—one's career. This kind of projection also signifies a closure, a certain blindness to other possibilities. If, however, one realizes that the concern for his or her professional success ultimately points toward the concern for one's being as such, no full identification with this or that ontic particular will be possible. This is to say that the person in question will see him- or herself as *different* from the chosen object, as someone who can never be relieved of the task to choose the possibilities of one's being. In this case, the sense of difference or the space between the one who chooses and the object being chosen ensures an openness to the future, i.e., the possibility of choosing something genuinely anew. Heidegger adds another clarification to "this mysterious reflection of the self from things" by saying that Dasein is not "in" the things as something extant among them but is rather "with" the things. (*Ibid.*, 161) An "*antecedent* transposition" is the condition of our being able to return to ourselves. (*Ibid.*) The task is to inquire into the meaning of this transposition and its relationship to the ontological constitution of Dasein. The question of transposition translates into that of transcendence. (*Ibid.*, 162) Heidegger defines transcendence as a "*fundamental determination of the ontological structure of the asein.*" (*Ibid.*) The subject of transcendence goes hand in hand with a problem that he claims is "unknown to all previous philosophy," the problem of world. His critique of Fichte serves as a passageway to his discussion of this problem: The Fichtean dictum "Think the wall, and then think the one who thinks the wall" in effect invites us to become



blind to the world. (*Ibid.*) This is the case because the world is prior to any explicit cognitive understanding of the object.<sup>9</sup> What is given to us is never the object in isolation. Rather, what is primarily given is a contexture, a contextual whole of equipmentality. (*Ibid.*, 163) “The *nearest things* that surround us,” Heidegger tells us, “we call equipment.” (*Ibid.*, 163) We see this whole from out of a practical circumspection, *Umsicht*. (*Ibid.*, 163) What is characteristic of circumspective seeing is that it always sees things from out of our specific involvement in the world.

The world that we encounter in this involved seeing is, literally, the world that surrounds us, *Umwelt*. This contexture is not something we can bring about or arrive at insofar as to see something as one determinate thing is to see it necessarily in relation to other things, to the whole that has already been given to us. Each piece of equipment refers to “that *for which* it is what it is.” (*Ibid.*, 163) It is thus always anchored in a specific *for-which* or *in-order-to*. (*Ibid.*, 164) Nonetheless, the seemingly endless chain of ends and means ultimately points back to Dasein’s own being. It is Dasein’s own being that is first of all at stake here and that for the sake of which the referential or relational chain is activated in the first place. But yet it is precisely the “for the sake of Dasein’s being” that tends to be forgotten in Dasein’s dealings with the world.

Heidegger’s emphasis on equipmentality may at first seem puzzling and therefore it merits a closer look. It seems that Heidegger wants to accentuate the equipmental character of things in order to disown the equation of things with mere objects, something that stands before us and leaves us indifferent. Things serve as the means to achieve our practical goals. Yet, we should not hastily conclude that the fairly simple contrast between non-useful and useful things is at stake here. The key here is that any piece of equipment is always already woven into the world and, in being used, tacitly illuminates the surrounding world to the extent it is able.

Heidegger’s phenomenological interrogation of the problem of world is radical because it differs from prior philosophical inquiry. At least in modernity, philosophical inquiry into the problem of world always started from the relation between the

subject and a particular isolated object. Such a formulation of the question is already a fabrication of our original experience of things in the world. Philosophy has always illegitimately redirected the problem of world to the problem of nature. (*Ibid.*, 165) In other words, philosophy has always *seen* what was in a sense furthest from it, thus failing to recognize the concept of world as such. For Heidegger, world is neither nature nor presence-at-hand nor a totality of present-at-hand things. (*Ibid.*, 165) The totality of things is, as he writes about it, the intraworldly, that which lies *within* the world. (*Ibid.*, 165) This distinction is in place because for something to be an entity means that it appears *within* the world. Yet this does not mean that the world is the sum of what is within it. Heidegger's basic determination of world is that the "world is not something subsequent that we calculate as a result from the sum of all beings." (*Ibid.*, 165) It is rather the antecedent horizon that is always ahead of us and out of which we return when we grasp this or that object. As Heidegger writes, "We are able to come up against intraworldly beings solely because, as existing beings, we are always already in a world." (*Ibid.*, 165) The world, he goes on to say, has the Dasein-like mode of being. (*Ibid.*, 166) If the world is Dasein-ish, i.e., subjective, it is precisely the phenomenon of world that calls for the radicalization of subjectivity. (*Ibid.*, 168) What is it that inextricably binds Dasein and the world? It is what Heidegger calls "projection" (*Entwurf*). Existence is, in addition to other things, casting-forth a world. (*Ibid.*, 168) Since Dasein's essential characteristic was said to be an understanding of being (which is in each case mine, as we are about to see) and since Dasein and the world are essentially the same, it follows that Dasein has an understanding of the world, the understanding of the world that is prior to a more nuanced understanding of this or that phenomenon in the world.<sup>10</sup> What I would like to note here is a peculiar interlacing of an understanding of being and an understanding of the world, that is, Dasein's self-understanding and its understanding of the whole of relations. Heidegger then writes that since "world-understanding is at the same time an *understanding-of-itself* by the Dasein," the understanding of the being that pertains to intentionality embraces two radically different ways of being, the being of Dasein and that of extant or

intra-worldly entities. (*Ibid.*, 175) Such general understanding of being, Heidegger says a few lines down, is indifferent, blind to “specific ways of being.” Thus, we see that intentionality in conjunction with Heidegger’s “Dasein-ish” concept of the world opens the way and accounts for Dasein’s essential tendency to become lost in entities that are fundamentally different from it.

In the next section, Heidegger points out two essential determinations of Dasein. The first is that Dasein exists for the sake of its own self or that “it is occupied with its own capacity to be.” (*Ibid.*, 170) The second is that Dasein is in each case mine (*jemeinig*). This “in each case mineness” (*Jemeinigkeit*) constitutes the singularity of Dasein insofar as it means that Dasein belongs to itself in its very mode of being as acting. In the “in each case” Dasein becomes plainly unmistakable to itself. Dasein’s concern with its own being means that it has the task of being in this situation here and now. This task cannot be handed over to anyone else. Dasein can lose or forget itself only and precisely because it is *its own*. (*Ibid.*, 170) This lostness in things is in fact the first way in which Dasein is unveiled to itself insofar as “inauthenticity belongs to the essential nature of factual Dasein.” (*Ibid.*, 171) Heidegger states that “authenticity is only a modification but not a total obliteration of inauthenticity.” (*Ibid.*, 171) At this point it is possible to bring the problematic into sharper relief. On the one hand, we have the essential unavoidability of the “I,” Dasein’s ineluctable glimpse into its “mineness” and the responsibility associated with it. On the other hand, we are told that Dasein is inauthentic by its very nature. Indeed, we are enigmatically told that authenticity is only a modification of Dasein’s purposeful comportment of the everyday. The three questions that arise here are as follows. Firstly, if Dasein’s reflexivity is about its coming back to itself from out of things, what kind of difference must be inscribed in the very being of things to allow for Dasein’s more authentic return to itself? If directedness to things is prior to Dasein’s authentic self-understanding, what is it that addresses Dasein from out of things and, as it were, makes it face ontologically its ownmost being? In the crudest sense, it concerns that which sparks off change in self-understanding in the first place. The second question is this: What is it about Dasein’s being that makes possible the authentic return to itself? It is thus about

the “how” of change. The third question is: If the self is primarily exteriority, there seems to be no other place for Dasein to return to other than the situation it is already in. Yet the focus of understanding nevertheless shifts. In what sense?<sup>11</sup> It is about the content of change.

Given the designation of things as “intra-worldly,” it appears that Dasein shifts from “the world” in its richness to concrete things with a remarkable lightness. For Dasein, the world tends to contract into things and grow out of them again. Heidegger substantiates such an interpretation with a reference to childhood where he says that the child’s world is charged with world. (*Ibid.*) This translates into the notion that the experience of world is prior to any experience of selfhood. The mention of childhood is followed by an appeal to Rilke’s poem. Poetry or creative literature (*Dichtung*) is understood here as the manifestation of our being-in-the-world or something like an

authentic (hermeneutically open) response to the world that addresses us from out of things. This reference to poetry seems the presage of Heidegger’s work in the 1930s marked by the explicit concern with the poetic word. One of the possible questions is: Where does poetizing end and philosophy begin *if* both are about letting the world speak to us? Another question we ask is: Do we need to be temporally distant from things (ruins or Rilkean walls) in order to see them in their unfamiliarity, in order to be captivated by their estranging power? If we do and if the recognition of our having-been in the world is uncanny, then is it because of our always coming too late, that is, our inability to be where we have been and even where we are now-in short, because of our mortality? Is it *techne* that discloses to us the fact that we as humans are

necessarily unable to be at home in any moment or at any site?

Now I would to complicate matters further by shifting my discussion to Stiegler’s *Time and Technics*. Stiegler writes, “Concern is always inscribed in a complex of tools, and a tool is always inscribed in a finality that itself stems from a mode of temporalization of temporality.”<sup>12</sup> To bring this closer to the language of my paper, concern or care is what guides Dasein through the lattice of references or relations. Even in Dasein’s self-

forgetting, care *is* the singular Dasein in its existing, in its multiple ways of passing through the whole of relations. A piece of equipment is lodged in the “for-the-sake-of” and hence in a kind of finality. This finality originates in a mode of temporalization of temporality, which is, Stiegler goes on to add, a forgetting. (*Ibid.*) At this point we may wonder whether the injection of the language of temporality into Dasein’s transactions within the referential framework adds anything new to the already introduced notions of projection and horizons. What seems to be at stake here is the way in which Dasein *endures* through the everydayness and the way in which the everydayness is essentially repeatable or selfsame. Being absorbed in and permeated by its everyday concerns, Dasein acquires a certain duration, a sense of time that is selfsame, undifferentiated. The neutral, everyone’s temporality is, as it were, communicated to Dasein by the entities it deals with.

Another way of saying this would be that Dasein’s disowned temporality and hence the seeming constancy of its being as such are “held together” by the things it is concerned with, not the other way around. It is this temporality that is synonymous with Dasein’s forgetting of its radical singularity, its “mineness.”<sup>13</sup> Stiegler then asks, “But is not this forgetting of the Self salutary, referring to a more originary temporality?” I will attempt to delineate the sense in which this forgetting can be said to be salutary at all, the way Stiegler sees it.

But first a few words need to be said about the temporality of authenticity, the way Heidegger writes about it in *Being and Time*. It was pointed out earlier that there are two senses of horizon at work in Dasein’s projection or understanding: in the first case, Dasein projects itself upon particular ontic possibilities that are given to it and in the other case it understands itself from out of the possibility of its ownmost being, which is to say, its finitude. In what way can we align Dasein’s own being as possibility with finitude at all?

We could approach the complex and ample discussion of Dasein’s being-towards-death laid out in *Being and Time* by first drawing two observations on what has been discussed so far in the course of present essay. First, the language of projection, antecedent horizon, and transcendence calls attention to Dasein’s existence as equivalent to possibility. In its being directed toward

the future and coming back to itself from out of the future, the ontological realm of Dasein is the realm of the possible. Yet, this realm of the possible is not infinite, for in this case Dasein would never return to itself. In other words, Dasein would glide over its possibilities without ever having to choose one or the other and without looking back to itself. Given the Daseinlike character of the world and the world as the site of disclosure of all possibilities, we can conclude that the complex of Dasein's possibilities is as finite as Dasein itself. What necessarily circumscribes the realm of Dasein's possibilities is nothing other than its own death. Second, we saw that Dasein relates to its ontic possibilities by things qua tools, which means that at the level of the everydayness, Dasein sees its possibilities as essentially realizable or achievable. The definitional purity of Dasein's ontic possibilities is compromised by their realizable character, their tendency to dissolve into actuality. If there is one possibility that can never be actualized, it is death. For the Heidegger of *Being and Time*, being-towards-death is the quintessential relation to the possible. Dasein *is* there as long as its death *is as* a possibility.

He writes, "*The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a possibility, is far as possible from anything actual.*" (Heidegger 1962, 262) In this way, death assumes the character of the most extreme possibility, possibility in the fullest sense of the word. Heidegger then elaborates the notion of the unrealizable possibility by saying that the possibility in question is "*the possibility of the impossibility of any human existence at all.*" (*Ibid.*) This is another way of saying that for Dasein, its death can only *be* precisely as possible. The possibility of death, Heidegger goes on to say, "reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all" and "offers no support for becoming intent on something, 'picturing' to oneself the actuality which is possible." (*Ibid.*) Before the possibility of death, all other possibilities that are present for Dasein become unfamiliar and meaningless and for this reason require something like a revaluation. Since this possibility also turns out to be "one's *ownmost* and uttermost potentiality-for-Being," it is now seen as the source of any meaningful recasting of Dasein's circumstantial givenness. (*Ibid.*, 263) It is the openness that is first disclosed in Dasein's shattering against its finitude that allows Dasein to be

free, i.e., to be different from *how* it was before and therefore to take on its facticity in a creative, recontextualized way.

The question that emerges from this is: How does Dasein's relation to its most extreme possibility affect its self-understanding? To put it in another way, what happens to Dasein's self-understanding after it comes up against the limit of all of its ontic possibilities? Heidegger's discussion of guilt and the call of conscience offers us some help in answering this question. He strips the notion of guilt of its moral connotations and defines it instead as "*Being-the-basis of a nullity.*" (*Ibid.*, 284) What does it mean to say that Dasein's being is grounded in the nothing, a nullity or a lack? The ground of an entity is identical with the entity's reason or cause. The groundlessness of Dasein has everything to do with the fact that it is not self-caused. In other words, Dasein has *not* been thrown into its "there" of its own accord. (*Ibid.*) Since Dasein's facticity or thrownness is saturated with negativity, two things follow. First, its own being was, as it were, handed over to it. The event of Dasein's origination always precedes it and is therefore beyond its grasp. Thus, Dasein is guilty first of all to itself insofar as it constantly falls behind its own being. Second, as Heidegger tells us, Dasein *is* this thrown ground "only in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown." (*Ibid.*) Dasein's coincidence with its facticity, its rootedness in a particular set of circumstances and an array of particular possibilities that stems from it, is also in reference to the possibility of no-longer-existing, to the negativity of Dasein's mortal horizon which shatteringly echoes the negativity bound up with its origination. Being out for the possibility of death discloses that into which Dasein has already been thrown. Hence, Dasein's authentic relation to the future recoils upon its relation to its past insofar as in anticipating death, Dasein is free to appropriate—that is, to repeat or retrieve—what is already given to it. In a sense, Dasein authentically chooses what is already its own. It comes to be ontologically itself by virtue of the individuating force of finitude.<sup>14</sup> That is, it is with a view to its finitude that Dasein's is 'introduced' to the true nature of its cares or concerns in its world in that it realizes that its cares center around its own being.

Yet, as we saw throughout this paper, Dasein is for the most part absorbed into its everyday world of plans and concerns. It therefore seems that there must be something that pulls Dasein away from its daily affairs and summons it to its groundlessness. It seems, however, that this “something” cannot come entirely from the outside, since it is Dasein’s ownmost being that is at stake here. Or at least, the summons cannot be issued forth by the outside as everydayness, since it is precisely in it that the being of Dasein is conflated with the being of other entities unlike it. Keeping up with the language of guilt, Heidegger terms this phenomenon “the call of conscience.” What is this call like and whose call is it? Heidegger asserts that “conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent.” (*Ibid.*, 273) Silence is speaking insofar as it gives something to understand, but yet silence is opposed to all ontic discourse. When Dasein falls under the spell of silence, it is transported into the midst of the uncanny, not-being-at-home, or, to put it another way, the unbridgeable difference between itself and everything around it, the difference between the ontological and the ontic. The call of conscience summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality for being, which means that Dasein’s being becomes an issue for it in the highest degree. The call differentiates Dasein from whatever it is ordinarily involved with and it makes room for Dasein’s looking at its lifecontext anew by precisely highlighting the fact that Dasein as potentiality could *have been* or could yet *be* otherwise than it is. What this amounts to is that the call animates the possibility of a genuine change or transformation of Dasein. The call and the caller, Heidegger goes on to say, are paradoxically one. He writes, “The call comes *from* me, and yet *from beyond me and over* me.” (*Ibid.*, 275) Dasein then splits into a command to authentically choose itself and the accomplishment of that command. Dasein simultaneously reminds itself and is reminded that it inevitably has the task to be, that in not coming into existence of its own accord, Dasein is not quite coincident with its being and is always yet to catch up with it by assuming its having-been.

What the preceding paragraphs attempted to bring to light is the following: Dasein can appropriate its own being *as* that which is shot through with negativity and because of that. Dasein has to pass through its own nullity in order to make an authentic choice



about its being. In other words, Dasein has to allow negativity to work a change upon its self-understanding by severing it from the ontic, everyday context. Such a passage through the nothing is possible only when Dasein is called upon or addressed by something. Yet the identification of Dasein with both the call and the caller makes the situation all the more enigmatic, since we have already seen Dasein's inseparability from the world or, in other words, the blurring of interiority and exteriority. The question is then: What is the role of Dasein's everyday world when it comes to the disquieting call of conscience or the call of the nothing?

Now we are prepared to return to and assess Stiegler's claim about self-forgetting in relation to temporality and the aforesaid question. Stiegler purports to introduce the question of work into the equation of the outside with instrumentality, *techne*. He refers to Maurice Blanchot's example of a writer to illustrate his point. A writer is a contradiction because someone who wants to write must know that he or she possess the gift to write, yet one does not know whether the gift is in fact there, until something is written by that person. The writer is in this sense posterior to his or her work and is therefore defined by it. Stiegler transfers the situation of the writer to that of humanity in general by saying that the "question of writing is nothing but a radicalization of that of the memory of the human." Human beings recognize or, more precisely, remember themselves as having-been in the traces of writing. It is however the task of the human being to first produce these traces and in order to do that it must forget itself. To forget the self means to "let one's other be-but another who is not a self, not one's own, but quite other."<sup>15</sup> Disappropriation, letting go of that which is one's own is the prerequisite for work as such. Yet, the loss of the self that is quintessential for work is countered by the recognition of ourselves in the work produced, the recognition of ourselves precisely as *new to* or *not* ourselves. According to the example of the writer, the effects produced invest the person who is writing with a crucially new self-understanding.

An important point follows. If the self is somehow renewed in the process of work, there can never be attained the presence of the self. To put this in more Heideggerian language, we could say that Dasein returns to itself precisely in the moment of

differentiation from itself. For Stiegler, the essential intertwining and inseparability of the human being and the world is best instantiated in the phenomenon of work. In a certain sense, the notion of work brings to the fore the malleability of Dasein's self and is therefore in perfect accord with Heidegger's decisive critique of the ego as constant presence. Work, however, is possible only on the basis of self-forgetting. The destabilization of any present or given self and the affirmation of its perpetual self-surpassing, its renewal, seems to be what motivates Stiegler's ascription of a highly positive valence to dissolution in work and the effects of work as such.

What Stiegler attempts to do in making such arguments, the way I understand it, is nothing other than an intensification of Heidegger's idea that Dasein's authentic self-interpretation always arises out of and cannot be separated from its inauthentic absorption in the everydayness. Dasein's self-understanding is constituted in its return to itself from out of things or the effects of work, which is to say that the everyday comportment is the baseline for Dasein's authentic access to itself. However, it remains unclear how Stiegler's analysis can account for any genuine change in Dasein's self-understanding. One question should suffice to show this: If, as was said earlier, the temporality of the everydayness is essentially constant and undifferentiated, if this temporality permeates Dasein's everyday absorption in *techné*, and, finally, if Dasein is informed by its everyday world, then where-methodologically speaking-does the possibility of change come into the picture? The problem with Stiegler's claims then seems to be his insistence on the change-inducing value of *techné* as such, which precludes differentiation within it. If just any instance whatsoever of *techné* offers a possibility of Dasein's authentic return to itself, then the phenomenon of such a renewal remains unexplained. Moreover, it appears questionable to me whether the assertion of *techné* in its homogeneity as well as an anonymous dispersion of Dasein in the world *minus* the notion of "mineness"<sup>16</sup> (it is, after all, uncertain what exactly allows the writing person to identify with the writer brought into existence by writing) offer us the conceptual means necessary to address the transformation of experience and- I am tempted to add-temporal unfolding as such. In other words, if it is the case that

the analysis of temporality as such hinges upon a rigorous notion of change, the fully-developed understanding of temporality and, by extension, of historicity, the analysis that lacks such a notion does not seem to be particularly vital.

Nevertheless, the emphasis on the outside may be appreciated in the early Heidegger's own thinking of authenticity and inauthenticity. We can see that this is the case by paying attention to the troubled aspects of his notion of the call of conscience. It is not clear how we are to think about the simultaneity of Dasein's calling itself and being called upon and in fact why we may want to assert the simultaneity in the first place. In other words, Heidegger-his resistance to such traditional notions of the self as interiority or self-subsisting entity notwithstanding-does not tell us why the call has to have the double origin in the world *and* Dasein. The suspicion that thinking

Dasein as the partial origin of the call is haunted by the remnants of traditional subjectivity is fortified by Heidegger's abandonment of the language of the call of conscience altogether and the shifting of his focus to the work of art in the 1930s. Heidegger's discussions of art and the poetic word specifically could be seen as a formal explanation of how Dasein can be called upon by the world in such a way that it enables a genuine modification in Dasein's selfunderstanding.

That is to say, Heidegger articulates and develops the differentiation within *techne* itself to allow for the possibility of change without any pronounced sense of agency. The change happens *to* Dasein not because there is some hidden interiority of Dasein that wills it, but rather because of the qualitative differences inherent in the effects of *techne* itself and Dasein's fundamental ability to be affected and informed by *techne* as it is woven into Dasein's surrounding world. Heidegger thus sees that the world itself has to address Dasein in two emphatically different ways in order to say that there is more than one way of living (I use the verb in the transitive sense) temporality.

The world as ordinary *techne* addresses Dasein in a way that does not introduce it to the essential difference between the being of Dasein and that of other entities. The world that is calling Dasein from out of the extraordinary *techne* of the work of art allows Dasein to return to itself in a restorative way or,

differently put, to convert Dasein's circumstantial limitations into an acknowledged distinctiveness out of which something new is born. In a sense, this is exactly where Stiegler stops in his analysis: he intensifies the notion of the outside qua *techné*, but yet he does not elaborate on any distinction within *techné* that would bring about any change in Dasein. I therefore find the later Heidegger's writings on art critically important in thinking through the issue of the self and the outside under the rubric of temporality without sliding into the language of interiority. To return to the question I raised at the beginning of the essay, it seems to me that the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity-however subtle-is an integral part of Heidegger's notion of temporality as such. Whether it is possible to collapse this distinction and yet present a viable account of change is the question that remains to be critically examined elsewhere.

**Endnotes:**

1. However, we should not forget that Dasein can also come back to itself from other Dasein. As Heidegger puts it, "Not only is Being towards Others an autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being: this relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein's Being, already is." On another occasion, Heidegger describes being-with as "thralldom," which suggests a certain captivity and the subsequent release from it. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1962), 125-163.
2. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
3. The German "da" (there) and "sein" (being) literally mean "being-there."
4. The terms "ontic" and "ontological" describe two ways of discussing Dasein's being: the one in terms of the formal ontological structures and the other in terms of the concrete, factual way of being at any given moment. The ontic way of being is always articulated by the formal ontological structures.
5. The context of this claim is Heidegger's extensive demonstration of his thesis that the Greeks hastily equated being with *ousia*, substance. Interpreted or in effect misinterpreted in this way, being was inserted into the philosophical tradition as being present-at-hand, constant, outside of time. For details, see, for example, Section Eleven of Chapter Two in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.
6. "Everydayness" is the *how* "in accordance with which Dasein 'lives unto the day ['in den Tag hineinlebt']", whether in all its ways of behaving or only in certain ones which have been prescribed by Being-with-one-another." Heidegger goes on to say that "in everydayness everything is all one and the same, but whatever the day may bring is taken as diversification." *Being and Time*, 370-1.
7. This is analogous to the notion of 'fallenness' (*Verfallenheit*) in *Being and Time*. Indeed, alienness into the world means "an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity." *Being and Time*, 175.
8. One question that arises here is whether a phenomenological description of reality is more useful than its normative description. That is, there is no way to tell that someone is acting authentically or inauthentically. The difference between the two modes exists *only* for the one who is acting. Perhaps the indiscernibility of the two 'on the outside' has a greater philosophical significance than their invisible, private distinction. One should bear in mind, however, that Heidegger is concerned with the most general question of ontology-that of being. An inquiry into the way people appear in the social space would be a specification and therefore a deviation from the original inquiry. The merit of Heidegger's description is that it conceptually captures the sense of being, i.e., the way in which being affects our self-understanding.
9. Although I cannot discuss this in any detail due to the constraints of space and time, it should be emphasized that for Heidegger the distinction between how the world is for us and how it is in itself is not a tenable one. Given his

commitment to the investigation of facticity, givenness, or the ways in which one finds him- or herself in the world, it seems that there is no passageway to any kind of supersensible realm. Otherwise put, any such realm would have to be *given* for Dasein in one way or another in order to fall under the scope of Heidegger's inquiry.

Yet, any givenness *for* human experience would compromise the objective 'purity' of such a realm. What this means is that we can no longer speak of the limitation of our human faculty of understanding, for this would mean that there is a different, experientially inaccessible world that we can only speculate about. Part of Heidegger's innovation here is that he minimized the gap between the concept and life.

10. I would like to point out the essential interrelation of Dasein's understanding of its being in the world and attunement (*Stimmung*). This interrelation tells us that Dasein's understanding is not neutral, unspecific, or colorless. Attunement means being attuned to the world in this or that way, being disposed to one's being in the world one way or another. It is, one could say, an affective coloring that is indissoluble from Dasein's understanding.

11. Although I will not address this question explicitly, I hope we will be able to see that the content of change is essentially about the way in which Dasein takes up its facticity or thrownness. Differently put, as was said before with regard to authenticity, it is about Dasein's self-interpretation.

12. See: Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 264.

13. For the Heidegger of *Contributions to Philosophy*, this will translate into the notion of *Ereignis*, i.e., the event of appropriation or enowning. Dasein becomes a self insofar as the self is given to it historically in the moment of enowning. In enowning, being determines Dasein's historical projection, which is to say, Dasein's self-understanding in terms of its own historical situation. More precisely, enowning indicates belonging-together of Dasein and being. It also brings Dasein "before the passing of the last god." Here we can say that the last god, just like finitude in *Being and Time*, is an indication of the experience that being is given to Dasein. It is the experience that Dasein can never be the master of its own being that, as it were, discloses being itself. See Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 286-7.

13. Heidegger writes that "Dasein can be *authentically itself* only if it makes" its ownmost potentiality for being "possible for itself of its own accord." *Being and Time*, 263.

14. See: Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1*, 264-5.

15. See, for instance, Stiegler's repeated references to Maurice Blanchot who, in his turn, suggests that the absorption into and the experience of language is incompatible with any discourse on subjectivity-which means that in its going out into the world, Dasein does not come up against any individuating phenomenon such as its finitude (252, 262, 264, 266 in *Technics and Time, 1*). Indeed, Blanchot writes of "not proper but featureless death," death that has "no relation to me" and "no power over me" (quoted in endnote six to Part Two, Chapter Three of the Stiegler text).

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# Religious Pluralism

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## **Abstract**

*This paper proposes the hypothesis that distinct religions and practices lead to equally real but substantively different final human conditions. This hypothesis of multiple religious ends arises at the convergence of three different questions:*

*1. What is the religious importance of detailed, empathetic study of different faith traditions?*

*2. In what way is it legitimate for one religion to witness to its uniqueness and superiority in relation to others?*

*3. How can those in one faith tradition recognize distinctive and transforming truth in religions other than their own?*

*The hypothesis has two sides. On the one side, it is philosophical and descriptive. It seeks an interpretation of religious difference that simultaneously credits the widest extent of contrasting, particular religious testimony. On the other side, it can in principle be developed in a particularistic way within any number of specific traditions. For instance, it may take the form of one Christian theology of religions among others. [1] My focus in this paper is primarily on the first side.*

**Keywords:** *religious pluralism, religious diversity, religious telology, ends, philosophy of religion.*

Discussion of religious pluralism is dominated by a question. Can religions recognize other ways to religious fulfillment than their own? The common typology of views-exclusivist, inclusivist, pluralist-presumes there is and could be only one religious fulfillment or 'salvation'. [2] The typology then divides people according to their convictions about the *means* that are effective to attain this single end. Exclusivists contend that their tradition alone provides those means; inclusivists argue that other faiths than their own may prove functionally effective as implicit channels for the truth and reality most adequately manifest in the inclusivist's tradition; pluralists maintain that each religious tradition provides its own separate and independent means to attain the one religious end.

The presumption of a single religious fulfillment is usually not a tentative claim but an axiom: there *could be* no more than one.

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The axiom challenges religious believers to recognize that those of other faiths actually are (in all truly important respects) seeking, being shaped by and eventually realizing the same religious end. All paths lead to the same goal. There may be variations in form and detail, but in relation to what the paths are for and where they are going, no difference is conceivable.

I suggest instead that there are real, different religious fulfillments. Gandhi wrote 'Religions are different roads converging to the same point,' and asked 'What does it matter if we take different roads so long as we reach the same goal? Wherein is the cause for quarreling?' [3] (Actually, it turns out it is all too easy to quarrel on exactly this assumption, as conflict within a single tradition or denomination frequently demonstrates.) But I ask, 'What if religions are paths to different ends that they each value supremely? Why should we object?' [4] Religious thinkers have long considered whether there are varying ways to salvation. They have spent little time considering whether there are different, real religious ends. Christian theologians, for instance, have seldom entertained the idea that there are actual religious goals that are not Christian 'salvation' at all. Those in religious studies have long emphasized the cultural and historical importance of concrete religious diversity. But when they consider the ultimate fruits of religious practice, most hesitate to suggest that this diversity could have any decisive and dividing effect. On the face of it, this is an odd conviction, since one thing that religious traditions seem to agree about is that the ends they seek are rather closely linked with the distinctive ways of life that they prescribe. This conviction also seems to offer no rationale for a serious study of traditions in their concreteness, since such specific differences do not correspond to any variation in religious outcomes. [5] It is hard to see how we can take the religions seriously and at the same time regard all the distinctive qualities that are precious to each one as essentially irrelevant in terms of religious fulfillment.

Those who affirm the validity of one religion and the utter emptiness of all others are ready to deny other traditions any but the most limited, 'natural' truths that might be discovered by human reason. Those who affirm the validity of many religions insist that important truth contained in any one religion should be of the general and abstract sort that they can then argue is

equivalently available in the others as well. In contrast with both of these approaches, the hypothesis of multiple religious ends allows us to affirm, as religiously significant, a much larger proportion of the *distinctive* testimony of the various faith traditions. We can specify conditions under which various believers' accounts of their faith might be extensively and simultaneously valid, affirming the various religious traditions as truthful in a much more concrete sense than either the most liberal or most conservative options in the current discussion allow.

If different religious practices and beliefs in fact aim at and constitute distinct conditions of human fulfillment, then a very high proportion of what each tradition affirms may be true and valid, in very much the terms that the tradition claims. This is so even if deep conflict remains between the religions regarding priorities, background beliefs and ultimate metaphysical reality. Two religious ends may represent two human states that it is utterly impossible for one person to inhabit at the same time. But there is no contradiction in two different persons each simultaneously attaining one of the two ends. Adherents of different religious traditions may be able to recognize the reality of both ends, though they are not able to agree on the explanation of how and why the two ends exist or on the priority they should be given. On these terms, salvation (the Christian end) may not only differ from conditions humans generally regard as evil or destructive but from those that specific religious traditions regard as most desirable and ultimate.

## 1

Academic study of religions seeks an understanding of particular religious traditions, not merely in terms of vague descriptive generalization, but through a thick appreciation of texture and detail. It attempts to approximate an insider's perspective and to give full weight to the distinctive features that make a tradition unique. Scholars widely share and commend this ideal of what it means to do such study well, even if it is very hard to fulfill. It is less often explained why this should be the goal of religious studies. Of course many benefits can be proposed for such study. We cannot understand entire cultures and civilizations, wide swaths of human history, great works of human literature or

perhaps the nature of human psychology without appreciating the differing religious forces that have shaped them. These are compelling reasons to study religion-as an adjunct to history or sociology or literature or psychology. But is there any *religious* reason for such study?

When someone has done all the arduous work to grasp the unique texture of an unfamiliar religion, do they know anything that is religiously important? To be sure, there are a number of possible answers. Such study of a religious tradition may help us relativize and contextualize our own religion. It may show us that some of the same moral standards, philosophical questions and transformational methods are present in more than one tradition. It may foster an admiration for the intellectual and community accomplishments of another faith. These are important effects and they include dimensions of humility and respect for our neighbors that may have a genuinely religious character. Note, however, that such learning abstracts completely from the specific character of the religion that was studied. These insights have everything to do with another religion as an example, little to do with the religion itself. So the question still stands: is there anything religiously important about what is special in a tradition?

In an interesting way, this question converges with the self-understanding of religious traditions. Each holds itself out to adherents and inquirers as the fullest ultimate account of the nature of things and as an unrivalled path to human fulfillment. That is, each regards itself as a 'one and only,' and its distinctive features as crucially important to true understanding and human realization. It is typical for those within a faith to tell those who wish to understand its fundamental character that the best and only adequate way to do this is to proceed on the path of belief and/or practice that the faith lays out. Religions may commend behavior that is 'generic' or common to more than one tradition, but all encourage distinctive practices and beliefs.

Attention to the distinctive features of religions inevitably raises the question of disagreement. If two traditions conflict, then at most one can be correct. Exclusivists in any faith deal with such conflict by affirming the error of the differing tradition. If your religion differs from mine, you must be wrong. The key principle is

‘What is contrary cannot be true.’ Those who do not wish to attribute error to one religion in comparison with another recognize difference but sever it from religious validity. They are convinced that where religions differ, the differences are only apparent (because of the metaphorical and symbolic character of religious language) or are real but irrelevant for attaining religious fulfillment. If you think your religion is a decisive alternative to mine, you must be wrong. The principle here is ‘What is different cannot be important.’

‘What is contrary cannot be true.’ This principle is certainly correct when applied to two logically opposed propositions, or to two mutually exclusive states of affairs in the world. And yet we must be careful to see its limits. One set of paths may be valid for a given goal, and thus final for that end, while different ways are valid for other ends. ‘The ascetic life leads to peace’ and ‘The sensual life leads to joy’ might both be true confessions. There are personal states that cannot both hold at the same time for the same person. Yet there is nothing contradictory in affirming that they are realized by different people at the same time, or even by the same person at different times.

If the statements above were rephrased to read ‘The ascetic life is the only path to salvation’ and ‘The sensual life is the only path to salvation,’ we would have two conflicting claims. So at least one of them would have to go. Yet this absolute exclusion might be an illusion, fostered by the ambiguity around the word ‘salvation.’ If the word has the same concrete meaning in each of those sentences, then there is a conflict. But if in fact it stands for a different concrete end in each case, then the conflict is not real. To say the two paths both lead to ‘salvation’ then is only to say they lead to *some* type of desired end, not necessarily the identical one. [6]

The question is not ‘Which single religious tradition alone delivers what it promises?’ Several traditions may be valid in that sense. If that is so, the truly crucial questions become ‘Which religious end constitutes the fullest human destiny?’ and ‘What end shall I seek to realize, and why?’ Both questions have a clear objective dimension. I cannot effectively seek an end that is not actually achievable. Real human fulfillment has to be rooted in the way the world actually is. And it may objectively be the case

that some ends encompass more possibilities than others. Both questions also include an irreducible evaluative dimension: what is to *count* as human realization? This approach challenges the second principle we noted above, the one that asserted what is different cannot be important. Different religious aims are profoundly important, if we once suppose that they relate to distinctively different religious ends. The 'one and only' testimony of the religions is truthful and trustworthy in presenting us with true alternatives.

Christians believe God is the creator and fulfiller of the universe. They believe this is truly the way the world is. Buddhists likewise believe there is a way the world is (even if they maintain that the particular way it is makes metaphysical terms themselves problematic) and it is undeniably different from the Christian conviction in crucial respects. There is a foundational level at which it is correct that what is contrary cannot be true. If there are such things as distinct Buddhist and Christian religious fulfillments, then one of three situations must follow. Ultimately, such Buddhist and Christian religious fulfillments as exist are embedded in a universe that more nearly accords with Christian convictions than Buddhist ones. Or such Christian and Buddhist religious fulfillments as exist are embedded in a universe that more nearly accords with Buddhist convictions than Christian ones. Or both are embedded within a universe which best corresponds to some other account.

But there is another sense in which what is contrary can also be true. Based on their views of the way the world is, Buddhism and Christianity each seek particular religious ends. The contrast in these ends may not be only apparent but quite real. And each end may be attainable. Whichever of the three scenarios above holds true, the religious ends themselves may still be real alternatives. In that case, adherents of religions with contrasting religious ends are quite right to see them as important alternatives, and to commend their own faith as the unique path to a distinctive religious fulfillment.

In recognizing that what is 'contrary' in two religious traditions may in fact represent a forced choice between two real alternatives (and not the logical contradiction of two states, one actual and one impossible), we do not eliminate the 'one and only' dimension of

religion. We transpose it to different key, one that contrasts, say, the specific Christian hope of salvation with other distinctive religious ends. In recognizing that what is different is often decisively important, we do not diminish the significance of other religious traditions. We actually enhance the imperative to learn about them in their unique specificity, to credit the 'one and only' dimension they claim for themselves. [7]

There is no 'meta-theory,' no neutral place which allows us to judge from above the religions rather than among them. I believe that it is inevitable and appropriate that religions interpret each other and the world within the categories of their own tradition. My interest is that they include in *what* they interpret the true difference, the true otherness of alternative religious life. The aim of a religious interpretation of religious diversity is to find, however imperfectly, an understanding of the other in its own integrity within the faith that is part of one's own integrity.

Rather than 'one way-all others error and torment' or 'all ways-equivalent religious outcomes,' the grammar of religious diversity is more complicated. Faith traditions inevitably apprehend some specific religious end as the highest and fullest available to humanity. They may well see extraordinary ways to attain this end through religious traditions and practices other than their own. The grammar of religious diversity should also allow for the attainment of religious fulfillments other than the one a given tradition holds to be supreme. And it should allow for the possibility of religious failure, utter lostness. This grammar is neither a two option view (a right way and a mass of indistinguishable wrong ways) nor a no option view (all ways inescapably right, and right about the same thing). Instead it has four options: a specific and ultimate religious fulfillment, an 'inclusivist' way by which others may converge toward that fulfillment (even while initially unaware that they do so), achievement of religious fulfillments that are concretely quite different from that of the 'home' tradition (and which others may regard as superior), and a state without religious fulfillment at all. [8] This four term grammar is an appropriate one for religions to use in their interpretations of each other. I contend that the relations between the religions would be most fruitful and peaceful if each encountered the other with the full range of such a grammar in place. [9] It is the third term in this grammar, an actual variety of

religious fulfillments, that is the most unusual note. It is largely absent in traditional Christian theological reflection on these matters and entirely missing in the (ironically titled) pluralistic thinkers who attack that tradition.

## 2

A religious end or aim is defined by a set of practices, images, stories, and concepts which has three characteristics. First, the set provides material for a thorough pattern of life. The religious end and the path that leads to it do not address only a limited dimension of life or one particular human need among others. They are ultimate in providing a framework that encompasses all the features of life, practical and sublime, current and future. Second, at least some of the elements in the set are understood to be *constitutive* of a final human fulfillment and/or to be the sole means of achieving that fulfillment. For instance, for Christians, there is a texture of such elements making reference to Jesus Christ. Relation with Christ is believed to be integral to the deepest human fulfillment itself. Some Buddhists may maintain that all the teachings and instruments used to follow the dharma way are ultimately dispensable, even the eight-fold path itself. But they can only be discarded *after* use, and nothing else is fit to serve the same purpose: one may pass beyond them but everyone must pass through them.

Third, for any individual or community the religious pattern is in practice exclusive of at least some alternative options. Living in accord with the set of stories and practices necessarily involves choices. 'The ascetic life leads to peace' and 'The sensual life leads to joy' may both be true reports. But we can practice the observance of one more comprehensively only at the expense of the other. For our purposes it makes no difference that there may be a tantric claim that some particular combined practice of asceticism/sensuality will lead to peace *and* joy. This is itself a practice which, if followed, rules out either of the other two paths in their particularity. There is a distinct purity to an exclusive ascetic path or an exclusive sensual path. A path that is some determinate mix of the two excludes either of those other distinctive aims.

The relations among religious ends are, then, as diverse as the ends themselves. Some fulfillments may be similar enough that the paths associated with them reinforce each other to some degree, as typing and piano playing may both train the fingers. Other ends may simply pose no direct obstacle, one to the other, save the intrinsic division of finite time and effort needed to pursue both, like marathon running and single parenthood. Yet other ends are so sharply divergent that a decisive step in the direction of one is a move away from the other: strict non-violence and participation in armed revolution. It is obvious that there may be many goods or secondary goals that overlap on the paths to different religious realizations. Discipline is a quality essential to learning the piano or a new language. It is connected with both these different ends, but it is not identical with either of them. If discipline itself were the primary aim, then music or a language would themselves become instrumental means and not ends at all. What for some is an instrument is for others an end.

There is an interesting dynamic balance in the relation of religious ends. The more similar the aims, the more sharply contention arises over whether one path should supersede another. If the aims are nearly identical, this tendency is very powerful. To take a trivial example, if the end in view is word processing, few would not take sides between computers or typewriters as the more adequate tools. It is also true that in the case of such convergent goals, the common features of the religious aims provide a compensatory shared ground on which to struggle and work toward agreement, a set of shared criteria. On the other hand, the more incommensurable religious ends appear, the less they contend for the same 'space.' Losing weight and learning Spanish are separate aims with their distinct requirements. Though they have less concretely in common, there is a proportionally smaller impetus to substitute one for the other. These dynamics are key elements in understanding religious conflict and the possibilities for mutual understanding.

The religious goal sought by any religious community is integrally related to a comprehensive pattern of life. A particular religious tradition would regard someone as fulfilled or liberated whose life had been most fully shaped by the distinctive pattern it fosters. Religious ends are not extrinsic awards granted for unrelated performances, like trips to Hawaii won in lotteries. To take a



Buddhist example, no one is unhappy in nirvana or arrives at it unready. This is because the state of cessation is an achievement life on the right path makes possible. The end is not 'enjoyed' until a person becomes what the path to the end makes her or him. [10] The way and the end are one. [11]

To frame discussion of religions in terms of 'ends' may appear already slanted toward certain faiths. The implication that religion requires a transformation or journey perhaps fits better with so-called 'historical' traditions than those that might view the religious good as an already existing reality or situation into which insight is needed. But the definition of religious ends we have offered attempts to honor this distinction. More important, to focus on ends is to focus particularly on the perspective of persons living in pluralistic environments. Study of religions may be undertaken for the sake of purely historical or cultural understanding. But surely it exists primarily in the context of the human religious search, and this search is basically oriented to the ultimate conditions people hope to realize as individuals and communities. To consider religions in the framework of ends is, in part, to stress the connection of the study of religion to the concerns of people who are religious.

In its simplest form, the hypothesis of multiple religious ends is not committed to any particular metaphysical view. Obviously, the universe does have some ultimate character or order. One or more of the religions may in fact offer descriptions of that order that are substantially better than others. But the hypothesis requires only that the nature of reality be such as to allow humans to phenomenally realize varied religious ends. There are many different constructions of reality that might allow this, including ones that correspond closely to particular religious visions. [12]

The various religious traditions can agree that their ends are not only a transient phase in a person's earthly life. They have a more permanent or transcendent character. All would seem to agree that though their religious end is not merely such a phase, it can in fact constitute a distinctive form and condition of life for adherents here and now. Our religious choices, practices and formation do determine distinct religious fulfillments in this life and in the next as well.

Recognition of diverse religious ends is the condition for recognition of the decisive significance of our religious choices and development, a significance that the particularistic witness of the individual religions collectively affirms. We can expect a fulfillment in line with the 'one and only' path that leads us to it. We may readily pose this question in terms of post-mortem destinies. But the point holds also if we consider religious diversity entirely in an earthly frame. Indeed, it is a recommendation of this approach that it maintains a consistency in the way religious ends are achieved in the historical realm and in any transhistorical realm. Whether in an eschatological future or here and now, our conditions of religious fulfillment are significantly constituted by the expectations, relations, images and practices that we bring to them. [13]

This is plainly the case with proximate historical forms of religious fulfillment: living a Christian life or following the dharma, for instance. The meaning, overcoming of selfishness, moral discipline and hope which persons experience in such historical religious fulfillment are permeated with the concrete elements of a tradition. The lives that lead to the rewards of a Buddhist monastic, a Muslim imam, a Hindu brahmin priest or a Baptist deacon have unique textures. In one sense this is a truism: we are able to distinguish these lives because they have different sets of practices. There are generic similarities in these cases: textual devotion, communal structures, ritual practices. But for any person who wishes to attain a religious fulfillment, generic elements alone are entirely insufficient. The person will need particular texts, a specific community, discrete rituals. Whether these historically and experientially distinct human possibilities remain different in an eschatological or transcendent framework, or all reduce to only a single positive religious condition (as both religious exclusivists and pluralists maintain) is in principle an empirical question.

Religious ends are not conditions that transcend the known parameters of humanity itself. We cannot posit some event that would be experienced as having the identical content and the identical meaning by persons who come to it with entirely different expectations, formation and categories. It is interesting that this kind of 'blinding revelation,' wiping out all the mediating structures that have been built up in a person's distinct culture,

tradition and personality, is often an axiomatic end point in both very conservative and very liberal theologies of religion. But any revelation consistent with humanity as we know it will condescend to the conditions of our knowing (even if stretching those conditions), not violate them. And any religious fulfillment will likewise be shaped by the categories of our experience. Religious ends may be transcendent, i.e. their existence is not causally dependent on the means humans use to approach them and they may endure after all earthly existence has passed away. But the nature of these ends as experienced by human subjects always reflects in part the paths that led to them.

We become different persons through our concrete choices and religious practices. Through these means we may increasingly realize a distinctive aim. In the characteristic religious dialectic, as we progress toward the realization of the aim, we at the same time develop an ever deeper and clearer desire for that end itself above all others. Finally, religious consummation is the entrance into a state of fulfillment by one whose aspiration has been so tuned and shaped by particular anticipations of that state, and by anticipatory participation in aspects of that state, that this end represents the perfect marriage of desire and actuality. It is a dream come true for one who has adopted that dream among all others.

We can certainly point to great figures in varied religious traditions who exhibit some common moral and spiritual qualities. But we can hardly deny the different textures of these achievements. The examples are clearly not identical, however similar selected items may be. If there is some sense in which our selected devotees all strike us as having a claim to be good people, it still appears that one would have to choose between one way of being good and another. It is also clear that people in various traditions pursue and claim to participate in religious attainments other than or in addition to moral transformation. The thesis of an identical religious end for all can be proposed with rather more impunity for the world to come than the current one, but in neither case is it persuasive if we are serious about the cultural-linguistic component of all experience.

If we take religions in their thickest historical, empirical description, then 'one and only' judgements appear inevitable,

almost tautological. In this life, there is no way to participate in the distinctive dimensions of Buddhist religious fulfillment but the Buddhist path. The only way to Jewish fulfillment is the Jewish way. The same is true of each tradition. Here again, the hypothesis of multiple religious ends coheres with the data we have before us, with the importance of a religion's concrete texture. The impetus for study of religious diversity is the realization that we cannot assume we already know what it is like to be a Sikh or a Sufi. The only way to find out is to approach that tradition and its adherents directly. If we do so, we discover a unique complex of elements, interlocking patterns of life, which cannot be descriptively equated to anything else. To know one is not to know the others. Each is a 'one and only,' and their religious ends are many.

The difficulty of our human condition comes from a mixture of suffering, evil and ignorance. The religions diagnose these in different patterns and address them in diverse ways. There is no need to deny validity to any pattern save that of our own tradition. But there is every reason to expect that the specific nature of our destiny hangs upon adherence to one rather than others. Living in accordance with religious commitments, our life is formed by them. They make us who we are. We can judge how well we have abided by our commitments, but we cannot judge with certainty the grounds for the commitments themselves. We could no more judge what our life might have been like as a Methodist instead of a Sikh than we can compare the children we might have had with those we did. [14]

There are of course interesting cases of the combination of religious traditions: cases where people may follow both Buddhist and Confucian paths, for instance. This only reinforces the point we have been making. Were they not exclusive paths to unique ends, there would be no need to follow two ways, since the same range of ends could be achieved in either one alone. Both are practiced because each constitutes a unique pattern, yielding distinct benefits, benefits in this case regarded as compatible and complementary.

Religious ends are constituted by a unity of various discrete elements. In this sense, there is inevitable and extensive overlap among religious aims. As an aggregated sum of practices, doctrines and injunctions, no faith is without duplication elsewhere. If it is a

Christian virtue to honor one's parents or to keep a sabbath, then these virtues are realized in and through other religions as well. Truth or benefits that attach discretely to these elements in one faith must also attach to them in another. These truths are available in more than one tradition. However, both the mix of elements and the integrative principles that unify them vary significantly among the religions.

If we abstract from the specific aims of actual religious traditions, we can formulate other, more general functional ends that religions serve. They may organize and sustain major civilizations, as the world religions all have. They may foster certain generic moral attitudes. They may structure human institutions like the family. By substituting aims like these in place of the primary, explicit, and final aims of the religions themselves, one can judge the religions, correctly, as roughly parallel means of fulfilling these social functions.

These last two dimensions we have discussed-the similarity of specific items across traditions and the generic associated functions that religions may serve-coexist in every religious tradition with the unique particularities and the integrating ultimate vision that constitute the whole. The religious end of a particular faith is a compound of these three dimensions. If we give 'religious end' an abstract meaning-the achievement of *some* religious fulfillment among several possible alternatives and/or the successful function of religion to serve some generic social role-then we can say that many if not all paths truly achieve religious ends. There is an 'any way' sign at most forks on the religious journey. A number of turns will get you to a real destination, but not the same destination. If on the other hand 'religious end' is a concrete religious fulfillment of some determinate nature, as described by one of the traditions, then it is clear that it is constituted by certain features to the exclusion of others. There is an 'only way' sign at many turnings on the religious journey. In either case we must acknowledge that all these paths link with each other, that cross-over travel is a real possibility. At most points a 'two way traffic' sign is appropriate. Roads can bear travelers over the same ground toward different destinations, whether those travelers pass in opposite directions or go side by side for this overlapping leg of their trip.

The hypothesis of multiple religious ends offers the best account of this geography. It provides the only coherent foundation that can uphold each of three elements that I believe are essential for an effective and responsible understanding of religious pluralism. These three are ordinarily not thought compatible with each other, and many would not desire to see them as compatible. The first of these is the religious significance of careful study of faith traditions in their particularity. The second is the recognition of distinctive and effective religious truth in other religions, truth that contrasts with that of my own faith. The third is the validity of witness on the part of any one faith tradition to its 'one and only' quality, indeed to its superiority in relation to others. Where witness can have no meaning, it is dubious if dialogue may either. This hypothesis presumes an open set of varied religious ends available for realization both within the historical horizon of human life and beyond it. The historical and eschatological sets may differ. For instance, some religious fulfillments that appear irreducibly distinct within the historical frame may ultimately collapse together in some future state. But this hypothesis does not presume that all faith-fulfillments do in fact reduce to one, either in the historical frame or eschatologically. Individuals and communities live their way through a cloud of live, alternative possibilities. In their passing, they make some of these possibilities rather than others concrete, as the act of detecting an electron 'collapses' a quantum probability distribution into an actual location or velocity.

### 3

The perspective I have outlined suggests that the capacity to recognize and accept the distinctive elements of another religious tradition can become a positive standard for the truth and adequacy of one's own. In this closing section I will look briefly at a case in point. It has to do with the question of how the evidence of religious experience is to be weighed. Religious experiences vary and may even conflict at many points, seeming to cancel each other out. They do not uniformly testify to a single, detailed description of the religious ultimate. If religious experience is supposed to be evidence for some particular, confessional religious reality-for a specific kind of religious ultimate or a concrete religious end

among others-then only some of it counts for that thesis and much of it goes in another direction. This could be taken as providing good reason not to believe in any religious claims at all. Some philosophers of religion suggest that if we were to take the traditions' specific claims seriously in any concrete sense we would undercut the positive value of *all* religious experience as evidence, since it would then support a mass of conflicting propositions. On the other hand, if religious experience is weighed as evidence for *some* kind of religious ultimate, a mystery unknown in itself, then it might all be taken to point in the same direction. If religious experience is to count cumulatively as evidence for the same proposition, that proposition will have to be one of extraordinary generality. [15] If we are looking only for evidence that humans are in contact with 'something more,' with an 'x,' then we can count all religious experience as evidence in favor of our thesis. The testimony no longer conflicts. It all agrees: there is something out there, even if all we can say about it is that humans adopt this series of dispositions toward it. Religious experience will rule against each religion taken one at a time, but it will support religion collectively, all at once. This argument is made by those like John Hick, who are genuinely committed to defend a religious interpretation of reality as reasonable, in the face of rational critiques of all religion as illusion.

And yet there seems to be some sleight of hand in co-opting the specific accounts of varied religious ends as evidence for belief in one mysterious and virtually unspecified goal as the reality referred to in each case. The argument in defense of that move goes as follows. Since religious experiences are varied and even conflicting, there are only three options: to reject them all as illusory, to take a few as reliable and reject all others as false, or to take them all as symbolic or mythical representations of a real but mysterious reality. If one is committed to a religious outlook, the first option is ruled out. If one adopts the second option, then you have to explain away the religious experiences that do not have the 'right' confessional features without undercutting the validity of the experiences that do-a difficult task. Some version of the third option then must be defended as the best way to validate religion, because one can argue that all the evidence supports the religious hypothesis (though admittedly in a very loose sense).

This analysis of religious experience is flawed. In any other area when we are faced with diverse perceptions (including conflicting ones), it is extraordinarily unusual to conclude that none of these perceptions are in touch with the world itself but all are responses to an 'unexperienced noumenon.' [16] The more common strategy is to seek some reconciliation of the inconsistencies. If this can be done by 'saving' the validity of the perceptions themselves, this is rationally preferable to advancing a theory which drastically undercuts confidence in any connection between the perceptions and reality.

In other words, when confronted with quite diverse experiential accounts of an object or a person or an event, we do not usually limit our alternatives to the three given above. Those three options would be to take all the accounts as illusory, to hold that the different accounts cancel each other out and therefore make any particular description of the object improbable, or to conclude that all the experiences do reflect encounter with a single reality, but don't tell us anything about that reality in itself, only about the kind of dispositions people develop after meeting it. This last approach especially seems very strained. When applied to the evidence of religious experience, it imposes a high level of consistency, even uniformity, on that experience, but at the cost of reducing its referential value to near zero.

In a recent book, Jerome Gellman has made a careful and convincing case for a quite different approach to religious experience and religious pluralism. [17] Gellman's larger argument is that philosophical consideration of religious experience provides strong rational support for the existence of God. He considers the diversity of religious experience as a possible challenge to this argument. He notes that most of what is regarded as incompatibility in religious experiences can be dealt with in the same way that we deal with discrepancies in other varied experiences of the same reality. Different aspects of one reality may come uppermost in experience at different times and for different people. Here the cultural conditioning and personal idiosyncrasies which Hick wishes to make the sources of the entire content of religious experience (with a bare stimulus alone coming from the religious ultimate itself) are given full scope as significant factors.



Gellman's thesis stresses that it is fully possible to have a determinate view of the religious ultimate and still to retain the evidentiary value of religious experience. In order to conclude that two experiences of God are incompatible,

what we need is at least some alleged experiences showing that God's character is *exclusively* of one sort, with other alleged experiences showing that God's character is exclusively of another, *logically incompatible* sort. Or we need alleged experiences showing that God's character is exclusively of one sort, and that God never can seem to act out of character, with alleged experiences showing God acting out of *that* character. [18]

Though such pairs of experiences exist, Gellman maintains they are fewer than often supposed. Major religious traditions have developed ways of harmonizing the dissonant experiences. Gellman says 'The attempt at harmonization should be guided by the desire to accommodate as much of the appearances as is possible as indicative of reality. Any adjudication which in this regard saves more phenomenal content than another is to be preferred, everything else being equal.' [19] Though conflicting religious explanations for the data of religious experience cannot all be correct, this does not remove the presumptive value of the data.

This is particularly so if the divine object is understood to have a complex nature. Gellman says that if some people experience God as loving and others experience God as just, 'they may both be experiencing the true nature of God, a nature both loving and just.' [20] Within most religious traditions, a certain spectrum of varying religious experiences is presumed. And within most religious traditions the religious ultimate is characterized in some way by having multiple attributes, even 'polar attributes.' [21]

More to the point, Gellman notes that alleged experiences of God 'often include the perception of God's inexhaustible fullness.' [22] He suggests that in religious experience something about God is openly revealed or directly encountered, but that typically the same experience also includes a perception of God's 'inexhaustible plenitude, a plenitude only intimated but not open to view.' [23] Gellman believes this is what religious people often mean in referring to their experiences as 'ineffable.' In a simple analogy, we might compare this to our experience of a person we

know in a certain context as a neighbor or a co-worker. At some time we might hear from others who claim to know a quite different dimension of this person: perhaps they served with him in a war or know him as an outstanding musician or as a former professional athlete. We would respond one way to these alleged experiences if we felt confident we had a near-exhaustive familiarity with the person. We would respond quite differently if our own experience already included intimations of unknown spaces, years unaccounted for, signs of a prior life, even an indefinable sense of depth in the person. Strictly speaking, we had no experience of these other facets. But we might receive these new 'contradictory' accounts as reasonable *confirmation* of our prior intimation of something undisclosed. 'I might have known that something like this was the case.'

Gellman, who holds God to be a personal being, says God is not *only* a personal being. God is 'an inexhaustible being, possessed of an inexhaustible, hidden plenitude,' save for that part of the plenitude with whose open, revealed presence the subject is graced. Given all of this, *judging from what is revealed of God in experience*, we can readily see how it could be possible for God to be experienced in ways other than and contradictory to His being a personal being. For instead, other features of God could emerge into the open out of the plenitude, just as God's personhood does. God could be experienced wholly as an impersonal being. And we can readily understand how it could be possible that the experience of God as a wholly impersonal being would be pure 'bliss and joy,' as are experiences of impersonal Brahman. [24]

Experiences of God as personal and experiences of the divine as impersonal are thus reconciled, with each retaining cognitive validity. It would not be possible to effect this reconciliation if the experiences in question were of the divine as nothing but personal and experiences of the divine as nothing but impersonal. It is the dimension of plenitude in the experiences that makes this possible. Gellman's concern is to rescue the maximum volume of religious experience as rational warrant for the existence of God. He offers this harmonization of diverse experiences simply as an example, showing that it is possible and therefore that diversity of religious experience cannot be used to rule out its validity as evidence for the existence of God. He also shows that to achieve this end it is not

necessary to go to the extreme of denying that God is experienced as God actually is in *any* of these experiences. Instead, Gellman's example shows that one can rationally maintain that in both experiences there is encounter with real aspects of one God. [25]

This also indicates that not all proposed reconciliations of this diverse data are equal. Gellman's reconciliation of the data in terms of a personal God makes a striking comparison with another version offered by the venerable tradition of Advaita Vedanta. From this perspective, experience of a divinity with personal characteristics is experience of *saguna Brahman* (the ultimate with attributed qualities) as opposed to *nirguna Brahman* (the ultimate without such qualities). There is a clear hierarchy between these two. *Saguna Brahman* is a lower level of truth, suitable for people at an earlier level of spiritual development. [26] *Nirguna Brahman* is the true religious ultimate, and personalistic representations of it must eventually give way, dispelled as instrumental illusion. The two categories of religious experience are reconciled, but by making one an imperfect form of the other, an imperfect form which can be eliminated completely with no religious loss. A classic parable likens enlightenment to a person who believes they see a snake in the path and then realizes it is a piece of rope. In this realization the illusion of an animate agent evaporates, to leave only a true insight into impersonal reality in its place.

Personalistic theism, Gellman's example, provides a reconciliation of a different sort. Here experience of God as impersonal and experience of God as personal are combined, with neither being reducible to the other, any more than we can say of a human that they are a person but not a body. If the object on the path actually *is* a snake, it does not lose the substantive inanimate properties one presumed it to have in mistaking it for a rope. It still takes up space, has length and width, weight, and so on. Those perceptions remain valid perceptions. Similarly, a human person has impersonal dimensions (physiological and physical properties) and personal ones. We may experience one to the near exclusion of the other, but neither is simply an imperfect form of the other. We could say that the *saguna/nirguna* distinction puts a stronger emphasis on 'one true perception' of the ultimate and narrows the complexity of the actual features of the divine ultimate. Personalistic theism affirms more thorough validity for both types of religious

experience. If we accept Gellman's criterion that we should prefer an account which rationally 'saves' the greatest referential value for the largest number of religious experiences, this is clearly a strong recommendation for such theism.

Gellman's discussion of religious experience is very suggestive in a further respect. In discussions of religious pluralism, religious ends are often treated in a manner analogous to the treatment of religious experience. Ostensible diversity among religious fulfillments is viewed as a possible challenge to the reality of any religious fulfillment, just as differences among religious experiences might be thought to undercut the validity we can attribute to any religious experience. If people disagree about the religious ultimate they seek or experience, perhaps the notion of a religious ultimate is itself confused and none actually exists. If people disagree about religious ends, they cast doubt on the reality of any religious end. The problems are similar, and so are the responses.

For instance, Hick will say that nirvana and communion with God upon death are contradictory beliefs. If we grant that they are seriously proposed as alternatives, he contends we have only three options. All such faith in religious ends is nonsense; one end is real and all others illusory or unattainable; or the true content of religion, the true end, is some unknown positive condition on a plane far above such contradictions. Since in their view, recourse to either of the first two options would render any idea of religious fulfillment implausible, pluralists like Hick opt for the third. They maintain that the varied accounts of religious ends are all conditioned and incoherent anticipations of a final human condition that is beyond description by any such account.

I believe that Gellman's basic principles for religious experience hold here as well: the best accounts of the varied reports of religious ends will be those that preserve the highest degree of concrete validity in the largest number of them. Religious fulfillments as human states can be viewed under the broad heading of religious experience, after all. It is precipitous to conclude that because religious experiences are diverse, the only way to salvage their validity is to deny that *any* of their particulars are true and instead insist that they be packaged as unanimous evidence for a foggy ultimate beyond description. Likewise it is

precipitous to conclude that because religious aims plainly differ, the only way to salvage plausibility for the attainment of any religious end at all is to imagine an end indeterminate enough to be the symbolic object of all these aims.

If we grant the reality of diverse religious ends, 'conflicting' religious testimony need not be discounted. Instead, the testimony may be essentially valid in both cases, about different conditions of religious fulfillment. The supposed incompatibility of religious experiences provides no cogent objection to the existence of one religious ultimate, but illustrates a practical incompatibility, the impossibility for any one person or community to realize contrasting priorities in religious experience at the same time. Nirvana and communion with God are contradictory only if we assume that one or the other must be the sole fate for all human beings. They cannot both be the case at the same time for the same person. But for different people, or the same person at different times, they could both be true. The fact that believers report accurately about varied religious ends does not undercut the trustworthiness of religious experience as evidence. Nor does it require that the varying religious traditions reject each other's accounts as false and baseless. Each tradition may have its own inclusivist means to assimilate and affirm the validity of most of the other's testimony.

To use an analogy, two contending scientific theories or schools of thought may be in agreement about nearly all of the relevant experimental data, and yet at odds about the nature of the reality it reflects. This difference in accounts does not invalidate all the data. The vast majority of the evidence may be rightly weighed as counting for both sides. It provides weighty reason to suppose that the right answer is to be found in one of the contending accounts and that where there is empirical agreement between the interpretations we have points of special interest. In such cases, one cannot contend that the alternative view has no predictive power or empirical basis. The argument turns on two issues. First, which paradigm is best able to encompass the truth in the alternative view while offering some additional value or knowledge as well. Second, what kind of problems and questions are considered to be the ones most in need of answers. A similar situation exists among the religions. One of the more hopeful implications of this fact is that in apologetic terms the religions need to compete to

demonstrate their capacities to recognize the concrete truth in other traditions. Any faith tradition that proves unable to affirm and explain the distinctive value of others, in its own terms, will seriously compromise its universal claims.

**4**

In conclusion, let me highlight several features of this hypothesis of multiple religious ends. First, this hypothesis focuses on the religious traditions themselves and their accounts of their own religious aims. It is the religions as they actually exist-as patterns and complexes of life directed toward particular textures of human fulfillment-that are addressed, not a generic construct imposed on them. In my view it is a virtue to find religious significance and validity in the particularistic features a religious tradition itself values. This focus is consistent with the claimed intrinsic value of academic study and interfaith dialogue that deal with the 'thick,' distinctive texture of faiths. The hypothesis of multiple religious ends clearly provides a basis for such study and impels us to take the testimony of the traditions and their believers with great seriousness.

Though this approach affirms the value of confessional witness, it also relativizes any one tradition's claim to have an absolute monopoly on truth. It indicates that more than one faith tradition may be correct in claiming to offer a distinctive human religious fulfillment. That is, it relativizes any single tradition not by the dubious claim to have a superior philosophical interpretation from an absolute vantage point above that possible for any actual religion, but precisely by the actual validity of other religious traditions themselves. It is not one imperialistic and absolute theory about religions that finally can or should curb any tradition's grandiose claims, but direct encounter with the concrete living reality and truth of other religious paths.

The second notable feature of this hypothesis is the manner in which it deals directly with the cultural and historical conditioning of all religious life. Some interpreters put extreme stress on this conditioning, to disparage the capacity of any religious tradition to offer a distinctive, universal truth for all people. If we are to maintain any consistency in the way we treat religious subjects and the way we deal with other realities, it seems we ought to

recognize that human knowledge and experience are partially constituted by the contexts and categories we bring to them. This includes the experience of religious fulfillment, both now and in the ultimate future.

The third feature I would note is that with the hypothesis of multiple religious ends our perspective on religious differences shifts somewhat in emphasis. Contrasts in ultimate metaphysical visions remain. Each religious tradition legitimately continues to make a claim to truth in this largest sense. And yet each one also is challenged to recognize a profound level of truth in other traditions: the reality of other options. If the ends advertised by the traditions are real, the differences between religions encompass not only the objective metaphysical facts, but evaluative commitments. We shift from dealing solely with flat issues of truth and falsehood to facing alternatives. We ask not ‘Which religion alone is true?’ but ‘What end is most ultimate, even if many are real?’ and ‘Which life will I hope to realize?’ Religious ends are not identical, and in reaching one we will not automatically attain others. That is, in approaching religious differences emphasis falls on the contrast of *positive* ends. In such a perspective, there are many true religions, and each one is an only way to its end.

**Endnotes:**

[1] The first side is dealt with in my book *Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion* (Heim, 1995 ) and the second in my book *The Depth of the Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends* (Heim, 2001).

[2] The typology has been developed within Christian theology, but applied analogously to other faiths. Christian exclusivists believe the Christian tradition is in sole possession of effective religious truth and offers the only path to salvation. Christian inclusivists affirm that salvation is available through other traditions because the God most decisively acting and most fully revealed in Christ is also redemptively available within or through those traditions. Christian pluralists maintain that various religious traditions are independently valid paths to salvation and Christ is irrelevant to those in other traditions. For a recent review of this typology and the addition of a fourth category, see Paul Knitter *Introducing Theologies of Religion* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2002).

[3] see: Gandhi 1939 p. 36) Quoted in (Burch 1972 p. 111)

[4] see: Burch 1972 p. 111.

[5] There may be good reasons to study religious differences in regard to cultural or social or historical issues: I mean that the views I have just outlined provide no rationale for being *religiously* interested in the specific character of religious diversity.

[6] J.A. DiNoia has made this point tellingly (DiNoia 1989; DiNoia 1992). His argument has been summarized this way: ‘...a Christian need not feel anxious if informed by his Buddhist friend that he cannot attain Nirvana except by following the Excellent Eightfold Path. If this is true, and if he does not pursue the Path, it follows he may never reach Nirvana. But, DiNoia continues, “since I have as yet no desire to attain and enjoy Nirvana, I am not offended by this reasoning. I have not been persuaded that Nirvana is what I should be seeking.” In the same vein, DiNoia quotes the revealing remark a rabbi once made to him: “Jesus Christ is the answer to a question I have never asked.”’ (Walls 1998 p. 34)

[7] As a Christian, it appears to me to make perfectly good sense to say two kinds of things. First, we may say that another religion is a true and valid path to the religious fulfillment it seeks. We may agree with the Dalai Lama for instance, when he says ‘Liberation in which “a mind that understands the sphere of reality annihilates all defilements in the sphere of reality” is a state that only Buddhists can accomplish. This kind of *moksha* or *nirvana* is only explained in the Buddhist scriptures, and is achieved only through Buddhist practice.’ (Gyatso, 1990 p. 169) There is no way to the Buddhist end but the Buddhist way. Second, we may say what the book of Acts says of Jesus Christ, that ‘there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among mortals by which we must be saved.’ (Acts 4:12) There is a relation with God and other creatures made possible in Christ that can only be realized in communion with Christ. On these terms, each tradition can acknowledge the *reality* of the religious end sought by the other, in terms



largely consistent with those used by that tradition itself. After describing the Buddhist end, the Dalai Lama says 'According to certain religions, however, salvation is a place, a beautiful paradise, like a peaceful valley. To attain such a state as this, to achieve such a state of *moksha*, does not require the practice of emptiness, the understanding of reality. In Buddhism itself, we believe that through the accumulation of merit one can obtain rebirth in heavenly paradises like the Tushita.' (Gyatso, 1990 p. 169) The Christian end, then, is something like one of the pleasant interludes that Buddhists may enjoy between births as a reward for merit on their path toward true release. As a kind of mirror image, consider the statement of a Christian theologian: 'Buddhists do not attain Christian salvation, since their Way does not lead to that personal relationship with God which is salvation. They attain a high degree of compassion and inner peace; and their unselfish devotion to the truth as they see it will surely fit them to receive salvation from a personal God when his saving activity becomes clear to them.' (Ward 1990 p. 16) The Buddhist end is a kind of compassionate selflessness that would be an appropriate preparation for relation with God. These are classically inclusivist views, which interpret other faiths ultimately in the categories of the home religion. But each recognizes the distinctive reality of the other's religious end, and so recognizes a diversity of religious ends. Each regards the other's ultimate as penultimate, leaving open the further possibility of transformation. There is no necessary contradiction in these two accounts of possible human ends, though there is a decisive divergence in their evaluative frameworks for these ends and there are contradictions in the assumptions associated with each framework. Both accounts could be flatly wrong. But there is no logical reason that both cannot be descriptively correct. In fact, if one of the writer's characterizations is correct, it implies a very substantial measure of truth in the other. Both writers might agree in broad terms to the existence of one 'salvific process.' But they would mean by this that a person can move in succession from the pursuit of the aim of one tradition toward that of another. This is emphatically not the same thing as insisting there is one and only one religious fulfillment. Accepting different religious ends allows for mutual recognition of extensive concrete substantive truth in another tradition. Ironically, this degree of mutual agreement is ruled out by those who insist on one truth in all religions and so insist the Buddhist end and the Christian one must be the same.

[8] We should pause to note that it is certainly possible to fail to actualize any religious end. Instead of achieving one among alternative fulfillments, a person may attain none at all. There are human conditions, whether contemporary or eschatological or both, that no religious view seeks as its final end or regards as consistent with its end. Such would be states of perennial suffering, of thorough ignorance, of malicious destructiveness towards self or others. On this point there is ample room for common cause among the faiths, for spiritual and practical cooperation to overcome these conditions, even from differing perspectives. There is an enormous difference between a lack of religious fulfillment of any description and the achievement of *some* religious fulfillment.

[9] It is particularly appropriate for Christians to use this grammar in facing the complex world of religious diversity, as it can be grounded in a trinitarian understanding of God (see Heim, 2001)

[10] This paragraph paraphrases several points made by DiNoia in a very helpful discussion of religious aims (DiNoia 1992 pp. 6–7, 56–58).

[11] Most religious traditions offer strong caution about descriptions of their ends, even descriptions provided by the tradition itself. The caution is that these can only be provisional accounts: true understanding of the end can come only from direct participation in its actual realization. Such realization lies at the far end of a long process of transformation and/or heightened insight. It is our own lives, our capacities of discernment, our understanding, our emotions, even perhaps the constitution of our nature, that will be different in this new condition. Not only will our circumstances be different, but the means by which we apprehend them will be different. Any presumption that we can describe or grasp such a condition within the terms of our current life is problematic. Devotees of a religious tradition will often readily acknowledge that they are unclear about the full dimensions of the goal they seek. There is mystery that only 'being there' can dispel. Some mystery may be part of the arrival itself. In a religiously plural situation, this presents an obvious problem. If traditions maintain that the only way to know the end they offer is to spend your lifetime actually attaining it, how might one decide which end to pursue? Despite the reservations just noted, religions have to invest real value in descriptions of their aims. These descriptions claim to provide outsiders and initiates with a true witness about the path and the goal before them. This may not be an exhaustive account, but it is adequate to begin the journey and to differentiate the end in view from others. Apart from explicit descriptions of religious fulfillment, special weight falls on the close association religious traditions make between their end and the path that leads to it. While the goal itself may not be fully understood, we can understand that it stands as the culmination of this distinct set of practices, beliefs and relations. People may reasonably decide that they will seek an admittedly mysterious end because of the nature of the way that leads to it: an end that is the culmination of *that* practice is given highest value, even if it cannot be fully described. Likewise, people may reasonably decide to follow a particular way (while knowing little or nothing about the specific practices it requires) by reference to the embodiment of its end they have observed in someone else's life.

[12] Coordinate with accounts of their religious ends, faith traditions make at least implicit philosophical and empirical claims. Investigation and argument about these is possible, and sometimes necessary. Religious apologetics remain a viable and honorable discipline, in which faiths defend and advocate both the world view within which their religious end is situated and the evaluative ultimacy of that end. (By 'apologetics' I mean both 'negative' arguments that there is no internal incompatibility in the primary convictions of a religious tradition and 'positive' cumulative arguments that one religious tradition's conceptual scheme is superior to another. This formulation is borrowed from Griffiths, 1991.) Though we recognize there are other religious perspectives from which varying conclusions can be reached, it is appropriate for each to

make the case for the universal validity of its perspective. It is this impetus toward the universal that forces us to take the reality and the truths of varying traditions seriously. Though we cannot now resolve the differences among religions at this level, these are matters of supreme importance for the objective relation that exists among religious ends. Each faith's conception and pursuit of its end is inextricably bound up with these ultimate empirical questions. Yet even without being able to resolve these differences, it may be possible for religions to reciprocally recognize the actuality of multiple religious ends. For instance, even if the Buddhist account of dependent co-arising is not an accurate metaphysical description of the inner nature of the world (which turns out to be better described in Christian tradition), yet an experiential religious fulfillment described by the category of nirvana may be an actual human state. Even if there is neither a triune, eternal God nor a created universe (and the universe turns out to be better described by Buddhist metaphysics), Christians might actually experience communion with a personal divine being. Christians would have their own explanations of the first case and Buddhists their own explanations of the second. The hypothesis affirms the reality of different experiential states of religious fulfillment. It does not require that all of the elements a tradition associates with attainment of that state are also empirically true. One religious fulfillment may be associated in its tradition with an affirmation of the eternity of the universe, another with affirmation of the creation of the universe. One may be associated with a theory of the self and another with a theory of the no-self. To regard the religious fulfillments as real does not entail accepting in their entirety both sides of these oppositions. Realization of one of these religious ends, or the realization of several of them by different persons, leaves the metaphysical questions still undecided. The answers to those questions will determine the ultimate status and relation of those existing fulfillments, and determine which religion or religions, if any, provides the ultimate and more inclusive framework for the truths in others. It is possible, of course, that all religious persons experience only illusion in this life and extinction in the next and are part of no coherent order or purpose. The religions are collectively committed to the proposition that the universe is such as to allow some fuller end than this.

[13] I have pointed out elsewhere (Heim 1992 pp. 39–40) that despite John Hick's contention that there is and can be only a single ultimate religious end, his own vision of eschatology expects that the experiences of a world to come could only be taken by the human subjects involved as concrete confirmation of *particular* religious expectations. He emphasizes that postmortem experiences of human consciousness would bear the shape of the categories an individual's history had provided for them. This would not require of course any thoroughly literal conformity to the detail of such expectations. To take one of his examples, experience of communion with a personal God and a risen Jesus would confirm a Christian's expectations beyond a reasonable doubt, whether or not it conformed to certain images of robes and clouds. If in fact such events are significantly conditioned by our prior practice and commitment, then it would seem there is good reason to credit the 'one and only' testimony of various religious traditions. It is unlikely that one can attain to an end in any other

manner than by following the way that aims at or near it in preference to other possibilities.

[14] The previous two sentences paraphrase (Burch 1972 p. 20)

[15] This is precisely John Hick's argument, which runs as follows. If one maintains that there is real, cognitive truth in religion, a primary pillar of this contention must be the validity of religious experience. But if religious experience is to testify consistently to any truth, it must be one that is beyond the obvious contradiction of various concrete religious experiences. Therefore one who wishes to defend a religious interpretation of reality is in fact compelled toward some version of the 'pluralistic hypothesis' which construes the experiences as conditioned versions of encounter with the same 'Real.' (Hick 1989 pp. 233–236)

[16] see: Gellman 1997 p. 115.

[17] see: Gellman 1997 Chapter Four is devoted particularly to this issue.

[18] see: Gellman 1997 p. 102.

[19] see: Gellman 1997 p. 112.

[20] see: Gellman 1997 p. 101.

[21] See (Carman 1994) for an excellent discussion of this point.

[22] see: Gellman 1997 p. 116.

[23] see: Gellman 1997 p. 117.

[24] see: Gellman 1997 p. 118.

[25] This also points up a problem or at least a deep ambiguity with Hick's contention that we can with equal validity regard the one religious reality, 'the Real,' as either impersonal or personal (Hick 1989, chapters fourteen, fifteen and sixteen). If this means that people are right to regard the Real as either solely and exclusively impersonal or solely and exclusively personal, then the statement tells us nothing except that it is acceptable to believe logically contradictory things about the Real, and any other contraries could be substituted for these. If Hick's contention means that there is an obligation of some sort on those who represent the Real in one of these ways to recognize validity in the alternative representation, then the apparent even-handedness cannot hide inescapable asymmetries. A definite advantage attaches to personal representation of the Real, since it includes intrinsic impersonal dimensions while the reverse is not true. That is, the personalistic view can affirm the validity of 'impersonal' religious experience in a way (as true experience of real aspects of the divine nature) that no impersonalistic view can reciprocally affirm the validity of experience of a personal God. Most recently, Hick has argued that both terms can be used because the Real is 'beyond characterization by the range of concepts available to human thought.' (Hick, 2000 p.35) Their parity lies in their similar inadequacy, since no positive concept can refer to the Real. This would seem to imply that one can call God 'personal' or 'impersonal' because one can call God literally anything, to equal lack of effect. But Hick himself does refer positively to the Real, a practice he justifies by classifying such reference as formal or indirect rather than substantive. And in practice he seems to take impersonality as a baseline. See Stephen Williams' criticism of Hick to this effect (Williams 1997 p. 38). Williams contends that Hick deploys his 'neutral' claim in a manner characteristic of a particular

religious perspective, which sees a personal view of the divine as an optional and subordinate form for apprehending an impersonal reality.

[26] Within Hindu tradition this hierarchical relation is maintained by Advaita Vedanta (whose great exponent was Sankara) but questioned by another stream of thought, Visistadvaita (whose great exponent was Ramanuja).

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# Philosophy and the Capitalist World

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## **Abstract**

*Philosophy today faces two challenges: first, it is not critical enough of its own processes and concepts; second, it is inadequate to the present. The first claim can be grasped more easily than the second. Reading theory today, it is remarkable how many concepts have been transformed into entities that one can imagine snatching with tweezers and dropping in a jar for further study back in the lab. Too often theory challenges the equation between concepts and objects only to dead-end in the reassertion of some primal category like “desire,” “the subject,” “the political,” and so on. It is perhaps impossible to do otherwise; but in that case we should be aware of the limits of what we parade about as critical theory. This paper deals with some theses on this matter and will review the condition of philosophy in our contemporary postmodern situation.*

**Keywords:** *philosophy, postmodernism, capitalism, enlightenment, theor.*

## **Philosophy Today**

“During long periods of history,” Walter Benjamin wrote, “the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence” (1968: 222). One would expect no less of thought itself. It should come as no surprise to assert today that philosophy is historical through and through. This recognition of philosophy’s historicity is one of the great legacies of Marx’s thought. Once consciousness is linked to social being and the “ruling ideas” of an epoch are characterized as “nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas” (1978: 172-173), it is only a willful bad faith that could lead one back into the slumber of ontology and metaphysics-taxonomic practices that mortal beings use to tally up the categories of immortality. A century and a half after *The German Ideology*, it is tempting to imagine that philosophy is no longer in need of such a stern reminder about the necessary material limits of its activity. Historical consciousness now reigns supreme in the academy in inverse proportion to the infertile toxic brownfields that characterize the postmodern mental landscape outside it.

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Bristling with endless qualifications and equipped with a map to the minefields of reductive thinking, critical philosophy today actively acknowledges its own contingency and highlights its limits as proof of its active confrontation with categories that will always prove to be inadequate to their objects. What more could one want or expect? What other form could it take on the ruins of those grand theories diligently elaborated in multiple volumes of tortured prose? In light of the disappointments and general squalor of mental life in the age of finance capitalism, should we not see in the vanguard of contemporary theory evidence that for once thought has run ahead of its historical moment, preserving within it the kind of Utopian possibilities once connected with art and the aesthetic?

Of course, such imagined ends betray their own bad faith. It is not hard to see how this vision of the philosophical enterprise re-enacts its own version of historical development, one that is essentially the same as Kant's vision of the Enlightenment. The final dismantling of the great master narratives is itself a grand narrative-why else would people get excited about it? This kind of story of growth and development, of the unfolding of life from seed to oak tree, cannot help but reactivate the suspicions of critical theory, which, understanding itself to be a relentless critical nomad, expresses a permanent suspicion about beginnings (childhood) and endpoints (maturity), as well as of the established pathways by which one travels from one to other. Indeed, critical philosophies of all stripes-those wildly variegated and interpenetrated sets of concepts collectively referred to as "theory"-have assumed much of their identity from their suspicion of fixed categories and meditations on the eternal.

Philosophy today faces two challenges: first, it is not critical enough of its own processes and concepts; second, it is inadequate to the present.

The first claim can be grasped more easily than the second. Reading theory today, it is remarkable how many concepts have been transformed into entities that one can imagine snatching with tweezers and dropping in a jar for further study back in the lab. Too often theory challenges the equation between concepts and objects only to dead-end in the reassertion of some primal category like "desire," "the subject," "the political," and so on. It

is perhaps impossible to do otherwise; but in that case we should be aware of the limits of what we parade about as critical theory. As Nietzsche reminds us, there is nothing especially impressive about hiding something behind a bush only later to trumpet its discovery.

The question of the adequacy of thought to its age is a more difficult one to make sense of. "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" (Marx and Engels 1978: 172). If this is the case, why should we imagine that this is any different today? If philosophy even considers this question, it does so ambivalently. On the one hand, Marx and Engels's famous formulation has been seen, especially in the case of contemporary societies, as far too reductive. As Raymond Williams has pointed out, "the body of intellectual and imaginative work which each generation receives as its traditional culture is always, and necessarily, something more than the product of a single class" (1983: 320). Nor can dominant thought be thought of as uniformly of the moment; ideology is perpetually disturbed by residual and emergent forms that are inevitably mixed into the stew. As Adorno expressed it so beautifully in *Negative Dialectics*, "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed" (1974: 3). The emergent, having failed to merge into the dominant, persists as residual. But if almost no one has taken up Adorno's challenge-to inhabit the residual as a critique of the actual-it is because genuinely critical possibilities of theoretical thinking are often assumed to be engendered automatically by the intimate epistemological interference imposed by the heterogeneity that characterizes modernity. It is as though the acknowledgment that there is no pure, homogenous, monolithic ideology necessarily implied that ideology contained its own critique.

On the other hand, the professoriate is fond of pointing out that critical thought today is pretty much an accident waiting to happen: not only in the "culture at large" but within the academy itself. For instance, Masao Miyoshi has claimed that "the current academic preoccupation with 'postcoloniality' and multiculturalism looks suspiciously like another alibi to conceal the actuality of global politics" (1996: 79). He is hardly alone in making such claims. Gayatri Spivak opens her recent book by stating straight out that "Postcolonial studies, unwittingly



commemorating a lost object, can become an alibi unless it is placed within a general frame” (1999: 1). There is no point in rehearsing the same kinds of criticisms that have been leveled at postmodernism, deconstruction, Western Marxism and so on. At one point or another, all of them have been accused of collaborating unwittingly with the Man. In this case, “critical” thought is in fact precisely adequate to its moment, just not in the way it imagines itself to be. It reiterates, no doubt in sublimated or misrecognized form, accepted social structures and political presumptions-effectively canceling out real critical reflection. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have pointed out in *Empire*-Alain Badiou has made this point more ascerbically-“the postmodernist politics of difference not only is ineffective against but can even coincide with and support the functions and practices” (2000: 142) of global capitalism as it exists today.

But if academic “critical theory” appears on this perspective as little more than a highly elaborated version of contemporary capitalism’s spontaneous philosophy, at the very most its vanguard wing, then the former proposition-that an adequate theory of the present can be discovered in the “culture at large,” reconstructed from the sheer heterogeneity of agendas and the interference of the residual and the emergent-is an even less satisfactory position to adopt. Philosophy’s critical power exists because it is, in fact, inadequate, not the same as the main substance of the age. Generally, as Hegel was pleased to remind us, philosophy belongs to the residual, always lagging behind-even if contemporary theory has always been more likely to claim for itself a position in the emergent. In this context it is useful to remember that odd moment of self-reflection in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* where Horkheimer and Adorno (1988) pause to claim that their critique of the total system can emerge only because they just happen to occupy the interstice between the end of classical German philosophy and the burgeoning of American mass culture. It is only because the former is radically incommensurate with the latter that Horkheimer and Adorno could “hate [both of them] properly.” But what this tends to mean is that philosophy is in fact unable to take up the present adequately. We might, then, possess a critical philosophy after all (or even a whole slew of them, each with its array of anthologies

and journals), but it is a philosophy of the city, the pedestrian, and urban public space, and not of the freeway, the drive-through and the swirl of suburban crescents. (The old urban downtown revived as a simulacrum of its former self does not bring the social world back in line with this thought, but instead leaves it yet a further step behind). This is why this critical philosophy retains a romantic fascination with Benjamin's arcades and can treat Las Vegas or pseudo-urban enclave only with horror.

The question that we want to pose here is: what would be a philosophy adequate to the age of "globalization," an age dominated by finance capital? But instead of indulging in the kind of definitional exercise that might now be expected (as if anyone wants to read yet another survey of the modalities of globalization-local and global, the end of the nation and its continuation, the production of antinomies out of every one of the concepts that social scientists have mistaken for the structure of life itself in Western modernity), we want to throw out another possibility. The task facing philosophy today is to examine its filiations to its most hallowed concepts and to consider anew their productivity within a new frame of reference-one, for instance, in which Europe is no longer the leading edge of world history (Chakrabarty 2000).

Easy to say, harder to think.

Unexpectedly, the result of this task might be to see old concepts as more productive than new ones, which suffer not merely from the fact that they are inevitability expressions of the general conditions of possibility of the present moment, but also because of the way in which the eternal production of the new is linked more strongly than ever to the basic drive of capitalism. The concrete meaning of any concept-what it is able to *do* as opposed to what it can be said to signify-depends decisively on the world in which it finds itself. And indeed, the last twenty years have seen the political significance of whole fields of concepts silently switch valences-often unnoticed by those who use them-as though an unexplained flip-flop of the earth's magnetic field had taken place at the level of the concept. Whatever its Utopian origins, the idea of the State has seemed since Marx to be a repressive one, fundamentally the tool and right hand of Capital. But now, with post-Cold-War mutations in the global market, the State is suddenly seen by many on the Left as a potential bulwark against the predations of multinational

capital. "Transgression" has long been transformed into a shock value whose primary purpose is to move units, not to disturb social limits. The "Universal," in the name of which an oppressive particularity came to dominate the globe, suddenly seems the last bastion against a neo-liberal world order that is happy enough to maintain "differences" (if only of wages, working conditions, and marketing parameters) as long as they are subsumed without resistance within the global market. A notion of subjective "authenticity" which had seemed to justify the worst sort of complacent self-privilege-not to mention the scabrous possibilities of ethnic and racial "authenticity"-tempts us once again with the offer of protection against the most corrosive and cynical ironies of commodity culture. The "aesthetic," which was so plainly the property and instrument of an elite defending its prerogatives, may yet turn out to be the last subjective vestige of Utopian possibility. "Totality," which was surely an alibi for a will to power, may be our only tool for grasping the new functioning of global Capital. And "History" itself, which had been exposed as the master trope of nineteenth-century racist ideology, now seems to be a powerful weapon against an ideology of the continual present.

All of these statements could of course be taken as profoundly conservative ones; to utter any of them without irony would invite a swift rap on the knuckles with the ruler of critical-theoretical thought. (It is good to remember that all genuinely historical thinking is ironic through and through, setting up truth only to turn it on its head the next moment). In a lapsarian mode, this would be globalization as imagined by John Gray or Samuel Huntington-the decline and necessary return of tradition and of "values," an essentially conservative stance. In a triumphalist pose, some of these formulations could take on the aspect of globalization as imagined by Francis Fukuyama or Thomas Friedman-global Americanism without apologies or tears. And, insofar as the philosophical categories invoked are those of Western modernity, this pose is repeated on the left in the kinder, gentler ideas of cosmopolitan governance elaborated variously by David Held (1995), Richard Falk (1999) and Ulrich Beck (2000). In the light of these positions, it might seem that taking a genuinely critical view of globalization necessitates the adoption of a narrative of cultural, social or political apocalypse: super-consumerism, globally dispersed; hyper-capitalism,

more theoretically innovative than anything coming out of the factories of conceptual innovation called graduate schools; monstrous pleasures (leading to social banality) made possible only by monstrous exploitation (leading to social collapse)-all of which can be sketched in minute detail, with great epistemological care not to simplify things for the sake of polemics, but about which, alas, nothing can be done. (Or almost nothing. One can say: Seattle gave me hope and confidence that the right gesture has been made.) Instead of adopting the comfortable (and, as Derrida reminded us, ultimately conservative) space of apocalypse, we propose to recapture conceptual territory lost to both conservative and cosmopolitan narratives of globalization, to develop a way of thinking about the actual without resorting to ambivalence or despair. In doing so, one always flirts with danger. Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff point to the troubling resurgence of the concept of “civil society” at the present moment. “During inhospitable times,” they claim, civil society “reanimates the optimistic spirit of modernity, providing scholars, public figures, poets, and ordinary people alike a language with which to talk about democracy, moral community, justice, and populist politics” (2000: 331). So who could object to its appearance at this profoundly asocial moment? As Comaroff and Comaroff point out, civil society assumes in its re-appearance much the same ideological function it played when it first emerged in the late eighteenth century:

Amidst populist moral panics, mass-mediated alienation, crises of representation, and scholarly perplexity, Civil Society, in its Second Coming, once more becomes especially “good to think,” to signify with, to act upon. The less substance it has, the emptier its referents, the more this is so; which is why its very polyvalence, its ineluctable unfixability, is intrinsic to its power as panacea. It is the ultimate magic bullet in the Age of Millennial Capitalism. For it promises to conjure up the most fundamental thing of all: a meaningful social existence. (2000: 334)

A meaningful social existence: this is the goal, after all. It could be a long march.

### **Twenty-Five Theses on Philosophy in the Age of Finance Capitalism**

*Nihil humani a me alienum puto. De omnibus dubitandum.*

(Marx's favorite maxims: Nothing human is alien to me. Everything should be doubted.)

We present here a set of theses that might help to imagine the role and scope of philosophy in the age of finance capitalism. The sources of these theses are as eclectic as a music collection: they bear with them the traces of broken relationships, misdirected enthusiasms, the inevitable, short-lived fascination with new, the enduring influence of old favorites that one cannot get past (about a final category—"things that sounded good drunk"-we'll say no more). These theses should not be taken as prescriptive. They might be read in the light of Friedrich Schlegel's conception of his philosophical fragments, as scraps or remnants of a total system that could never really exist.

Fredric Jameson has described his own critical practice as a "translation mechanism," a theoretical machine that makes it possible to convert other discourses into the central political problematic that animates Marxism (Zhang 1998: 365-66). We conceive these theses in much the same spirit: as grasping towards a mediating code rather than presenting a set of truth-claims. The utility of these theses will thus be determined by their ability to help produce a philosophy politically rather than conceptually adequate to finance capitalism—a philosophy that takes up the political challenge of the present without thereby failing to become anything more than an expression of (an adequation of) the dynamism of finance capitalism itself.

1. *A theft.*-Relativism is the dialectic for idiots.

2. *Hegel is dead.*-One is always coming up against reminders that we have "moved beyond" teleological, Eurocentric Hegel. Sometimes these reminders come in the imperative. But how do we know something is beyond something else, rather than behind it or beside it, above it or below it, without reference to a vanishing point? And isn't the presumption of a vanishing point in time what we call teleology? Never mind: teleology and Eurocentrism—the dominion of the Same—are bad ideas and they should be avoided. Hegel, bless his 18<sup>th</sup>-century soul, didn't always manage to do so. But why this fixation on Hegel? Let us rather say that the method he invented, but which even he did not always fully understand, has nothing to do with these. Anyone who can read muster the strength to read Hegel with both sympathy and skepticism—in other

words, to read Hegel like we read everyone else-can see that teleology is the thinnest veneer, even if diligently applied; a last-ditch attempt to save the dialectic from its own deepest implication: the perpetual deferral of Utopia, the impossibility of recuperating contradiction once and for all. Far from being a philosophy of the Same, the dialectic elevates antagonism into an ontology-and in so doing turns the very fiber of being into a tissue of fissures, contradictions, frustration, and carnage. The violence of this gesture-visible, above all, in Hegel's brutal contempt for Kant and the often deadpan irony brought to bear on anything that resembles a unitary conception of Being-is lost on us today, due in no small part to Hegel's own rhetoric. But like those Victorian novels where social upheaval is prevented how? by staging a marriage!-the flimsiness of the ultimate reconciliation gives the clue to its falsity. As with the "cosmological constant"-which Einstein briefly introduced into general relativity to silence what his own theory said about the history of the universe-so with teleology: the dialectic gets along better without it. It has been said that every competent student of physics today knows far more about general relativity than Einstein ever did. Perhaps we are in a position to understand the dialectic better than Hegel.

3. *American Hegelians.*-Critical common sense in North America still gets itself worked up into a lather about the evils of the dialectic. But even during the heyday of the most recent orthodoxy, it wasn't always easy to see what it was fighting against. Once upon a time, in a land far, far away, the dialectic meant Kojève, or Sartre, or Stalinist pseudo-philosophy. Enemies worth fighting! But we literal minded North Americans largely missed the point, and developed a hatred for a Hegelian orthodoxy that we never really experienced. Who were the American Hegelians? There were some, not in the last century but the one before that. One ran a shoe factory and lived for a time with the Creek in Oklahoma. Another was a superintendent of schools and believed the dialectic could be used to show that history would end in St. Louis, Missouri. These were the American Hegelians. And then there's Francis Fukuyama-another Midwesterner, by the way. So what's the panic? See thesis #2.

4. *A bad penny for your thoughts.*-The best critics of the dialectic are practical dialecticians. As for the rest of us, we

must beware lest we find ourselves, in our relation to thought, in the position of Milton's Abdiel, rushing to God with his discovery, only to find "Already known what he for news had thought / To have reported."

5. *As easy as 1, 2, 3.*-The thought of the One goes around creating an awful mess, but it's not terribly common among metropolitan intellectuals. Call it fundamentalism, call it narrow nationalism, call it ethnic chauvinism-or call it the philosophy of Being: the idea is that totality should conform to a single rule. The thought of the Three effectively means the thought of infinity; it is always perfectly correct-and perfectly banal. Multiplicity is easy to find, Difference is indeed everywhere-and very useful, too, for playing whack-a-mole with the thought of the One. But a concept as universal as Difference necessarily lacks all specificity. It is empty as to content. How then, without content, can there be any difference? Are we not back to the thought of the One? This is not mere logic chopping. The point is not that there is no difference between the Same and the Different-that would be absurd-it is rather that they share a Ground-that every mere difference exists by virtue of a field that stamps it with the imprint of the Same. The most innovative thinker of the Three is Alain Badiou, who adds it to the thought of the Zero-and in so doing produces, in the antagonism between Situation and Void, a brilliant version of the thought of the Two. So what is the thought of the Two, the structuring antagonism? Here's an ontological version of it. We all know that the subject's object doesn't coincide with that same object in itself because if it did, the subject would be God. In other words, knowledge is imperfect. But here's the part that's easy to forget: the subject is not a fool, and knows this. The "object in itself," then, is also the subject's object. Both are real; the object is not, so to speak, simultaneous with itself. It is split: not between what is known of it and what is beyond knowledge, but between the object that exists for us and the object that exists (for us) independently of us. But if the subject knows the same object in two different and incompatible ways, then neither is the subject simultaneous with itself. This should make it clear that the subject-object split is misnamed. The split is within the object itself-or if you prefer, within the subject. This restlessness within the object (or the subject) is called History.

The choice among these three options-or is it two?-is not trivial. 6. *Three classes or two?*-The existence of classes in our age is not a factual question, but a political one. Nobody will deny that wealth is distributed unevenly. Those who want to do something about this live in a world that consists of two strata, the poorer and larger of which must struggle against the domination of the richer and smaller. Those who benefit, or think they benefit, from the status quo live in a world with three classes or, what is the same thing, with none, since the notion of the "middle class" can encompass everyone who does not belong purely to Labor or Capital in the classical sense-which is to say virtually everyone. The question is not whether, empirically, there are two classes or three or a thousand or none. The question is rather: is there class antagonism, or isn't there? Here, the distinction between the descriptive and the political-perhaps always a spurious distinction-disappears.

7. *More haste, less speed.*-Though it belongs to a different era, *Minima Moralia* is a handbook for conducting philosophy in the age of finance capitalism. One cannot avoid reflecting on the temptations and limitations of bourgeois intellectual thought, and indeed, of the temptations of reflecting on these temptations. The concept of "reflexive modernity" lately championed in the social scientists by Ulrich Beck and the architect of the Third Way, Anthony Giddens, seems to represent an advance over a modernity that has no prefacing adjective. But just as being against capitalism doesn't imply that one is a socialist, so being reflexive doesn't mean the problems of modernity are magically solved. Adorno reminds us again and again of the institutional settings out of which thought grows, and the constraints and expectations these settings produce. "Since there are no longer, for the intellectual, any given categories, even cultural, and bustle endangers concentration with a thousand claims, the effort of producing something in some measure worthwhile is now so great as to be beyond almost everybody" (1974: 29). Is it possible that Totality has been rejected not because it is specious or Eurocentric but because to think it takes too much time? It might as well be admitted: far from having been slowly co-opted by a shift from a university of culture to a university of excellence (as Bill Readings suggests [1996]), intellectual labor is the very model for production in the age of finance capital.



Long before high-tech firms plopped pool tables down in the middle of their high-ceiling, reconverted factory-buildings, the professoriate was working twelve-hour flex-time days on gothic campuses and hanging out at the faculty club.

As for us: guilty as charged. The lesson here is to leave behind even the lingering idea of intellectual purity vis-à-vis the contaminated state of the rest of the world. And to think with less speed, but more urgency.

8. *Aura after Aura.*-There is no longer anything threatening or dangerous about Walter Benjamin's reflections on the significance of mechanical reproduction for "a number of outmoded concepts, such as creativity and genius, eternal value and mystery" (1968: 218). It is often forgotten that Benjamin positions his reflections as coming at the end of a fifty year process of social transformation that was only beginning to be expressed symptomatically in culture in the 1920s and 30s. Benjamin's work on mechanical reproduction is thus belated; indeed, Benjamin was writing at the dawn of the age of electronic circulation, an age that Debord (also belatedly) sketched in *Society of the Spectacle*.

What kinds of things are born in and destroyed by electronic circulation? It would be wrong to suggest that this is a question that no one has yet taken up. However, it seems to us that when it has been addressed, the question is taken too literally. The attempt to think about the social significance of images and visibility at the present time seems to be stuck in the to and fro of the epistemologies of idealism. The problem of mediation has not got beyond certain very basic notions in Hegel-perhaps because Hegel is not to be got beyond. Whatever the case, contemporary thought has tended to conceive the history of representation as a very un-dialectical intensification of a more or less eternal dynamic.

Ours is an age that imagines the visual to have a specific and exceptional force and power. The idea of American cultural imperialism (itself a stand-in for globalization) is often imagined as synonymous with the spread of the visual signs emanating from the United States: advertising, the design of consumer packaging, Hollywood. Nevertheless, for all its vaunted power, our theories of electronic circulation amount to undertheorized ideas about cultural diffusion (any visual image will expand to fill the existing global space), osmosis (it seeps into you), and contamination (it poisons you). More needs to be said.

9. *The world is not legible, but audible.*-As for the other side of global culture, the flow of musical form across the surface of the globe, things look even less promising. Both disciplinary musicology and cultural-studies approaches to music are-somebody has to say it-stupidly empirical in the absence of any sort of remotely adequate theory of the object. But music is an activity by means of which bodies are synchronized into a social body, and a genuine theory of music may one day be able to do more to explain the modalities of global culture than any theory of the image. The global trajectory of musical forms, subterranean and unpredictable compared with the colonization of the world by the Image, may be the very substance in which new social relationships are registered. The job of theory, in that case, would be to cognize (interpret does not seem quite the right word) the non-cognitive (unconscious does not seem quite the right word) performance of musical being-in-the-world. Could it be, as Jacques Attali proposed, that “the world...is not legible, but audible”? (1985) Unfortunately, Attali’s thesis remains in the realm of science fiction: Music predicts the future! The missing term that would make this intelligible is desire. Can we say more reasonably that music embodies a social desire? Sometimes this desire dies and nothing is born. But if the desire is realized in social form, the musical form that nurtured it appears prescient.

10. *Nobody knows, everyone is in the know.*-Simultaneously, two contradictory theses about that most alien of creatures, the mass, have been emerging in globalization. On the one hand, there is a sense that globalization institutes an era in which, belatedly, mass culture critiques hit their mark. Now that global media monopolies have anxiously consolidated their hold on every aspect of leisure, we can safely skip over the more optimistic pronouncements of some theorists of mass culture and go straight to Horkheimer and Adorno: “Fun is a medicinal bath” (1988: 140). On the other hand, globalization is also the era of the end of ideology and of the universality of cynical reason (in Žižek’s famous formulation, “they know what they are doing but they are doing it anyway”). What philosophy in the age of finance capitalism needs to explain is how both of these phenomena can not only occur together, but are in fact produced out of the same historical conditions of possibility (and contradiction). Elsewhere

Zizek writes that “a direct reference to extra-ideological coercion (of the market, for example) is an ideological gesture *par excellence*: the market and (mass) media are dialectically interconnected” (1994: 15). In other words, whatever explanation one produces must come from the *inside* rather than the *outside*. It is not only, as Hardt and Negri (2000) suggest, that the outside has disappeared: for philosophy, it was *always* a mistake to conceive of an outside. But that’s history for you.

11. *The Eclipse of So-Called Tradition*.-For Gramsci, “traditional” intellectuals are connected to one another across time. Since “traditional intellectuals experience through an ‘*esprit de corps*’ their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification, they put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group” (1971: 7). It is this simultaneous autonomy vis-à-vis the present and filiation to the past that still fires the imagination of critical theorists, even though we are now suspicious of both this separation and this connection. But what if we imagined ourselves first and foremost as “organic” intellectuals? Shouldn’t we more properly see ourselves as part of that strata of intellectuals that, *especially* in the age of finance capitalism, give contemporary capital “homogeneity and an awareness of its function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields?” (1971: 5). The exemplary organic intellectual in the age of factories and production is the engineer. Like it or not, the exemplary organic intellectuals in the age of finance capitalism are intellectuals and cultural workers-otherwise known as “content providers.”

12. *Ex Nihilo*.-You can’t start from scratch. If the unruly spirit of Adorno must energize one part of philosophy in the age of finance capitalism, the caution of Raymond Williams should animate the other. The technological euphoria that pervades the official discourses of finance capitalism all too often finds its equivalent in the enthusiasm of theory for all manner of techno-theories (from Debord’s spectacle to Haraway’s cyborgs) that contemplate a present that has made an absolute break with the past. Williams reminds us that things are far messier than that. Every social formation is the product of more than a single class, and the product of more than a single age. Academics who theorize the present in the manner of science-fiction films (the

ones that imagine the future as so absolutely future that not even the practice of eating real food remains) have a predilection for nineteenth-century houses.

It is an open question whether futurity can be positively conceived at all. The future is no more than a lack in the present—as the Mozambiquan writer Mia Couto puts it in his story “Os mastros do Paralém,” (“The Flags of Beyondward”), “o destino de um sol é nunca ser olhado” (1998: 185): the destiny of a sun is never to be beheld. Positive visions of the future like the cyber-Utopias of our own very recent past or the popular futurisms of the 1950s—or for that matter Plato’s *Republic*—cannot think the future; they can only re-articulate the actual in futuristic form.

13. *Without a Base.*—The base/superstructure model has had a rough ride since it was taken all too literally by those Marxists who followed Marx. By now, everyone agrees that what is fundamentally missing from this model is, as Williams has said, “any adequate recognition of the indissoluble connections between material production, political and cultural institutions and activity, and consciousness” (1977: 57). Paulin Hountondji (1990, 1992) and others have described the ways in which the cultural is finally collapsed into the economic, and the economic into the cultural, in such a manner that one must go beyond what is implied in Williams’ criticism. There needs to be a whole new model of causality in the age of finance capitalism, since one of the things that distinguishes this period from all others is that it no longer makes sense to comprehend the social totality through the lens of even a highly developed and complicated idea of base/superstructure. John Tomlinson writes that “the complexity of the linkages established by globalization extends to phenomena which social scientists have labored to separate out into the categories in which we now, familiarly, break down human life: the economic, the political, the social, the interpersonal, the technological, the environmental, the cultural and so forth. Globalization arguably confounds such taxonomy” (1999: 13). What this means is that we have to take seriously the fact that material explanations may require increasing reference to immaterial forces and entities.

At any rate, one need not be ashamed to maintain that, precisely to the extent—not necessarily great—that humanity controls its

own destiny, any intervention in history's course has to take place at the level of thought. This is not the same as idealism. No doubt an infinity of determinations come before thought; no doubt, even, the truth of thought lies outside itself. But if nothing can happen until it becomes possible, possibility cannot be understood in purely materialist way. Conception, too, is a condition of possibility.

14. *We refute us thus.*-Every materialism is vulgar, ripe with unexamined presuppositions to be sneered at by any philosopher who happens to pass by. Every philosophy is an idealism susceptible to some version of Johnson's boot. What if both these statements are true? Perhaps then the only way out is to occupy the antagonism between them: not by "refuting" one to champion the other, but rather by engaging in the intimate and perpetual struggle against one's own idealism. How many people have tried this? We can think of one, anyway.

15. *Worstward, ho!*-“We” and “Ours.” Such words embolden polemics such as these. Fear not: we imagine neither a universal subject nor a unitary community. But we also refuse to imagine a “West” that has long founded not only the unreflective “we”s and “our”s of the Eurocentric academy, but also their critique. Indeed, we assert that there is no West, there is no Westernization; for that matter, there is no modernity or modernization. There is Capital, and there is its limit, as expressed both in its internal contradictions and in active resistance to it (which is also, in a different way, internal). There is therefore no such thing as multiculturalism. The instant something becomes a culture-the moment that it ceases to be a world-it belongs to Capital or, what is more rare, resistance to Capital. What we call the “West” names this culturalizing machine, an aspect of Capital. Perhaps especially, of capitalism now.

16. *Capitalism always comes from elsewhere.*-It is well known that the disequilibrium intrinsic to the function of capital can be kept under control only by the expansion of capital itself: as Marx put it in the *Grundrisse*, “the tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome” (1973: 408). This is from the perspective of Capital. But it should not be thought that any place is originally capitalist and therefore free from the

encroachment of capital. From any human perspective, Capital is always encroaching. The privatization of government, the “corporatization” of the arts, of higher education, of sports, of heretofore un-rationalized industries like cattle ranching, continues in the dominant countries today a process that has gone by many names, among them colonialism yesterday, and enclosure before that.

17. *Capitalism is indigenous everywhere.*-Marx’s pages in the *Grundrisse* on “pre-capitalist” modes of production, problematic though they are in so many respects, are important for suggesting that every social formation tends to produce inequalities that can easily give rise to a pool of free labor-a suggestion, it should be noted, which is corroborated by any number of fictional narratives of the colonial encounter. Capitalism is not simply another, particularly voracious, social formation, but rather, as Deleuze and Guattari claimed in *Anti-Oedipus* (1983) the specific nightmare of every social formation, the secret possibility, always repressed, of recoding existing social inequalities as the capital-labor relation. To confuse “Capitalism” with the “West” is to elevate the latter, a merely heuristic category, to a causal level where it has no place.

18. *Ex hybridis, libertinis servisque conscripserat.*-It is finally recognized that hybridity, one of the dominant terms of the last decade, presupposed its opposite. This incoherence cannot be removed simply by asserting, as the most advanced thinkers of hybridity did, that hybridity goes “all the way down,” that the essence which inheres in the concept can be deferred infinitely-any more than the fable to which this phrase refers can explain the suspension of the Earth in space by resting it on an infinite series of turtles. At some point both theories presuppose a ground. If hybridity really went “all the way down,” it would annihilate itself as a concept. This is not to argue for authenticity; indeed, if by “hybridity” one means simply “lack of essence,” it does indeed go “all the way down.” But, in order to maintain its distinctness as a concept, hybridity must also mean a “combination of essences.” There is no way out of this contradiction except to return the word to its origins in a class distinction. In Latin, *hibrida* refers to the child of slave and freeborn. “Hybridity,” then, would come to refer to something like the complicity of homologous class fractions in

dominant and dominated regions of the globe. But no doubt we have better words for this.

19. *Same difference.*-It is becoming clear that the hegemonic concept of Difference is at one and the same time the most universal and (therefore) the most empty concept, virtually synonymous with Being since both name the very medium of experience. In fact it is Difference (as slogan and as concept), not Totality, that reduces the complexity of the world to the monotonous Same, since the truly different (i.e. what refuses to be seen as merely different-what goes, for example, by the ideological names of "totalitarianism," "fundamentalism," "communism," and "tribalism," to name just a few examples) is excluded from the field of difference. The primacy of "difference" in fact outlines an identity-the unacknowledged frame of the monoculture, global capitalism.

20. *Fear of error or fear of truth?*-A position of permanent critique can itself become yet another kind of metaphysics. Suspicion about the strategic function of the signified, for example, is a powerful demystifying tool, but in its chronic form it produces a delimitation of the domain of truth more crippling than any naïveté.

21. *The good, the bad, and the ugly; or, the baby and the bathwater.*-It has been said that the essence of liberalism is a facile separation of the good from the bad, as though systems-economic, philosophical, whatever-could be simply carved up and the undesirable elements discarded: Competition is good but poverty is bad, so let's just get rid of poverty (while retaining the dynamic that sustains it); Marx is good but revolution is bad, so let's forget about revolution (while educating undergraduates in the poetry of Capital). Totality, incidentally, is the name for the rejection of this tendency, which is as common as ever-it is virtually the editorial policy of the *New York Times*-but a seemingly contrary tendency is equally insidious. This is to conflate a philosophical concept not with its dialectically necessary other but with an ideological cognate. Utopia is a case in point: the construction of Utopias is a transparently ideological operation, but the notion of Utopia-that is, the reservation within thought of an horizon that is not merely the present-is essential to any genuine politics. Indeed, the failure to think Utopia in the strong sense leads directly to Utopia in the

first sense-in particular, to the Utopia (never called that) of a market without poverty. This corresponds to Hegel's "bad infinity" of infinite approximation as opposed to the properly infinite judgment. The same goes for Totality-the denigration of which in current thought serves to discredit the dialectic by associating it with the thematics of the eradication of difference, with which it has nothing in common.

22. *And the truth shall set you free.*-“In any case, the death of metaphysics or the overcoming of philosophy has never been a problem for us: it is just tiresome, idle chatter. Today it is said that systems are bankrupt, but it is only the concept of system that has changed. So long as there is a time and a place for creating concepts, the operation that undertakes this will always be called philosophy, or will be indistinguishable from philosophy, even if it is called something else” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 9). This is true, and yet Deleuze and Guattari's description of this ceaseless activity of invention called philosophy can't help but send the wrong message in an age that has grown accustomed to language of invention-inventing communities, inventing identities, inventing ideas... hey, no problem! But the generation of concepts does not occur willy-nilly. If philosophy's truth originates outside itself (as Lenin taught us), so does it finally reside. The real truth of all thinking, its effective truth, is of a fundamentally different order than the truth it claims for itself. In Christian allegory, the anagogic Truth that it seeks is only an alibi for its real truth, which is the production of faith and a community of believers. So too with thought. If the intellectual wants to change the world, so much the better. But here there are no shortcuts; St. Augustine could not just order his congregation to believe. There are other, perhaps better, ways to change the world. But for the intellectual, however naïve it may seem, the only path is responsibility to Truth.

23. *What is to be done?*-This is the question that is not being asked today. Let us call one possible position the politics of immanence. Better yet, let us call it Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000). There is to be no revolution, certainly no Party; the world to come will arrive through a plurality of struggles which, taken as a whole, express the desire of the multitude. What desire? The desire that was so effortlessly coopted during the Cold War by high wages in the first world and (relatively) generous development aid in the



third? Or the desire which, after the disintegration of actually existing socialism, exists only to be brutally crushed in the name of the Market? For the secret of the story of the immanent desire of the multitude is that it quietly relied on a prior transcendent revolution. Once the revolution (or at least its vestige) disappears as Capital's threat and horizon, the desire of the multitude has no recourse. And surely we do not need to be reminded that in the wrong circumstances the Utopian desire of the multitude can be channeled towards the most obscene ends. The other position might be called the politics of transcendence; or better yet Slavoj Žižek (2002a, 2002b) and Alain Badiou (2001). There is to be a revolution, even a revolutionary party, but revolution is fundamentally a decision, a risky experiment never guaranteed to succeed, and therefore an untheorizable particularity. Yes, yes, yes—and a resounding no. Lenin had a theory of revolution, a very precise understanding of the historical conjuncture in which revolution was a possible decision. But our situation, in which no merely national revolution will have much significance (the dilemmas faced by the few national governments genuinely on the Left are evidence enough of this), is immeasurably more complex than Lenin's. We remember Lenin because his revolution succeeded. How many failed? The potential cost of not asking "What is to be done?" is a period of bloody and ineffective rebellions, some of them deeply reactionary. Neither is invoking "Seattle" much help; the protests against our current mode of globalization are a sign and a slogan, but not an organizing principle. And waiting for a Messiah will only waste time. What we face instead is the hard work, the collective work, of theorizing the possibilities that inhere in our current conjuncture and possible ways to proceed. The only thing worse than picking the wrong moment would be missing the right one, and it may come sooner than we think.

24. *What is the Multitude?* Since the moment of its appearance, we have been enchanted with the poetry of the multitude. But before we get too carried away, it's worth asking what it is. How can it both resolutely refuse being reduced to a unity and at the same time explode in a political project? Isn't a positive political project—as opposed to political drift, the average of all political projects, or to "the multitude against," a unity imposed negatively from without—a

concrete unity? Hardt and Negri (2004) invoke neuroscience to explain the apparent contradiction. The brain doesn't have a center of command, but it manages to make "decisions" without ever being a real unity. What feels in our daily life like a subjective decision is just the outcome of innumerable parallel processes. So far so good: in some sense this is no more than obvious. But allow us to ask the dialectical question of the "reality of the appearance": What if the illusion were taken away? Isn't the illusion of a subject itself a necessary part of the functioning of this decentered system that is not a subject? But in this case, the "illusion" is not simply an illusion but also real. Can we then read Hardt and Negri's analogy back again into political subjecthood? Is the illusion of transcendent unity essential to the functioning of a real immanent multiplicity? Does someone have to come up with a project and sell everyone else on it? Does the political subjectivity of the multitude require-gasp!-a political vanguard to bring it into being? Somehow, we're not too keen on that idea, either.

25. *Project(ions)*.-Writing philosophy in the age of finance capitalism is neither the most self-indulgent (and thus useless) practice possible, nor is it the sole space in which it is possible to fan the flames of aesthetico-utopian imaginings. As Fredric Jameson reminds us, "Capitalism itself has no social goals" (2000: 62). It is through philosophy that such goals can be imagined.

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# Aristotle's Ethics and the Post-Modern Condition of Engineers

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## **Abstract**

*In our postmodern era all certainties seem to have gone. Neither the idea of progress nor standard ethical theories have apparently retained enough power to guide humanity. As a result, technologists find themselves in a paradoxical situation. While they demonstrate increased reality-changing activity, they are increasingly losing the instruments to effectuate their responsibilities for the future of the species. Two reactions to this state of affairs are possible. The first way is to accept this condition passively. This reaction consists of hardly more than hoping and praying. The second way is more active. That reaction consists of bringing about alternative routes to tackle the responsibilities of technologists. Providing such a reconceptualization is the aim of this paper. Its starting point is rooted in the old Aristotelian philosophy. However embarrassing this might sound, the claim will be defended that the basic structure of Aristotle's ethics (quality of character in changing circumstances) is highly relevant for a fresh approach to forming the "virtuous engineer."*

**Keywords:** Aristotle, Ethics, postmodernism, philosophy of engineering, virtue, practice.

## **The post-Modern Condition of Engineers**

Engineers have an important role in the shaping of the human future. By inventing and maintaining new technological products and processes they have a great impact on the world in which people live and will live. As a consequence of this they should shoulder special responsibilities. In addition to their obvious, but important, technical responsibility they have to meet the standards of their field of competence and the requirements of the product specifications they are charged with having a responsibility for the societal effects of their activities in the long run. This social responsibility is based on the assumption that engineers have a privileged insight into the consequences of technology.

Under the aegis of the ideology of Progress these two types of responsibility (technical and social) were presumed to go hand in hand. The cunning of reason would place the many small scale activities and effects within a broad socially and culturally

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desired whole, the technological paradise. On the basis of this ideology the long run social responsibility was sufficiently met by the short term technical responsibility.

This state of innocence was of short duration. Instead of applauding technological blessings, many critics talked about dangers, disasters, and the Moloch character of technology. These critics stressed the social responsibility of engineers as opposed to their technical responsibility. In their view technology had to be tamed by ethics. Two ethical theories, Kantian deontology and utilitarian teleology, were supposed to handle this difficult task.

This small history of ideas has some ironic overtones. In line with postmodern ideas some fundamental objections can be raised against the proponents as well as the critics of technological progress. In spite of their differences they have a lot in common. They agree on the conceptualization of technology, reason, and progress as homogeneous entities. However, we have to accept their essentially heterogeneous character. Within technology we have to distinguish a plurality of unrelated technological domains, methodologies, artifacts, and so on. The idea of a homogeneous reason supposed to be the (external) guide of humankind, either in a scientific-technological embodiment or in an ethical-theoretical one, has to be abandoned. In our relativistic era we not only know that rationality has many faces, but also that it is rather powerless. In accordance with these criticisms, the idea of homogeneous progress (either in the form of a blessing or in the form of a disaster) has to be given up. Progress just has a local character, rather than a global one.

Because of all these kinds of heterogeneity general statements regarding the responsibility of technologists can hardly be made. But the situation is even worse. The presupposition of the most influential ethical theories, to wit a certain constancy and universalism of human preferences, has been weakened by technology itself. Technological inventions change the world people inhabit and the criteria in accordance with which they evaluate their situation. As a result the post modern condition of technologists appears tragic. Engineers are facing an increasing responsibility for the human future, although in a context in which almost all (classical) approaches seem to fail.

This condition is in need of consideration and reconsideration. In my view, accepting the postmodern description of heterogeneity

does not imply accepting the impossibility of normative action. Instead of passivity or even irony, it will be important to reformulate what it means to act responsibly, what it means to be a good engineer. In this paper this problem will be tackled with the help of an old ethical theory. In this theory character is the central element, instead of reason or action. It stems from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. For Aristotle character (or virtue) is the central concept: the ability to act responsibly in new and unknown circumstances. His approach may lead to some interesting analytical and normative tools for interpreting the ways technologists learn, act, and behave.

After a short explication of the Aristotelian ethics it will be placed within a social context which can embody it. That context has been phrased by Alasdair MacIntyre as "practice." Because this concept combines descriptive and normative elements it will be suitable for analyzing the situations and responsibilities of engineers. Both concepts (virtue and practice) may shed some new light on various problems: the tensions between technological practices and socio-economic institutions; the nature of techno-professional normativity and ways to foster it; the relation of the internal normativity of practices to the two other types of normativity (technical and social). In conclusion a special topic will be attended to: the cultural and existential importance of the concept of trust.

### **From Virtue to Practice**

The ethical theory of Aristotle sounds simple: virtue is the attitude of choosing the right middle. In concrete situations a virtue in combination with a rational analysis of the specific circumstances brings about a justified course of action. For example, having the virtue of being a brave man sometimes leads to fighting, sometimes to fleeing, depending on the specific characteristics of the situation. It is important to note the aspect of learning and maintaining of virtues. They are not naturally given, but are the product of lifelong exercising. In judging people's activities, the results of their behavior are not at stake, but their attitude. Of course, Aristotle claims, we may have some reason to think that the right attitude will probably lead to desirable results.

In relation to deontological and teleological theories two differences can be distinguished. First, normative judgment regards character



and not (the results of) actions. Second, instead of an algorithmic approach on the basis of universalistic principles Aristotle's ethics stresses a more heuristic approach in terms of attitudes. By implication it is underdefined how to act in concrete situations. The combination of character and context does not generate criteria for definitive decisions. It was this problem that led teleologists to their computational approach of preferences (the greatest happiness or utility for the greatest number). Two counterarguments are relevant here. First, as we have seen, this computational approach sometimes misses the point in technological contexts, because preferences may change as a result of technological in(ter)ventions. Next, the problem of underdetermination of action can be viewed as a benefit, rather than a loss. It gives space to personal and professional responsibility, instead of insisting on general outcomes of calculated data.

Another problem is more urgent. It can be stated in the form of a question: Which virtues? For Aristotle, typical masculine Greek virtues, such as bravery, modesty, magnanimity, love of truth, and justice, formed the heart of his ethical system. In the Christian tradition faith, hope, and love became the virtuous three. Greek virtues, Christian virtues, which of them and which of the many other virtues should get priority? The deontological approach of Kant can be viewed as an attempt to resolve this problem once and for all. Through all differences he saw one common denominator of virtue: good will. Taking good will as his starting point, he analyzed its structure in such a way that it could stand above all the mentioned virtues. To be universalistic good will should have an abstract character, and not be substantiated by any cultural or religious content. The only way to meet this condition for Kant was to restate good will as analogous to a (scientific) law. This led to the introduction of the *meta*-virtue of universalization (categorical imperative). Kant himself was not always consistent in his approach. Sometimes he used, and in my opinion rightly so, the meta-virtue of universalization as a different level of normative consideration. In other places he suggested that his theory could substitute for all other ethical theories, which implies that his meta-virtue would have the same standing as the classical or Christian virtues. I agree with postmodern criticisms on the last interpretation of Kant's ethics. Nevertheless, I do not wish to give up the first one. It is most important to retain his meta-virtue of honesty, of the right

to speak, of the duty to listenóin short the moral space in which people can deliberate about the virtues which are appropriate (Habermas).

Having given due credit to Kant's meta-position, the problem of which virtues on the object-level is still unresolved. To tackle that problem, an abstract universalistic position is not very instructive. Virtues do not exist in a social vacuum, but are part and parcel of human (and also technological) practices. We have to turn to these embodiments of virtues to clarify the real power of Aristotle's ethics for today's technological culture.

### **Practice in Action**

The concept of practice has been elaborated by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book, *After Virtue*. Here is a clear description, worth quoting:

[A practice is] any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence, which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended (p. 187).

Some examples may illustrate this definition. Throwing a football with skill is not a practice, but the game of football is. Bricklaying is not a practice, architecture is. The range of practices is wide: arts, sciences, games, politics, farming, all fall under the concept. Within each practice a great variety of activities are carried out: the writing of essays, the planting of turnips, the stopping of penalty shots by goalkeepers, the performance of operations by surgeons. Practices are, and that is the first part of the definition, socially established forms of human activities from which those activities get their meaning and value. There are two kinds of valuation to discern:

a. *Internal goods*, which are essential to a practice, such as beauty, elegance, depth, originality. Participants in a practice compete with each other to show their own excellence and to foster their practice. The results of this kind of competition are likely to be advantageous for every member of that practice. For that reason it is opportune to use the expression, "goods internal to that practice." In another sense it is also appropriate; only members of that practice can judge the qualities of their fellow participants. For

example, to be able to value the depth of Fischer and the originality of Bronstein, one needs to be a rather good chess player.

b. *External goods*, which are contingently attached to practices by the accidents of social circumstance. They mostly have the appearances of money, prestige, and power. Competition for external goods generally leads to winners and losers, rather than to an improvement of the practice at hand.

Being an excellent practitioner does not mean earning a lot of money, but first and foremost getting admiration by fellow practitioners. It is interesting to note that Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science corresponds very well with this concept of practice: a scientific community, centered around a central paradigm, values its members in the measure of their success within their domain of inquiry. Following MacIntyre in his description of practices some characteristics can be added:

- To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of the internal standards and the (in)adequacy of their own performances as judged by them. It is to subject the personal attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to standards which currently and partially define the practice.
- Practices are basically different; they have a local character, defined by their own rules and goods.
- Practices also have a history; the rules and standards of games, sciences, and arts are themselves not immune to criticism and change. To improve the practice, to make progress in the specific field, can imply changes in the central conceptions.
- Every practice requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in it. They are entitled to co-operation under the banner of the standards of the practice in order to reach the objectives headed under "internal goods."

In my view, the concept of practice is a useful tool for analyzing the role of technologists in shaping the future. By stressing the multitude of practices it is an antidote against a unifying concept of technology. By conceptualizing practitioners as members of a (technological) community it leads engineers out of their alleged solitude which is implied by the vision of technical normativity. By enabling the articulation of specific central norms of (the members of) practices it might lead to the formulation of professional (ethical) codes.

Moreover, the acceptance of heterogeneity sharpens the eyes to discern tensions at different frontiers: (a) tensions between different practices, (b) tensions between practices and society in general, (c) tensions between practices and institutions.

Starting with tensions between different practices, practitioners of different blends do not have overarching criteria for success; they speak different languages; and they have different world views. Disputes between them are mostly ineffectual. Notwithstanding the negative impact of this description, insight into this type of tensions can be helpful for the needs of heterogeneous communication. (Recall Kant on extended thinking.). Tensions between practices and society in general can be illustrated by the sport of boxing. Cassius Clay, alias Mohammed Ali, has contributed in a fascinating manner to the quality of this practice. His style of boxing has led to a new norm of excellence. Notwithstanding the recognition of his excellence, from a general ethical point of view (it is morally wrong to beat fellow humans) one can refuse this specific practice. This tension implies the need for insight into the relation between practice and society. Within society tensions between practices and institutions are frequent. The difference between both is one of the most essential findings of MacIntyre. Chess, chemistry, and medicine are practices; chess clubs, laboratories, and hospitals are institutions. Institutions are necessary for the flourishing of practices, by contributing to their basic financial and institutional preconditions. They may foster or even withdraw the space of existence of specific practices. However, institutions have their own goals, which may be in contradistinction to the goals of practices. In particular, many technologists are situated on the sharp frontier between the practice, in which they have been educated, and the institution, in which they work. In the institutional context the role of external goods (profits, products for a market, and so on) may exceed many times the role of internal goods.

The concept of practice is a useful tool for analytical purposes, for description and interpretation. It takes professionals seriously as conscious workers in all kinds of heterogeneous situations. It gives space to the clarification of the many tensions which can make their lives so rewarding and difficult. For prescriptive purposes, it stresses the need for internal debates on the central

practice normativity, as well as for the explication of the role of practices in society as a whole. These aspects lead to the next section in which the virtuous professional will be the main topic.

### **The Virtue of Practical Normativity**

The activities of engineers are essentially normative. They try to come from a less satisfying situation to a more satisfying one (Romisowski). They work in the light of specific norms. The emergence of those norms can follow different paths.

a. Stressing only methodological-technical requirements, the norms will come from external sources, such as employers, markets, governments. Engineers just have to perform their job according to the best possible technical criteria, without taking into consideration further reaching responsibilities. (If they nevertheless act in such a way, they do so in the role of citizen, not in the role of engineer). This position gets its ideological backing from the (logical-positivistic) view that technology is applied science.

b. Stressing also societal-ethical normativity, the norms can emerge from a deliberation between technologists and all other affected people in which they formulate a common project. This approach, proposed by Habermas, differs from the previously mentioned social responsibility. In that case ethical consideration should place boundaries on technological activities; in this approach co-operation between variously involved groups is emphasized.

c. Stressing the quality of the technological practice itself, the norms will stem from that practice. The previous section has demonstrated different examples of this.

This short list has some peculiarities, worth mentioning. For most technologists and also non-technologists the first path represents the dominant ideology. Thanks to Habermas a valuable alternative has some credit. In accordance with the second path two techniques have recently been developed to approach the future in a non-linear way. In both empirical and normative elements are coupled. The first technique is called scenario-building. (See for example the many publications of the Dutch Central Plan Bureau in the Hague.) It applies especially to societal domains like traffic, environment, and education. For each domain a number of alternative future descriptions are elaborated on the basis of the most plausible empirical assumptions in combination with a variety of normative

positions people might embrace. This technique has some advantages: people are able to choose on the basis of the knowledge of the effects of their choices; the future is partly in their hands; political discussions increase in substance. Nevertheless, at least one problem remains unsolved: the changing of preferences brought about by the change of time and context. To overcome this problem a second technique has been introduced: Constructive Technology Assessment (Rip and Misa). CTA aims at more than the building of scenarios and the choice between them. It will contribute to processes of reflection in the course of processes of technology development. This means that every step is open to new deliberation, in such a way that the different actors can (technologically and ethically) act and learn together. An important assumption is the (relative) openness of the future. For different reasons (who is involved, who is excluded in the reflective process; how can oppositions be bridged) this technique is rather complex. Nevertheless, scenario-building and CTA demonstrate the normative richness of combining two previously separated domains of responsibility.

The third path of norm emergence takes the norms from the practice itself. Scientific research leads to next generations of research; artistic performances lead to new kinds of art. Practices which only have an internal logic, like sports and arts, can be sufficiently characterized by their own dynamics, although to what extent depends on institutional factors. In the technological domain, however, practices not only have an internal logic, they also have an external point. In medicine, for example, the central norm can be stated in two ways: promoting (physical) health and diminishing (physical) suffering. It would be interesting to dwell on these differences, but for the argument at stake it would suffice to mention their relation to the world outside the practice. This is typical in the case of technological practices: they have their own normativity related to external elements. On the basis of this structure debates on the central normativity may foster the quality and the effectiveness of the practice. Doctors may dispute the two norms, to come to a better understanding of what it means to be a good doctor. Even military researchers may consider alternatives for land mines (for example designing their active life span not to exceed six

months) from the normative position that they really want to work on defensive weapon systems.

These examples lead to the heart of virtuous practices. Basic to the previous examples is the assumption that practices will have their own logic, their own normativity, worth being defended against external institutional forces and worth being improved by internal debates. The concept, "virtue of practical normativity," may lead to a number of consequences.

To start with, it may emphasize the formulation of professional codes in which groups of practitioners describe the quality requirements of the work to be done and of the members to be admitted to their group. Although the status of such descriptions may run from a rather loose heuristic formulation to a strongly disciplined one, with regard to the content two (extreme) directions are open.

One direction stresses the (relative) autonomy of the practice, leading to the protection of one's domain against invasion by external pressures. The anarchistic ideas put forward by Paul Feyerabend (protect society from scientists, protect scientists from philosophers) can be extended to engineers: protect professionals from market imperatives. Ideas about a "risk-society," developed by Ulrich Beck, can find a specific elaboration in this special context: let practitioners play their own game, not directed to some specific social or economic benefit.

Another elaboration of professional codes emphasizes the external point of a practice, leading to societal-ethical consequences. In such codes not only responsibilities for the internal quality but also for external objectives are formulated. Examples are professional medical codes and codes of educators. For hard boiled technologists such codes, with the exception of a few proposals, hardly exist (Hogenhuis). Although some causes may be put forward to explain this situation, nevertheless, proposals aiming in that direction might be valuable. Not only for ethical reasons (it may be helpful in a moral dilemma to get institutionalized support from peers), but also for giving an impulse to the self-image of the technologist in the (new) sense of being a virtuous engineer.

Stressing the practice-related virtues may even lead to new insights in the central normativity of practices themselves. In these days much attention is given to environmental aspects of technology. Within a purely instrumental approach to technology

this implies adding some environment-related specifications to the usual course of action; by accepting environment as an essential part of the central normativity, a totally new concept of engineering would be possible, and this might lead to unorthodox approaches of research and development.

### **Conclusion**

The highlighting of virtue and practice stems from two basic ideas. The first is the conceptual and emotional poverty of the usual approach to normative action. Being situated in the dichotomized field of technical versus social responsibility, technologists are presumed to serve so many masters that the outcomes may vary from schizophrenia to total indifference. The concept of practice has been introduced to analyze the condition of professionals in more dimensions than only two. It has also been introduced to clear the grounds for fresh ideas on being a good engineer.

The second reason to introduce the concepts of virtue and practice stems from cultural or even existential arguments. It is based on taking the reality-changing power of technology seriously. Although the ideology of solid scientific data is very strong (any manager who wants to make a decision will demand more exact figures than science can deliver; any patient desires more medical research than is healthy for him), this assumption is not correct for activities concerning the future. Taken technically and existentially, the ideology of certainty misses the point of humanity. In the long history of humankind the idea of calculating the future was a product of the Enlightenment, having no firm grounds before and having lost its credibility thereafter. Instead of certainty a different code word has to be coined: *trust*. Trust is based on experiences of the past and on hope (rather than data) for the future. In terms borrowed from Kant, we might say that trust is a regulative concept, worth revitalizing.

The emphasis laid on the concepts of virtue and practice is aimed at restoring the importance of the idea of trust. As well for humanity as for technologists such an approach may be valuable, by making people less frightened and by making practitioners more self-confident.



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# Chemistry in Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*

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## **Abstract**

*Hegel's chef-d'œuvre, the Wissenschaft der Logik (Science of Logic), contains a section on 'measure'. As 'measure' unites the two categories 'quality' and 'quantity', it is a key aspect for determining qualitative and quantitative objects, and hence is the decisive category for natural sciences. In the chemical passages of this section, Hegel took concepts from chemistry (for example 'elective attraction'), changed their function, and converted them into categories of logic. In this paper, the relationship between the development of categories by reflecting reason and the chemical material cited for this development is discussed. Hegel claimed that the chemical material presupposed in the logical development could be replaced with specified proportions of measures, derived from developing and specifying the category 'measure'. This claim is criticized.*

**Keywords:** *Hegel, logical development, measure, chemical concepts, logic and its material.*

## **1. Introduction**

In the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, Hegel faced the emergence of the science of chemistry. Chemistry revolutionized its central theorems and produced sensational discoveries in a bafflingly short period, but could not achieve clarification of its fundamental principles. In a systematic way, Hegel tried to conceive the highly topical knowledge of chemical phenomena and incorporated the result of this reflection into a key passage of his *Science of Logic*, the section about "measure"[1]. There he developed the categories of 'quality' and 'quantity' into new categories, *viz.* those of 'measure'. He claimed the latter to be fundamental for the philosophy of natural sciences. In the course of this, Hegel not only used examples from contemporary science for didactic illustrations in order to grasp more easily the structure of a category, but he also took concepts from chemistry and physics ('elective attraction', 'nodal line'), changed their function, and converted them into categories of logic. These categories, 'new' as compared to the classical concepts of logic, are the coordinating links for the

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movement from the categories of 'being' ('quality', 'quantity', and 'measure') to those of 'essence' ('identity', 'difference', 'contradiction', 'ground').

Although fundamental, this movement remained obscure. On the one hand, natural scientists considered Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* to be hocus-pocus, drastically contradicted by the progress in chemistry and physics, and discredited all passages of Hegel's *Science of Logic* in which models from the *Philosophy of Nature* played a role. On the other hand, philosophers tried to keep the *Science of Logic* independent of every specific material that had become obsolete by scientific progress. However, taking logic as a realm of pure thought (*i.e.* thinking about only pure thinking) makes the idea of a development of logical concepts impossible. Hegel himself considered the passage where he develops logical concepts *with regard to* chemical and physical concepts as one of the most difficult topics.[2]

## 2. From Kant to Hegel

Hegel's construction of concepts is comprehensible only if we recall Kant's explanation of transcendental principles of pure reason[3] and of metaphysical principles of natural sciences.[4] Kant distinguished[5] between "cognition by pure reason gained only from concepts" [*reine Vernunftkenntniß aus bloßen Begriffen*], which results from immanent reflection of reason upon its pure concepts of understanding and which he called "pure philosophy or metaphysics", and "cognition by reason gained from the constructing of concepts" [*Vernunftkenntniß durch Construction der Begriffe*], which he called "mathematical cognition by reason" [*mathematische Vernunftkenntniß*]. Since construction cannot be performed without anything, a material is required that Kant found in 'pure intuition'. Starting from "mathematical cognition by reason", cognition of nature by reason-according to Kant the "pure part of all real natural science"[6]-can be obtained if the "existence of something" and, more specific, the "concept of matter at all" is taken as the basis for construction.[7] Only by means of this concept, possible relations in mathematics can be restricted to those relevant to physics. It was already Kant's idea to develop principles apodictically valid for every natural science. The reflection of reason upon itself enables synthetic judgements a priori, "but only

discursively, by concepts".[8] It does not remain in itself, but becomes reason constructing in the "pure intuitions of space and time", where constructing is limited by something third, the presupposed and heterogeneous material of construction. Kant's claim on this is inconsistent: His "concept of matter at all" does not require particular empirical knowledge; however, it is "empirical in itself", separated from "particular experiences".[9] Because of the key function of "construction of concepts" [*Construction der Begriffe*], there is, according to Kant, only so much real science in each physical theory, as mathematics is found in it.[10]

Hegel's "development of measure" is a consequent continuation as well as a critique of Kant's plan to construct the principles for natural sciences a priori. Kant's "mathematical cognition by reason", which is constructing concepts in 'pure intuition', is treated by Hegel as the development of the category 'quantity' in the section Quantity of the *Science of Logic*. The limitation of "mathematical cognition by reason" to apodictic principles of the natural sciences is elaborated on in the section Measure. To that end, "mathematical cognition by reason" is constitutive in a double manner; first, as the basis and starting point for the development of the category 'measure'; secondly, as the form of "constructing" in the "development of measure", viz. as the "quantitative ratio",[11] according the following steps. One measure is set into relations to other measures; these relations of measures yield distinct proportions (ratios) of measures; these proportions (ratios) can be determined by an 'exponent'; 'exponents' on their part are measures, they are set into relations to others which yield once more proportions of measures *etc.*

According to Kant, the categories are given and fixed, and as such they are presupposed for the "complete analysis of the concept of matter at all".[12] They are alien to the constructing activity, but required. Hegel criticized Kant's representation of the categories in that Kant picked them up "empirically",[13] viz. out of a "subjective logic", by gathering given forms of judgement and deriving thereof his (pure) concepts of understanding (categories). Such an empirical access to the categories is contradictory to their function in a transcendental logic, however. Accordingly, Kant did not conceive the "necessity" of the categories. "He does not think

about setting the unity and deducing out of the unity the differences" and therefore he did not think about "deducing" the categories.[14]

Hegel systematized the categories (or, more precisely, the titles for the four classes of the categories 'quality', 'quantity', 'relation', 'modality'), which, according to Kant, are alien to each other as well as to the constructing activity, by developing them as merging into one another. Thus, the "development of measure" emerges out of 'quality' and 'quantity' and is their unity. This was Hegel's response to Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. He further developed the categories that are more concrete, such as 'real measure', 'measure as series of proportions of measures', 'elective affinity', 'nodal line of proportions of measures' in the section Measure. These are the building blocks for a theory of the fundamental principles of natural sciences. The key for understanding Hegel's critique of Kant's "construction of concepts" lies in Hegel's material for the "development of measure", for it replaces Kant's "concept of matter at all" as the limiting basis for the constructing of concepts in 'pure intuition'.

### **3. The Material for the Work of Determining and Developing Concepts**

In order to discuss the relation between reason, which reflects upon its concepts and develops them by construction, and the material being whatsoever, we must first examine the assumption that there is no such relation. According to this view, we cannot start with the given existence of a specifically determined material and from given categories by which that material can alone be conceived. The only 'thing' given and presupposed would be, as Hegel himself said, "being, pure being,-without any further determination".[15] Thus, the *Science of Logic* would be an immanent reflection upon that "pure being". This immanent reflection is not to be understood in the subjective-idealistic version, *i.e.* as the immanent reflection of reason reflecting by means of the principles 'unity', 'diversity', and 'affinity' upon the categories given in the forms of judgement. But it is yet precisely the immanent reflection to which nothing else is given but an object at all-as indefinite as possible-*viz.* "pure being". The "development of measure" would be the immanent reflection upon what arises from the beginning, the absolute denial of

determination, which alone can be presupposed, *i.e.* the immanent reflection upon the 'unity' of 'quality' and 'quantity'. Prima facie, it seems to be like that: One measure is set into relation to other measures; from the (distinct) ratio of two measures an 'exponent' of this ratio can be inferred which in turn is a measure; 'exponents' for their part are set into relation, and so ratios of ratios of measures are formed; from those new ratios in turn further 'exponents' can be inferred *etc.* If one follows this deceptive idea, the "development of measure" would be a permutation of the categories 'quality' and 'quantity', performed by reflecting reason by means of its own categories of reflection (the concepts of the 'determinations of reflection', *i.e.* 'identity', 'difference', 'contradiction' *etc.*). However, such a movement of reflecting reason could not be distinguished from the "movement from nothing to nothing, and through that back to itself".[16] For there cannot be made a distinction between the first movement, which takes place in "pure being" and therefore in complete indifference, and the second one which does not make this presupposition and which is a only movement of the 'determinations of reflections'. Thus, the logic of 'being' would coincide with the logic of 'essence'.

However, Hegel denied such a consequence. Therefore, one must conclude that his determining and developing of the abstract beginning toward more and more concrete concepts (in the *Doctrine of Being*) refers to a presupposed material. (It is doubtful whether Hegel himself was always clear about that point or not. In the *Doctrine of Being*, he tried to reduce the presupposition of a distinct and specific material to the presupposition that science has an object at all of whatever specification.) It is only because a (specific) material restricts reflecting reason,[17] that the process of determining and developing, qua productive imagination and/or qua experimental work acquiring and reshaping the material, is a synthesizing process. In other words, the reflection upon the categories ('quality', 'quantity', 'unity', 'measure', 'negation', and 'relation') and upon their combinations would run idle if it would not refer to a material, each time specifically determined and diverse. Therefore, the key for understanding the logic of 'being' and especially the logic of 'measure' lies in the relation between a specific material and the categorical reflection.

As the *Doctrine of Being* begins with a completely indeterminate object, precisely with 'pure being' or 'pure indeterminateness', the material for the categorical reflection must be added as a specifically determined material and, thus, must be presupposed. Then, when further developed, determinations of measure are set as a substitute for those presuppositions. For that reason, models from physics and chemistry are quoted in the section Measure; chemical concepts like 'neutrality' or 'affinity' become essential for conceiving a science of logic; 'elective affinity' and the physical concept 'nodal line' become logical categories in and through the synthesizing process of the development of 'measure'.

In Kant's "construction of concepts", judgements synthesized a priori are possible only because the construction is performed in 'pure intuition' and, accordingly, has received as its material the 'pure manifold' (*i.e.* the 'pure diversity') which is included in the 'pure intuition'. Kant's argumentation provokes the questions if this 'pure manifold' is an inconsistent concept and if such a 'pure manifold', when removed from every qualified determination, can be material at all. As compared to Kant's basis for the "construction of concepts", his 'pure manifold', Hegel's substratum for 'developing categories' is more concrete.

#### **4. Reason Reflecting Upon its Categories Needs Chemical Material**

In the following, the relation between the reason that reflects upon and develops categories and the material for this reflection will be brought out in an example, the 'chemical' passages of the *Science of Logic* in the section on 'measure'. Since 'measure' unites the two categories 'quality' and 'quantity', it is a key aspect for determining qualitative and quantitative objects and therefore the decisive category for natural sciences. The category 'measure', resulting from a movement of reflecting reason, corresponds-as all categories in the *Doctrine of Being*-to a process of and between real things, *viz.* the process of measuring. Something can only be measured if the thing to be measured is related to a rule.[18]

If both sides of that relation are not of the same quality, then-as the next stage[19] in the development of measuring-a new and more concrete type of 'measure' emerges: the ratio of two quantifiable

qualities, one of which is taken as the unit (denominator) and the other one as counting (numerator). For instance, if the two qualities are time and space, velocity is the emerging measure. But as time and space are 'abstract' features, their ratio is external to the thing itself. In order to perform a more genuine measurement, it is necessary to go on to a new measure in which the quality in the numerator is a core quality (mass) compared with that in the denominator (volume). The resulting ratio (density) is a measure that specifies what a thing is. (In Hegel's time, scientists tried to understand the differences in the quality [of substances] as a function of their density.) As compared with the more superficial velocity, density is a quality that constitutes the thing's reality. Hegel called it "real measure".[20]

Yet it is doubtful if the transition to the "real" and allegedly more intrinsic measure can be regarded as a step in the logic of measuring without referring to a particular material. It is also doubtful if there is a merely logical reason that the direct ratio of mass and volume is the correct one for such a measuring. Anyway, chemical substances can be determined and characterized by their "real measure" 'density'. However, this measure is different from the substratum (the chemical substance) to which it refers and which must be given first of all. A substance cannot be completely characterized (i.e. identified) only by its density. Characterization requires density values of several substances to be compared. Moreover, in such a comparison, the substances remain external to each other, to the effect that characterization by external comparison turns out to be superficial. For example, change of external conditions, such as temperature and pressure, can change the values of the superficial quality 'density'.

Thus, the next stage[21] in the logic of measuring can be attained when the substances are no longer external to each other. This is the case if a real process happens in which the substances themselves are involved; first of all, they are mixed. The resulting combination of two measures turns out to be not simply the arithmetical mean, calculable from the individual density values. Instead, the new measure for the combination requires a new measurement. Through the combination of two substances, the movement is performed from an external comparison to a distinct and fixed relation between two measures-generating a new ratio



of two measures that, in turn, are ratios of measures. The value of the new ratio characterizes the combination. It is different from the arithmetical mean that would be an 'abstract' measure external to the combination. From that difference, Hegel concludes that there must be a process in which the substances change, and that the quality of a substance can be characterized more precisely by comparing its initial density with the densities of its combinations with other substances.

Again, it is doubtful if the transition to the combination of real measures (a ratio of ratios of measures) is an inherent development in the logic of measuring.[22] Reference to a real process is necessary. Hegel-as well as contemporary chemists-had difficulties to distinguish between processes in nature. In those times, alloys, solutions, and chemical compounds were frequently confused. At the stage that deals with the combination of 'real measures', Hegel quotes solutions and alloys. In the following stage,[23] "measure as a series of proportions of measures", he quotes chemical compounds. The change of those quoted examples indicates a change of the material to which the (logical) development of 'measure' refers. Moreover, each stage of the development is comprehensible only with regard to its particular material and each transition from one stage to the next one necessarily requires-as Hegel's own sophisticated arguments show-a change of the material quoted.[24] Therefore, we can conclude that Hegel's (logical) development of 'measure' is not self-subsistent and self-sustaining-as his idealistic program demands.

At the already mentioned next stage, Hegel develops the category "self-subsistent real measure" by setting one measure "in relation" to several other measures. This yields "a series of proportions of measures" all being definite, distinct, and fixed. The basis for setting those measures "in relation", *i.e.* reason's material for developing categories, is real processes: the involvement and chemical reactions of substances characterized by "self-subsistent real measures" (*i.e.* by densities). The resulting 'series of proportions of measures' are the series of stoichiometric masses. For example, since one unit mass of sulphuric acid can be neutralized by a specific mass of each of a series of bases, the series of neutralizing masses characterizes sulphuric acid and is called "neutralization series". Analogously, we can determine a

"neutralization series" for the same unit mass of another acid, *e.g.* nitric acid. In these two "neutralization series", the values for each base are different, but their ratios are the same. By standardization we can get a specific value for every acid with regard to the standardized "neutralization series". In chemistry, this new measure is called equivalent weight. It characterizes a substance more specifically, more 'chemically' (if the comparative is accepted) and more intrinsically than density. Hegel called it "*Fürsich-bestimmtseyn des Maaßes*" [the measure's being-determined-for-itself] and pointed out that it is an intensive magnitude and that it is more concrete in determining the presupposed substance. In the further development, it replaces the preceding measure (density).

Hegel maintained that a transition in the development of measure can be achieved in strictly logical terms and that the quoted material (here, chemical processes) is arbitrary to the development of categories. However, there are remarkable shifts within the quoted material.[25] At the first stage, densities are compared while the substances remain unchanged. Secondly, substances are amalgamated and the density of the resulting alloy is compared with the initial densities. Finally, substances react with each other, especially acids and bases in neutralization reactions, and this yields proportions of the stoichiometric masses (not the densities). Only if we refer to the chemical content, the logical transition is comprehensible as well as conclusive; if we do not, the transition is a mystery.[26] By assimilating the just discovered laws of constant and multiple proportions, Hegel directly contradicted Kant who disputed chemistry to be a science.[27]

In order to proceed to the next stage[28] in developing the category 'measure', the particular measures obtained in the previous stage (*i.e.* the equivalent weights) are related to each other. For this logical operation, certain chemical reactions (neutralization reactions of acids and bases) serve as material. The material penetrates the logical development to such an extent that chemical concepts emerge-actually not merely as examples, but rather as content substantial for the logical development that would otherwise run idle. In the neutralization product (the salt), acid and base are in a distinct and fixed proportion, more

precisely: the ratio of the stoichiometric masses is constant. The resulting salt has the chemical property that it can be dissolved by certain acids to form corresponding salts and that it excludes the dissolution by other acids which remain inactive. Contemporary chemists suggested an 'elective attraction' that should act between acids and bases if they form a compound. If an acid ( $A_2$ ) can dissolve a salt ( $A_1B_1$ ) by replacing the salt's acid to form a new salt ( $A_2B_1$ ), then the 'elective attraction' between  $A_2$  and  $B_1$  should be stronger than that between  $A_1$  and  $B_1$ . The 'elective attraction' should characterize a compound.

In Hegel's categorical construction of the *Science of Logic*, the step from the neutralization reaction to the 'elective' quality of the neutralization product is formulated as the transition from '*Fürsich-bestimmtseyn des Maaßes*' (which he called an 'exponent' of the proportions of previous measures) to 'elective affinity'. He borrowed that concept from contemporary chemistry and used it unchanged as a logical category of 'measure'. If, according to Hegel, those 'exponents' enter into a fixed proportion, they are "negatively set" in it.[29] Through this (negatively setting of the 'exponents'), something underlying for that proportion is set which, first of all, is determined merely negatively against the previous measures (*viz.*, it is not the presupposed 'quality' from the beginning, nor 'quantity', nor 'immediate measure', nor 'exponent' of a proportion of measures, nor a variable 'relation' of such 'exponents'). Nevertheless, it should be the substratum for the proportions of measures and the "truth"[30] of the previous determinations. This construction, and particularly the crucial point of the construction, becomes comprehensible and conclusive through the relation to the material. The transition, allegedly performed by reflection on the category 'measure', can be deciphered as the transition from the equivalent weight, which results from ratios of stoichiometric masses, to the chemical affinity that is measured today by a quantity of energy such as the free enthalpy (Gibbs energy). Hegel wanted to explain the constancy of the stoichiometric masses of the salt's components by a new measure that describes the chemical property according to which the formation of other salts are excluded. This new measure (*i.e.* chemical affinity) should be developed from the previous measure (equivalent weight) as its underlying basis. Hegel would

say that determining a substance—all the way from volume, weight, specific weight, and equivalent weight to elective affinity—means measuring more concretely and thus gradually getting a better understanding of its essence. His efforts at explanation were in accordance with those of contemporary chemists who empirically searched for a relation between the numbers for a ‘series of neutralization’ (equivalent masses) and the ‘elective affinity’.[31] Today, we know that the driving force of chemical reactions, indicated by a quantity of the measure ‘Gibbs energy’, is not connected—following a set pattern—with the proportion of the stoichiometric masses of the reacting substances. We also know that—in Hegelian terms—the constant proportion of ‘exponents’ and ‘elective affinity’ are ‘external’ to each other and that, therefore, ‘elective affinity’ cannot be developed from the previous proportion of measures. Hegel was aware that the new measure (chemical affinity) is qualitatively different from the previous measure (equivalent weight). However, he was not willing to acknowledge that this difference is a substantial one in the underlying basis, *i.e.* in the material for the determination of ‘measure’. The proportions of stoichiometric masses of the reacting substances belong to stoichiometry, whereas Gibbs energies belong to thermodynamics that is different and not derivable from stoichiometry. The substantial difference could have been inferred from the fact that, in the development of ‘measure’, mere reflection upon the previous determination of ‘measure’ (the stoichiometric mass proportions) cannot create the new quality. The impossibility indicates that the material distinctiveness does not completely resolve into those (logical) determinations of measure. However, that would be in conflict with Hegel’s general program to replace the presupposed material distinctiveness by those determinations of ‘measure’, developed in the process of reflecting upon the category ‘measure’.

Hegel definitely saw the difference between stoichiometric mass proportions and thermodynamic quantities of energy. However, the difference appears in the *Science of Logic* not as a substantial one but in the relation between what he calls the quantitative and the qualitative “side”[32] of ‘elective affinity’; or, more precisely, in that both “sides” together do not yield a consistent determination of ‘elective affinity’. The “quantitative side” is the value of the

measure from the stoichiometric proportions of neutralizing amounts and is interpreted as quantitative affinity or power of affinity. Being a continuous function, this cannot explain the specific quality of 'elective affinity', the specifically excluding reaction that is a discontinuous function. The explanation, and that is the aim of Hegel's argumentation, should be provided by the turn from continuous change of quantitative proportions of measures to a new quality, performed on the "nodal line", *i.e.* the next stage in the development of 'measure'. [33]

The inconsistency of quantified affinity and qualitatively excluding reaction blows up the determination of the measure 'elective affinity'. This indicates a substantial difference between-in modern terms-quantities of mass and quantities of energy. In Hegelian terms, the inconsistency reflects the difference between the presupposed material distinctiveness and the development of 'measure' by reason reflecting upon its categories. The latter difference becomes, according to Hegel, part of the development of 'measure' itself and is then, in the further development, both cancelled and saved (*i.e.* 'aufgehoben' [sublated]) by being raised to a reflected form. The crux of idealism lies in this 'transformation'.

Hegel takes the inconsistency as the starting point for his further argumentation: if the relation between quantitative affinity and qualitatively excluding reaction cannot be resolved for a single elective affinity (in a quasi-static manner), then reflecting reason must go on to processes where elective affinities interact with each other. In these processes, the inconsistency should be determinable and resolvable into the relation between continuously changeable and discontinuous quantities of measure. The development of the category 'elective affinity' into 'nodal line of proportions of measures'-the next step in Hegel's derivation [33]-should happen in processes where elective affinities interact with each other, to be represented by proportions of their measures. For these proportions, again, other chemical reactions, *viz.* the reactions of salts with each other, are the material basis. According to Hegel's categorical construction, one elective affinity "is continuing itself" [34] into other elective affinities. This process of continuing can be expressed by a quantitative, continuous run-through of proportions of measures. From this run-through, Hegel infers

something qualitative that is required as its basis. The transition to this qualitative basis is the next step of the logical development of 'measure'. Hegel calls it "nodal line" and suggest that this 'measure' must have a producer, viz. the "self-specifying unity [...] which produces within itself proportions of measures".[35] The new measure is no longer-as the determinations of 'measure' before-a proportion of "self-subsistent real measures" (such as density, equivalent weight, elective affinity) and, thus, does not refer to a qualitative variety of substances to be presupposed. But it is a whole of process and substratum, of reflexivity and quantitative externality. It is a reflexive unity which, in a process of self-specification, sets proportions of measures and alternates between those which remain only quantitatively different and those which form specific measures by which the presupposed qualities are completely determinable and in which they resolve themselves.[36]

### 5. Hegel's Work With the Material

Neither the categories ('quality', 'quantity', 'unity', 'measure', 'negation', 'relation') by themselves nor reflection upon them and their combinations yield a process which can claim to be a 'development of measure'. In order to develop categories synthetically, reference to a specific material is necessary because only with this material we can ascertain measures and proportions of measures. Natural scientists do not work with an arbitrary, undefined muddle but with identified substances under standardized experimental conditions. They first need to establish a field of objects before proportions of measures (the logical term for laws of nature) can be applied.

Hegel knew that. However, in his view, a defined field of objects only serves to provide some quotable objects such that the examples (taken from different fields) can be used as models for logical developing. These models then play the role of examples, apparently arbitrarily called into play and replaceable with others that might be more suitable for the purpose of illustration (*demonstratio*). Indeed, Hegel replaced his models in the progress of his argument: solutions/alloys with chemical compounds, and neutralization reactions with the reactions of salts with each other. Thus, the particular features ('quality') of

a model (and of the corresponding object) are regarded irrelevant to his logical development. Moreover, Hegel applied concepts from a certain discipline that are defined for its field of objects without further ado to other fields; *e.g.* the chemical concept 'elective affinity' to sounds and their relations in acoustics, the physical concept 'nodal line' to chemical reactions of salts and their 'elective attraction'.

Since the synthetic development requires the relation between reason reflecting upon categories, on the one hand, and a specific material, on the other, and since this material, as the replacement of the models shows, is regarded interchangeable, Hegel presupposed a common analogy between the corresponding objects of these models. When certain features of the objects do not fit the common analogy, he either explained this due to the still insufficiently developed state of the science[37] or declared the features as unapproachable by reflecting reason and relegated them to "the particular areas of concrete natural science".[38] The assertion of an analogy, including the distinction in what respects the models (and the corresponding objects) are analogous to each other and in what not, cannot lie in the material itself but only in the categorical reflection. This, however, would be in conflict with Hegel's understanding that the synthetic development requires a relation to the material. Supposing that such an analogy exists, every material would be equally suitable for the subject of logical development because of the same logos, and one could keep to the model once chosen. Why then do we need to make a special selection among the models; why that juggling-really like a virtuoso-with the models, if they are interchangeable?

Hegel noticed that the development of 'measure' requires determined, qualified objects and that, for each step of the development, different objects are necessary. His artistic composition of the models in quotes, which are crossed over with and merged into one another, should ensure a development of categories that is self-subsistent and self-sustaining with regard to the material as well as referring to the material. However, the artistic handling of quotes has no corresponding basis in the material denoted by those quotes. Thus, Hegel's postulated transition from equivalent weight to chemical affinity could not be confirmed by modern knowledge. A Hegelian

could respond by claiming that Hegel chose but an inappropriate example due to the insufficient knowledge of his time. But then we would require better examples because the content of his text cannot be presented without material examples.

Two possibilities are open: If Hegel's artistic handling of quotes is not related to the material denoted by the quotes, a moment of subjective arbitrariness would govern the access to the material.[39] If, on the other hand, such an 'artistic' work with the material proves to be essential for the text, then this would contradict his general program of Objective Idealism.

### **6. What is the Impetus for the Logical Development?**

It is a cardinal problem, to be resolved in the *Science of Logic*, if and how the logical transitions are well-founded. The transition from 'elective affinity' to 'nodal line of proportions of measures' may serve as example. The starting point is the determination of 'elective affinity'. 'Neutrality' is specified as 'elective affinity' by the measure 'power of affinity', which Hegel took from the previous proportions of measures (*i.e.* of equivalent weights). That specification contains a contradiction. The specifying agent, a quantitatively changeable measure, and the basis for the specification, 'neutrality' (determined merely as the negative unity of the measures which form 'elective affinity'), are both 'external' to each other, *i.e.* they are incompatible with each other. Therefore that specification cannot achieve-what it should-the explanation of the specifically excluding quality of 'elective affinity'.[40] In Hegel's text, this appears as an inconsistency of the relation between the quantitative and the qualitative "side" of 'elective affinity'. Reflecting reason could recognize this inconsistency as an indication of a preceding, determined quality of the material, *viz.* that stoichiometric proportions of the amounts of the initial substances and Gibbs energy of the compound are physical quantities not reducible to each other.

According to Hegel, the impetus for logical development is a contradiction brought out by reason and, then, reflected by reason. Because reason does not accept such a contradiction, it does not come to a standstill. Here, the determination of 'elective affinity'-'neutrality' is specified as the specifically excluding



'elective affinity' by the (continuously changing) measure 'power of affinity'-contradicts itself. By reflecting this contradiction, reason turns this contradiction and, through that, the relation between the principle of specification and the basis of specification into *its* object. Thus, reflecting reason must move on to the process of specification in which the contradiction is resolved. This process manifests itself in the relations which individual and diverse 'elective affinities' form with each other. Such 'elective affinities' are measures; their relations can be expressed by distinct proportions of measures. In order to determine such relations as proportions of measures, there must be a substratum that is the underlying basis for these relations. The substratum for these relations emerges in the model cited, *i.e.* the chemical reactions of salts with each other. The logical transition to the 'nodal line' is therefore a process developed out of a contradiction and driven by reason reflecting this contradiction. In order not to remain at a standstill by merely asserting the statement of a contradiction, reason requires reference to particular material. Only with that material quoted, relations of those measures (the 'elective affinities') are determinable, and proportions of measures are defined. In the quote essential to the transition from 'elective affinity' to 'nodal lines of proportions of measures', Hegel used an equivocation in the concept 'neutrality' that was not yet cleared up before years after Hegel's death: First, 'neutrality' is the one salt; afterwards, 'neutrality' is the state in which reactions of salts occur. This is an example of how the models that are used for the different stages of the logical development merge.

### **7. Idealistic Dialectics?**

In Hegel's 'development of measure', 'immediate qualities' are replaced with measures, proportions of measures, relations of such proportions, 'exponents' for such relations, *etc.* This is not completely wrong. It reflects the progress of knowledge in the natural sciences. At the beginning, chemical substances were characterized by immediate properties such as gloss, fusibility, and volatility without change. From these three properties, chemists went over to their unity which was determined as the 'basic substance' of metals, 'mercurius'. 'Mercurius' was no longer an

'immediate quality', but a general principle of metals and related to the moon, the feminine *etc.* Later, such 'immediate qualities' and their uniting 'principles' were replaced with measures-such as density, melting point, relative atomic mass-by a process of scientific development including reflection, critique of the 'principles', and experimental work with substances and their controlled reactions. These measures can form proportions that are partly determined by laws. There can be no objection to such a development of more and more specific measures and to the replacement of former and out-dated 'qualities'. In Hegel's terms, this is the progress from 'immediate quality' to 'immediate measure', to 'real measure', to proportions of such measures, to relations of such proportions, to their 'exponents', *etc.*

There can also be no objection to the findings that the continuous change of proportions of measures is connected with the discontinuous change of qualities.[41] Every specified measure (and thus the specific constellation of continuous and discontinuous change of measures on the 'nodal line') includes qualitative moments. These moments enable reflection upon the qualitative presuppositions of the measure, by which its qualitative basis-a material substratum-can be inferred. The specified proportions of measures fit this material substratum. However, the substratum does not completely dissolve into these proportions of measures, because there are qualitatively diverse substances and basic measures, such as mass, energy, *etc.*, that are not reducible to each other.

Hegel's idealistic program of developing categories does not acknowledge any substantial difference of the substrata. The *Science of Logic* contains two ways of reasoning: first, inference to the basis ('ground') by (metaphorically speaking) going backwards; secondly, self-specifying of 'measure' and, through that, developing more concrete categories-metaphorically speaking, going forwards. Hegel merged both ways; they are set identical. Thereby, the basis ('ground') is set as the result of the development of 'measure'. Thus, Hegel claimed that the qualitative moments included in 'measure' could be completely determined by the system of 'proportions of measure'. From that he concluded that the presupposed qualities could be *dissolved*

*in and replaced with* specified proportions of measures, arising from a process of self-specifying of 'measure'. Ultimately, this claim summarizes what idealistic dialectics argues in respect to the relation between chemistry and philosophy.

How can we formulate a critique of idealistic dialectics?[42] First, by disclosing that idealistic dialectics fails and why it fails, *viz.* because of its inconsistent relation to the material. By so doing (*cf.* the previous sections) we find out something about the material that otherwise, without reference to the idealistic construction, could not be conceived. Secondly, by formulating two theses in opposition to the idealistic construction:

***A. Proportions of Measures are not a Complete Substitution for Qualities.***

Relations between measures exist, as defined relations, only for particular connections of nature. Usually, these connections can be approached only by experimental work that isolates them from the universal connection of nature. Such concrete work refers to a material that is presupposed, determined in itself, and specific. If the dissection of particular connections of nature is an essential condition for every knowledge in the natural sciences and if this condition cannot be eliminated in the progress of knowledge (because the universal connection of nature cannot be completely composed as sum total out of all the particular connections of nature ever dissected), then we can draw the following conclusion. The 'development of measure' which expresses the results of gaining knowledge in terms of proportions of proportions of measures cannot both cancel and save (*i.e.* 'aufheben' [sublate]) the specific qualities, determined in itself and given with the universal connection of nature.

***B. Measures are Measures Referring to a Substratum.***

The specific qualities of the substratum are replaced with measures, relations of measures, their proportions, and rules about the proportions of proportions of measures (*i.e.* laws of nature). Hegel tried to conceive such a determination of measure by the development of 'measure'. More precisely, reflecting reason first develops the category 'measure' from the categories 'quality' and 'quantity' and then develops the thus obtained and expounded 'measure' further into the 'nodal line'. This reflection upon the

category 'measure' cannot be separated from the development of the category itself. It refers to the relation between measure and substratum, which thus becomes the material of this reflection. Hegel determined the relation between reflecting reason, which develops more and more categories of 'measure', and the material for this developing in such a way that the latter is considered replaceable, merely quoted and merging into one another, finally set by the movement of reflection. This is wrong. *The (specific) material is constitutive for the development of 'measure' into 'essence' and is not to be set (aside) as void, looking from the perspective of the result.* It is simply pretense to think that the development could succeed only by quoting material and that the material would be used up with the result (the general principle of the 'nodal line' or, then, the 'essence') and that, by this procedure, its function for the development of 'measure' into 'essence' would be fulfilled. The pretense that such a movement, detaching itself from material, could succeed is common both to Objective Idealism and (modern) Systems Theory.[43]

### **Endnotes:**

- [1] Cf., Hegel 1832, pp. 323 ff.
- [2] Cf., Hegel 1832, p. 327, ll. 18 f.
- [3] Cf., Kant 1787, B 189 ff.
- [4] Cf., Kant 1786.
- [5] Cf., Kant 1786, p. 469; 1787, B 741 ff.
- [6] Cf., Kant 1786, p. 469.
- [7] Cf., Kant 1786, p. 472.
- [8] Cf., Kant 1787, B 748.
- [9] Cf., Kant 1786, p. 472.
- [10] Cf., Kant 1786, p. 470.
- [11] Cf., Hegel 1832, p. 310 ff.
- [12] Cf., Kant 1786, p. 472.
- [13] Cf., Hegel 1816, p. 44, l. 5.
- [14] Cf., Hegel 1833, p. 568.
- [15] Cf., Hegel 1832, p. 68, l. 19.
- [16] Cf., Hegel 1813, p. 250, l. 3.
- [17] Restriction of reflecting reason by a material means limitation. 'Limitation' is the third category under the title 'quality' after 'reality' and 'negation'. If we follow Hegel and understand this third category as emerging from the first and second one as their unity, we are confronted with the following problem: Limitation of reflecting reason makes possible the development of categories as a synthesizing process. However, the question remains if such limitation is

constructable merely by 'distinct negation' without relation to a specifically qualified material.

[18] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, p. 333.

[19] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, pp. 336 ff.

[20] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, pp. 345 ff.

[21] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, p. 347.

[22] Hegel gives the impression that the logic of the developing of 'measure' should be independent of special natural processes. In his *exposition de texte*, Burbidge supports this view; *cf.* Burbidge 1996, pp. 31, 222.

[23] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, pp. 348 ff.

[24] *Cf.*, Burbidge (1996, p. 34) argues that the "same quality" is measured, only in "a more sophisticated way". However, in alloys the densities of the components are the measures to be compared, whereas in chemical compounds the stoichiometric masses of the reacting substances are the measures to be set in relation. If natural scientists develop new methods of measuring, they do not erase the specific material. On the contrary, more sophisticated methods can only be found with respect to the resistance of diverse materials. Burbidge suggests that the developing of such methods would be a refinement which proceeds by reflection upon the inherent weakness of the former methods. The specific material and the experimental work with this material would be of a second order (pp. 224 f.).

[25] Burbidge (1996, p. 38) concedes that there is a replacement among the material quoted, and he maintains "that this move cannot be represented, only conceived. For thought must work through the limitations [...] only thought is plastic enough to undergo such metamorphosis". However, it is questionable how this 'plastic' thought could find something beyond the representation that the diverse materials would have in common if their associating thread is actually beyond themselves. It is also questionable why thought should be 'plastic' if it acts beyond the representation of the material for which that plasticity is needed.

[26] Therefore, this passage remained *terra incognita* for 150 years. Philosophers kept the *Science of Logic*, especially those passages of the *Doctrine of Being*, independent from the referring material and, by that, mystified what they thought to be the realm of pure thought.

[27] Kant maintains in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*: "As long as there is still no concept found for the chemical actions of substances on each other that can be constructed, *i.e.* no law of approaching or removing of their parts can be given by which-for instance, in proportion to their densities and things like that-those movements together with their effects can be visualized a priori in space and can be represented (a demand which will hardly ever be carried out), so long can chemistry become nothing more than a systematic craft or a doctrine of experimenting, but never a real science, because its principles are merely empirical and allow no a priori representation in intuition" (Kant 1786, pp. 470 f.). To develop the "chemical actions of the substances on one another" out of the proportions of "densities" is just what Hegel tried.

[28] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, pp. 352 ff.

- [29] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, p. 351, l. 25.
- [30] *Cf.* Hegel 1813, p. 241, l. 8.
- [31] *Cf.* Ruschig 1997, pp. 128 ff; Kopp 1844, pp. 312 ff.
- [32] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, p. 353, ll. 30 ff.
- [33] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, pp. 364 ff.
- [34] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, p. 364, ll. 10 f.
- [35] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, p. 364, l. 29.
- [36] In this essay it cannot be clarified if Hegel's construction in the chapter 'nodal line of proportions of measures' is correct. For further considerations, *cf.* Burbidge 1996, pp. 44 ff.; Ruschig 1997, pp. 189 ff.
- [37] References: Hegel 1832, p. 362, ll. 32-3; 1813, p. 214, ll. 31-35; 1832, p. 363, ll. 4-6; *cf.* Ruschig 1997, p. 184.
- [38] *Cf.*, Hegel 1832, p. 353, l. 8.
- [39] This moment of subjective arbitrariness in accessing the material is determined contradictorily in Kant's philosophy as well. On the one hand, he acknowledged it, on the other, he dismissed it: The "concept of matter at all" should be "empirical in itself", but could be gained without "special experiences" (Kant 1786, p. 472).
- [40] *Cf.*, Ruschig 1997, pp. 193 f.
- [41] *Cf.* the example above of the connection between the continuous power of affinity and the specifically excluding property of salts.
- [42] *Cf.*, Bulthaup 1975, pp. 141 ff.
- [43] *Cf.*, for example, Luhmann 1984, pp. 30 ff.

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# Ontological Assumptions of the Medical Model of Psychiatry

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## **Abstract**

*A common theme in the contemporary medical model of psychiatry is that pathophysiological processes are centrally involved in the explanation, evaluation, and treatment of mental illnesses. Implied in this perspective is that clinical descriptors of these pathophysiological processes are sufficient to distinguish underlying etiologies. Psychiatric classification requires differentiation between what counts as normality (i.e.- order), and what counts as abnormality (i.e.- disorder). The distinction(s) between normality and pathology entail assumptions that are often deeply presupposed, manifesting themselves in statements about what mental disorders **are**.*

*In this paper, we explicate that realism, naturalism, reductionism, and essentialism are core ontological assumptions of the medical model of psychiatry. We argue that while naturalism, realism, and reductionism can be reconciled with advances in contemporary neuroscience, essentialism-as defined to date-may be conceptually problematic, and we pose an eidetic construct of bio-psychosocial order and disorder based upon complex systems' dynamics. However we also caution against the overuse of any theory, and claim that practical distinctions are important to the establishment of clinical thresholds. We opine that as we move ahead toward both a new edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, and a proposed Decade of the Mind, the task at hand is to re-visit nosologic and ontologic assumptions pursuant to a re-formulation of diagnostic criteria and practice.*

**Keywords:** *realism, naturalism, reductionism, and essentialism, ontological assumptions, psychiatry.*

## **Introduction**

Psychiatry is uniquely problematic because debates over what mental disorders **are** have presented substantial challenges to medical praxis and ethics. In many ways, the question of what constitutes a mental disorder is related to uncertainties about the nature of mental experience, and the underlying relationship(s) of body, brain and mind. Traditionally, medicine has been successful in establishing etiology of diseases and disorders, and developing focal therapies based upon such mechanistic conceptualizations. The acts of medicine (i.e.- diagnosis, therapeutics, and prognosis)

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depend upon the ability to distinguish between what is "normal" and what is pathologic, and the evolution and practice of psychiatry has attempted to adopt and utilize the medical model in this regard. Yet, as neuroscience probes ever deeper into the workings of the brain, it becomes evident that the "mind" remains somewhat enigmatic, and thus, any attempt to link mental events to biology must confront what Chalmers has referred to as the "hard problem" of consciousness [1]. But given the continued ambiguity of the brain-mind relationship, unresolved questions remain of 1) how can, and perhaps should psychiatry proceed to formulate a viable system of characterizing mental normality and abnormality, and 2) how might such formulation affect the scope and tenor of psychiatric practice?

As several papers in this journal have shown, such questions are not esoteric or merely academic. Rather, in light of 1) ongoing progress in genetics and neuroscience; 2) development and tentative articulation of a forthcoming Decade of the Mind; and 3) proposed healthcare reforms that are based to a large extent upon diagnostic classifications, these questions reveal genuine challenges, and form the groundwork upon which a new diagnostic schema (if not **Diagnostic and Statistical Manual**) for, and definition of psychiatric profession and practice might be constructed.

### **Problems in Psychiatric Diagnosis**

Horwitz asserts that "because [diagnostic psychiatry] uses symptoms to classify disorders, it also categorizes an enormous diversity of human emotions, conduct, and relationships as distinct pathological entities" [2]. At first blush, such an approach seems logical because precise diagnostic classifications can presumably distinguish between particular disease states and offer reliable information about etiology, prognosis, and treatment. In the **The Myth of Mental Illness**, Szasz disputed psychiatry's claims of medical legitimacy. Szasz was concerned about the validity of psychiatric concepts, and his critique raised questions about the evaluative nature of the psychiatric enterprise. To Szasz, psychiatry utilized terms (such as delusions, compulsions, and obsessions) that lacked the descriptive objectivity of other domains of medicine. Szasz did not deny that neuroanatomical lesions could result in dysfunctional behaviors, however, such abnormality is, strictly

speaking, a brain disease. Labeling various forms of behavior as pathological "...rests on a serious, albeit simple, error: ... mistaking or confusing what is real with what is imitation; literal meaning with metaphorical meaning; medicine with morals" [3]. If psychiatry lacked terms that could definitively individuate normality from pathology, how could psychiatrists issue seemingly objective diagnoses and prognoses while relying on a predominantly subjective (and elastic) epistemology?

This conceptual tension in psychiatry mirrors larger debates about objectivity and normativity in the philosophy of science. In **The Structure of Scientific Revolutions**, Thomas Kuhn argued that science does not operate within an Archimedean framework, but instead, is sensitive to the normative practices of social communities [4]. Scientists (and clinicians) undergo training and develop expertise within localized academic institutions. As a consequence, intellectual traditions tend to bind scientists and clinicians within a coherent community of practitioners. Kuhn noted that members of a particular academic community tend to hold similar constructs and values about what constitute a good theory, and these values were largely assumed, unquestioned, and maintained as valid within the group. For Kuhn at least, the collective nature of scientific theory-building suggested that communities' **values** matter in the content of scientific discourse and theorization (and, we might add, clinical practice).

Postmodern criticisms of science generally impugn this relativistic bend, and pose the question: If science evolves within a cultural frame (just like other ideologies), then in what sense is it immune from the normative practices of society [5]? The crucial issue is not whether the unique status of science (and by extension, clinical medicine) hinges on cultural biases, but whether its epistemology is better than other ideologies at obtaining knowledge about the natural world. All ideologies manifest hegemonic assumptions about the nature of reality and being. However, unlike other ideologies, science also values a self-correcting process through which increasingly refined and robust characterizations about the natural world can be made over time. If new observations become difficult to reconcile with standing hegemonic beliefs, then those initial assumptions are usually abandoned. Thus, scientific

epistemology allows for large scale reorganization of ontological assumptions, or what Kuhn called "paradigm shifts" [4].

In applying this framework to the medical model of psychiatry, we see a reliance upon four main ontological assumptions. These are 1) **Realism**: the claim that mental properties (such as desires, beliefs, and thoughts) are real phenomena and not merely artifacts of socio-cultural norms; 2) **Naturalism**: the concept that disturbances in neural structures are causally implicated in the formation and persistence of mental disorders; 3) **Reductionism**: the view that at some level, disturbances in neural structures are necessary to account for mental disorders, and 4) **Essentialism**: the assertion that mental disorders have underlying 'essences' that allow distinction of one type from another.

Are each and all of these assumptions warranted and necessary in order to arrive at a valid concept of mental disorder? We assert that naturalism, realism, and reductionism are reconcilable with advances in contemporary neuroscience, but that essentialism has proven to be, and may still be somewhat more problematic, vis-a-vis the medical model of psychiatry, at least to date. Let us examine each of these assumptions in turn.

### **Realism**

The realist position asserts that terms used in scientific theories map onto actual properties in the external world, even if the relevant phenomena are not necessarily observable. So, for example, sodium-gated ion channels or serotonin receptors all do, in fact, exist. Their existence is not predicated upon our ability to perceive them through our senses. Another important aspect of realism is that properties referred to by scientific theories are independent of our linguistic practices or socio-cultural norms; hence, the amino acid glycine will always have a hydrogen atom as its functional group. This description holds true regardless of human circumstance.

Realism entails that a mental realm does not exist separately from the physical, and so an acceptance of realism necessitates a rejection of dualism. Simply, there is not an ontologically separate mental world, independent of its physical instantiation in the brain. The idea of an overriding mind, metaphysically independent of the brain, becomes untenable when we realize that lesions to various

regions of the brain have profound consequences for subsequent subjective experience. How would the mental realm causally interact with an aphasic's brain, given the loss of linguistic capabilities due to an insult to the superior temporal gyrus or Broca's area? Similarly, how are we to account for the gradual loss of cognitive function in patients with Alzheimer's disease?

To experience disease is to **be** in a certain experiential state. To use a rather overplayed computational metaphor, to have such an experience requires that one have the requisite "hardware" (brain) and "software" (mind). A rejection of dualism would logically mean that all mental disorders are (in some way) biologically based. The tenet claims that every mental process, pathological or otherwise, arises in and from the brain [6]. It is important to note that nothing has been claimed about **how** neural structures causally produce mental states (**naturalism**), or whether mental states are best understood through their more basic, physical components (**reductionism**).

Realism has been a rather controversial assumption in the philosophy of psychiatry. An objection to the realist case is that there is no reason to claim that mental properties, such as beliefs, doubts, desires, and fears actually exist in the natural world. Moreover, as matter of fact, such mental properties do depend on the normative constraints of local communities. According to Cash, "...people's intentions, beliefs, thoughts and decisions are different in kind, not just in scale, from causal mechanisms in the brain. The nature of this 'difference in kind' can be revealed by considering the nature of the public criteria we use to ascribe intentional states to one another" [7]. The veridicality of intentional states often depends upon the requisite conditions; intentional states can **mean** or **be about** something. The property of **aboutness** cannot be mapped onto reality in any law-like way.

One can sidestep this criticism by noting that realism is best approached as an epistemological constraint. It is not the case that the tentative plausibility of a certain theoretical term commits us to finding its 'real world' equivalent. The validity of theoretical terms, that is, their ability to appropriately map onto real world properties, is completely contingent on the congruency of the associated theory with other established scientific principles. Critics of realism often conflate the object of scientific knowledge

with the process of knowledge construction. Fundamentally, science is an interpretative process; it is something people **do**. Given that science is a project of collaboration, it is empirically impure, relying on built-in explanations that become embedded in the process of theory development. This does not mean that science is merely a by-product of cultural practices. Roy Bhaskar articulates the problem in this way:

"[M]en in their social activity produce knowledge which is a social product much like any other, which is no more independent of its production and the men who produce it than motor cars, armchairs and books... and which is no less subject to change than any other commodity. This is one side of 'knowledge'. The other is that knowledge is '**of**' things which are not produced by men at all: the specific gravity of mercury, the process of electrolysis, the mechanism of light propagation. None of these 'objects of knowledge' depend upon human activity. If men ceased to exist sound would continue to travel and heavy bodies fall to earth in exactly the same way, though **ex hypothesi** there would be no one to know it" [8].

Knowledge, in the form of theories and explanations, is interpretational and should be regarded as a changeable social product. This does not mean that the object of any such knowledge is always dependent upon socio-cultural constructions. Science describes entities of nature, but "proof" comes through our success in interpreting, interacting with, manipulating (and often, controlling) them.

### **Naturalism**

Naturalistic theories of mind generally assume that mental properties, such as thoughts or beliefs, are derived from neurobiological structures in a causally relevant way. In order to legitimize the naturalistic characterization of a mental disorder, the observed clinical expressions of behavior should have causal roots in biology. This is not to claim that all mental behavior should **only** be understood through biology, but rather that we-as dynamic organisms within complex environments-will undoubtedly be influenced by a variety of interacting variables, including biology. A pressing question in naturalistic theories is how is it, exactly, that neurobiological disorders can be causally linked to certain

behavioral outcomes? The steps implicated in the causal chains from the biochemical to the behavioral level(s) are vast and endless, and as Hume noted, we cannot "see" causation [9]. In science, we observe event regularities, and if such regularities occur with sufficient frequency, then we tentatively accept these observations as truly causal. Such observations are affirmed through the use of statistical theories, which provide a mathematical measure for the probability of an event occurring solely by chance.

While the development of statistical methods has refined the scientific process, the act of establishing causal relationships in the world long predates the development of statistics, or even mathematics. Such reasoning is possible because human beings have the capacity to reason inductively and infer logical relationships from data in, and obtained from the environment. Children as young as three years old can make appropriate judgments about novel stimuli and causally link processes they have only observed in operation [10].

These types of observations have prompted many philosophers (since Hume) to posit that causality can, at best, be understood as event regularities. We cannot determine by reasoning alone which of the observed (or potentially unobserved) effects actually cause the phenomena in question. To arrive at such conclusions, however, is to be led astray by words. As Ross states, "...to the extent that we have culturally universal intuitions about causation, this is a fact about our ethology and cognitive dispositions, rather than a fact about the general structure of the world" [11]. In other words, naturalistic intuitions are not evidence of their content.

### **Reductionism**

Over the last few decades, neuroscience has elucidated a biological basis for several mental disorders. These developments have fuelled the quest to explain mental properties by reducing them to an interaction of their putative substrates. Given that interactions of neurobiological structures are causally implicated in aberrant of behavior, a logical paradigm would grant underlying genetic and biochemical entities explanatory primacy. Subjective experience and cultural influences can play a role in psychiatric disorders, but the "true" explanatory locus would rest in pathological structures and functions.

Many of these overly reductionist tendencies can be assuaged by revisiting some of Dennett's work that attempts to clarify the relations and predictions of mentalistic behavior through the use of three levels of explanatory abstraction [12]. The first is the **Physical Stance**, in which behavior could be predicted, in principle, from physical laws governing the interactions of material components. The second is the **Design Stance**, which predicts behavior, not from an understanding of the physical constitution of the mind, but through an understanding of the mind's purpose, function, and design. The final level of abstraction is the **Intentional Stance**, which requires neither an understanding of the physical constitution of the mind nor any design principles, but instead predicts behavior by considering what moves a rational agent would make in a given circumstance.

The brain and its potential representations are a primary focus of neuroscience, and neuroscientific information sustains both an evolving philosophy of mind, and the profession and practice of psychiatry. But it is important to recall that neuroscience, as a science, remains a process, and in so far as people are working on the common project of explanation, the objects of knowledge need to be interpreted. Normativity cannot be expunged from science, nor should it be. **We** make sense of the world and explain it with our theories, and it is inevitable that practical considerations will play an important role in theory choice. This means that reductionism need not be the **raison d'être** for the naturalistic project, but neither should it imply that reductionism is not possible, in principle. It is important to note that defining mental content in this way becomes a practical consideration. Accordingly, behavior can be interpreted using a level of abstraction that depends upon the needs of the investigator (and/or clinician).

### **Essentialism**

A more controversial ontological assumption of the medical model of psychiatry is essentialism. This is the claim that psychiatric disorders, as defined by clinical nosology, map onto reality in a discrete way, and that these disorders possess essential properties, without which they would not be what they are. We argue that this assumption is highly questionable, and that as **currently**

**conceived**, is anachronistic at best, and remains inconsistent with scientific thinking (at worst), and therefore is in need of re-examination and revision.

Science routinely organizes its body of knowledge into categories. How we sort things into categories largely depends on what measures we value. That is, we classify objects for a particular reason or to serve a specific function; to these ends, classification schemes cannot be arbitrary or random assortments. As Sadler notes, "...this non-arbitrariness is essential to a classification because it provides the basis for users with common purposes to talk about the same things. For us to discuss 'major depression' productively, we have to agree, in large part, about what major depression is, and in what practical context such a notion arises" [13].

An important concern for classification is the concept of validity. The validity of a category is related to the degree that it fits within a consonant body of explanatory theories. So, to group lungfish and cows in a similar category would require that there are genuine motivations for doing so. If one were an evolutionary biologist, such a grouping would align with what is known about macro-evolutionary processes. If one were a fisherman, the validity of such a pairing would seem impractical.

A criticism of the construct of essentialism is found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Summarizing the Wittgensteinian view, Garth Hallett writes:

Suppose I show someone various multi-coloured pictures, and say: "The colour you see in all these is called "yellow ochre"... Then he can look **at**, point **to**, the common thing." But "compare this case: I show him samples of different shades of blue and say: "The colour that is common to all these is what I call "blue"." Now what can be looked at or pointed to save the varied hues of blue? And don't say, "There **must** be something common, or they would not, be called 'blue,'" "but **look and see** whether there is anything in common at all" [14].

The crucial argument here is that the property of "blue" is reliant, to some extent, upon practical considerations and constraints.

Yet, a form essentialism persists in psychiatry. This is clearly articulated by Robins and Guze who claim that, "...the finding of an increased prevalence of the same disorder among the close relatives of the original patients strongly indicates that one is



dealing with a valid entity" [15]. In this framework, genetic and biochemical factors are attributed as primary causes, and the role of psychiatry is to locate these pathological qualities within the physical brain. While experience does play a role in one's mental health, this model is decidedly oriented toward brain function. In this way, genetic and biochemical causes are seen as exerting their influences uni-directionally and any/all manifest symptoms are the consequence of unique and individuated etiologies.

The medical model of psychiatry views the current classifications as representing discrete organic disease states as opposed to heterogeneous symptom clusters. Validation of these symptom clusters often occurs via post-hoc quantitative and statistical analyses (such as hierarchical cluster analysis or pattern recognition paradigms) of the clinical data to ascertain which combinations of symptoms tend to group together. The problem with creating these types of discrete definitions for many contemporary psychiatric conditions is that "...no amount of clustering can get around the fact that several variables used in such models may have little or no biological plausibility" [16]. Without clear biological mechanisms, it is unclear whether symptom clusters represent different ways of labeling the same affliction, socio-cultural influences, or other biological confounds. Peter Zachar and Nick Haslam have presented a strong case that psychiatric categories do not uniformly individuate to underlying essences, but are defined, to a large part, by practical considerations [17-24]. In many ways, this recalls the Szaszian argument for mental illness as "myth"-here literally used to denote a practical, explanatory narrative.

We do not refute, or even doubt that practical considerations are important to define the threshold(s) at which a particular set of signs and symptoms may be deemed clinically relevant. But, if we are to regard essentialism as critical to the medical model of psychiatry, and adopt practice standards in accordance, then the task at hand is to establish how and what essential criteria are pertinent to any construct of normality and order (versus abnormality and disorder), as relates to brain function, mental processes and expressions of cognition, emotion and behavior (within a social milieu). Toward this end, we have posited that one such "essential" element of normality is non-linear adaptive

properties within and between particular brain networks; thus progressive linearity would be aberrant and could manifest effects from the cellular to the cognitive-behavioral (and even socio-cultural) levels [25]. In this way, mental disorders would occur as a spectrum of possible effects. We maintain that particular genotypic factors predispose endo- and exophenotypes that are differentially expressed through interaction(s) with internal and external environmental influences throughout the lifespan, thereby grounding neuropsychiatric syndromes to underlying biological factors [25,26].

This acknowledges causal determinants of psychiatric disorders (at least at formal and material levels), and while accepting a form of token physicalism (i.e.- that particular mental events occur as result of some physical function(s) or dysfunction(s)), allows for appreciation of both emergence and the bio-psychosocial influence of environments. As well, the spectrum disorder concept satisfies the criteria that define the medical model (i.e.- realism, naturalism, reductionism, essentialism). In this light, a spectrum disorder can be considered to 1) involve neural substrates (i.e.- realism); 2) represent a disturbance in the natural function of the substrate(s) or system (i.e.- naturalism); 3) be a perturbation or disruption of some underlying and/or contributory component(s) of the bio-psychosocial organism (i.e.- reductionism-in this case as token physicalism), and 4) manifest a particular "**eidōs**" that defines its aberrant qualities-in this case the progressive loss of non-linear adaptability and the resultant effects on neural function, cognition, emotion and behavior (i.e.- essentialism).

### **Conclusion**

Psychiatry has increasingly adopted a categorical approach in delineating mental disorders. This has been beneficial insofar as the defined categories reflect clear and well-understood biological mechanisms. For certain psychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other psychoses that involve clear dysfunctions of mechanisms that regulate perception, cognition, and communication, a categorical approach may be reasonable [2]. Human beings, however, have a range of behaviors whose normality or pathology is constrained within certain socio-

cultural niches. Various phobias, compulsions, obsessions, and emotions cannot easily be explained by a singular biological mechanism. As well, manifestations of the same condition may be the result of heterogeneous mechanisms working in concert.

Essentialism is evidently important to the medical model, and as such persists in contemporary psychiatry. One of the central tenets in essentialism is the existence of natural kinds. According to Zachar, a natural kind is "...an entity that is regular (nonrandom) and internally consistent from one instance to the next" [24]. That is, once the property that captures the essence of a specific natural kind is known, that property can identify any other prototypical instantiation of that kind with accuracy. But, if a category cannot be identified with respect to its essential properties, then such a category is not, in the strict definitional sense, a natural kind, but an artificial category.

Rom Harré argues that the philosophy of science is such that the idea of a 'natural kind' is a fancy, and that a 'natural kind' is a concept which can only be understood within the double framework of practice and theory [27]. The validity of a category is contingent upon how well it integrates within a diverse, multidimensional system of fact(s) and explanation(s). While the theoretical context of the kind determines, via appropriate hierarchical explanations, what properties constitute an entity's essence, it is the practical context that distinguishes accidental properties from essential ones, and we opine, perhaps more importantly, what extent of properties will be deemed relevant to regard and guide action(s).

To be sure, physiological systems function and interact nonlinearly over a wide range of spatial and temporal scales. As Goldberger notes, "...the combination of nonlinearity and non-stationarity, more the rule than the exception in the output of physiologic systems, poses a major challenge to conventional bio-statistical assessments and standard reductionist modeling stratagems" [28]. Biological systems (including the embodied brain-mind) display complex network properties, and behavioral processes are often best characterized as non-linear interactions between physiological systems and the environment [29]. The extent to which the activity of the system as a whole reflects the response(s) of its component networks will vary based upon the condition of the system and its

sensitivity, and relative attractors and constraints that exist; each and all of these may be differentially expressed in certain individuals, at various points throughout the lifespan. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the activity and response-parameters of constituent parts and networks (i.e.- "bottom-up" effects) may be responsive to, and affected by the activity of the entire system as a whole-inclusive of psycho-social factors in which it is nested (i.e- "top-down" effects) [30].

Therefore, it remains an open question whether there are essential parameters that characterize these nonlinear dynamical patterns. We believe that the aforementioned refined eidetic conceptualization shows some promise, and in this way might provide a "missing link" between the medical model and psychiatry. Further research in neuropsychiatry will need to reassess the role of spatial and temporal scales in diseased organisms. Mental disorders, like all other dysfunctions, are **processes** that unfold through time. It is important to heed Ghaemi's advice, and recall that etiology is not a binary issue, but instead involves elements of degree [31]. In light of this, we posit that one of the benefits of the spectrum concept is that it allows categorization of mental disorders according to the extent and type(s) of relatedness conferred by 1) common genetic risk and predisposing factors, 2) dysfunction of shared substrates and networks, and 3) benefit from types of treatments that have identifiable effects/actions.

An understanding of mental normality and pathology necessitates an approach that embeds it in the complex spatial and temporal processes of life. Yet, we must be cautious-despite the attractiveness and popularity of complexity science, it is important to ground any such account to well-established fact(s), and appreciate the limits of what is known and un-known. As Jaspers noted, "every concrete event-whether of a physical or psychic nature-is open to causal explanation in principle, and psychic processes too may be subjected to such explanation. There is no limit to the discovery of causes and with every psychic event we always look for cause and effect" [32], but he also adds that "...reality is seen through the spectacles of one theory or another. We have therefore to make a continual effort to discount theoretical prejudices...and to train ourselves to pure

appreciation of facts...every advance in factual knowledge means an advance in method..." [33]

At some point, the distinction between what is normal and abnormal, ordered and disordered will need to be made, and any such distinction must be practical in the sense of its viability to sustain the good of patient-centered clinical care. Therefore, it may be that the task (for the Decade of the Mind project, development of the **DSM-V**, and for psychiatry, if not medicine, writ large) is to clarify how syndromes are related (within various spectrum disorders), and adapt or create a classification scheme, nomenclature (and thus ontology) that communicates the meaning and value of taxonomy and diagnosis. Whether an attempt to elucidate the "natural basis" of mental function and dysfunction will serve such practical ends remains to be seen, and thus, this goal remains a work in progress.

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# Image Consciousness: From Phenomenology to Movies

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## **Abstract**

*One of the dualisms dominating recent debates in the philosophy of mind and epistemology concerns internalism and externalism. The former posits a subject immersed in a mental life that functions as the source of truth about the world. The latter suggests that the subject's knowledge is largely dependent on environmental and physical factors where the truth about reality is to be found, rather than in the subject's mind.<sup>1</sup>*

*However, experiences of art and film indicate ways to move beyond this impasse, especially when examined in the light of Husserl and Sartre's phenomenology. This paper deals with aspects of this dualism and examine the image consciousness theory in Husserl and Sartre's phenomenology with regards to Hitchcock and Buñuel's movies.*

**Keywords:** *phenomenology, image consciousness, Husserl, Sartre, Hitchcock and Buñuel.*

## **Introduction**

The subject comes to film with various predispositions to recall or create mental images activated during cinematic experience. Anyone who has read a book that describes a face, a blade of grass or a rabbit with a pocket watch cannot doubt that these mental images arise in conjunction with reading. Film has its own peculiar ways of stimulating mental envisioning even while we are busy reading cinematic images. We need only to consider the simple convention played out in the opening sequence of many films where we see someone stepping out of a car and firmly planting their feet on the ground. We observe their shoes, their style of walking, their attitude, but

by now, many of us have already formed a picture of the rest of their body, their face, even their personality. In fact, such devices play on our expectations, our knowledge of who is starring in the film to prime the process of mental envisioning.

Particularly successful films mediate a viewer's natural inclination to sustain various mental images while watching a film. And while a film sequence can affect the rhythm, intensity

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and configuration of mental images, this envisioning is, in turn, responsible for making sense of film, uploading it into complex semantic structures without which film would remain a random flicker of light and dark. A film playing to an empty theatre exists in the world in the most rudimentary sense but it becomes meaningful only when one is able to process and detect the 'external marks' of those who have lodged meaning into it as a series of signs. For a painting to be more than a confusion of splodges, and for a film to rise up from a pile of frames, there must not only be some interaction between the object and its viewer in the way I have described, the cooperation of different kinds of vision must also occur. Sight directed at the film's information-rich field (edge, shape and colour detectors, spatial and temporal monitoring) must combine with processes of semantic and conceptual production, involving the interpolation of remembered or imaginary images, in order for film to be film. In a phenomenological sense, the viewer works 'on the fly' with the film's *mise-en-scène* which often purposefully invites the mental envisioning of the viewer. It is this reciprocity that creates meaning and a heightened consciousness of its constructs. At least for the viewer, the 'external' world is an extension of the image-making capabilities of the mind which, in turn, are stimulated and refined by the exposition of cinematic images. This is a feedback loop that some films, remarkably, make us aware of while we are watching them. We watch the things film characters are shown watching, and observe their actions based on visual evidence which we are party to; we are made to see what they appear to think by following their lines of sight and their focal points, signalled to us by various framing devices: rear-view mirrors, framed pictures, windows, computer monitors, cinema screens. It is a rapid, often silent and elegant communication. With the aid of flashbacks and camera angles we also 'see' the mental images of the characters' daydreams and the world of their imagination. When we remember such sequences walking in the park, or falling asleep, it seems that the mental images of others are intertwined with our own. Such films represent (and activate) the switchback mechanism between optical and mental images as a way to articulate plot development and suggest the thought processes of the characters. But this switchback mechanism that the characters are shown experiencing

may very well be what the audience is *actually* experiencing: the depicted perceptual activity appears to be a visual activation of the perceptual activity at work in the viewing subject. In this way, the complex process of visualising involved in the experience of film is reflected back to the viewer during the experience of viewing. This takes us beyond the limited logic of internalism and externalism, particularly because inherent in a film's exposition and organisation is its reception.

In what follows, I discuss the nature of mental imagery as theorised by Husserl and Sartre. This philosophical introduction, aided by the latest cognitive studies of vision, provides a basis for understanding a number of films by Hitchcock and Buñuel which similarly probe the subtleties and uses of mental imagery. Thus, one of the ways the viewer can enjoy these films is to see them as explorations of 'visual phenomenology' which allow us enact, as well as reflect upon, mental images as part of the film experience.

### **Mental Imagery**

A common misconception is that one sees with the eye. In fact, it is the basic apparatus of the eye along with specialised areas of the visual cortex which process stimuli in the visual field. But seeing also involves the cooperation of other brain areas. The scanning of the eyes ('saccadic rhythms'), moving from one detail to another, conducts an information reconnaissance in cooperation with memory, imagination, reasoning, interpretation, self-monitoring and emotion. But such saccades are also *searching* for patterns in the visual field that relate to mental image schemas, the details of which are disputed (Ellis 1999, 163; Jacob and Jeannerod, 2003). These mental images are sustained by a cooperation of several brain areas. They help us to recall and imagine, as well as interpret, what is seen, and work in cooperation with the detection of shape, colour and movement.<sup>2</sup>

The depiction of a character looking at an object depends on montage techniques that exploit these two kinds of operations: we have the physical sight of a character that seems to launch a gaze at an object, and we then see the object of the gaze. We do not literally see the action of gazing. It is the interpolation of our own mental images arising from the editing that conveys the image of a gaze happening in time.

Another way of explaining these cooperative ways of seeing is to consider perceptual constancy: we can see objects 'through' a series of idealisations or schemas which are retrievable in our memory (Zeki 1999, 76-96). These need not be fixed memories of experience but memories of what we have imagined or logically infer, immediately assembled as working sketches rather than stored as elaborate images. There is a perceptual constancy in a wall painted red. We see it as red even though it will be infinitely patchy and marked with gradations; the marks are subsumed into the overall experience of a red wall. Similarly, digital photography simulates ideal colour constancy through look-up tables. In the same way, we can order the vast array of chaos in the external world into abstract order by referring to our memory and inductive reasoning and this is a kind of seeing.

This perceptual constancy is in evidence with many other examples of object perception such as faces, trees, rooms, artefacts and their appearances in film. It is important to note that mental images are not stored as picture-like images that can be hung on a wall and we do not need actual eyes inside the head to see them. Different types of mental images are stored or made accessible in different ways, from the topographic and schematic to the symbolic (Pinker 1997, 284), or as predispositions for distinct neural firings, relationships and routines.<sup>3</sup>

In the process of scanning the world, which is also a way of constructing it, these images are codified using different brain areas as well as codes. During this scanning we also make use of aspects of pre-existent engrams in our long and short term memory. We find the raw material for our imaginary images outside in the world, but the world may have these images, or features of them, 'ready made' for us to find, we do not need to duplicate the world in all its detail but sometimes the mental images we consider to be ours are made with the cooperation of the world. This is especially so in art and in films which depict the mental images of dreams or fantasy settings which seem familiar to us. In some ways, what we discover is what we were looking for and what we recognise, in conjunction with what seems new and this reciprocity characterises the experience. This is consistent with the enactive view of engagement with the world (and film).

Even realism in film is a transformation of mental images projected by another: editor, producer, director, actor, cameraman, scriptwriter. Post production is a process of constructing the editor's mental imagery in conjunction with what is available and the mental imagery of other players in the film production process. The camera aperture is an editing choice, cutting out what is left outside and creating an image of whatever is judged to be or appropriate-but appropriate to what? Part of the answer is that in creating a composed image or sequence, the film director (or other agents) are negotiating expectations and processing judgments about composition and meaning. The film director captures part of the world because these judgments appear captured in the world as a form of what seems appropriate, or they are manufactured in order to be discovered. And this process is re-enacted by the film viewer whose judgements and predispositions also seem captured or discoverable in the world.

Mental image schemas may be shared: they are intertextual and made intersubjective in and through film. Filmmakers are able to tap into images or symbols that have resonance for a mass audience or that reflect back upon the viewer's own modalities of sight, parodying or otherwise referencing such processes. The film's images seem external to us 'in the world' and yet we see them with an intentionality that gives them a character intimately linked to the recesses of our identity. Both mental image formation structured by the brain and enacted with images of film (similarly produced by brain processes) are 'in the world', 'co-present' during the experience of film, as much as I am in the world while I watch the film of my choice.

It is important that this entire process can be made known to us not only through philosophical reflection but during the experience of film viewing itself. Apart from the minutiae of film techniques that rely on rigging mental image formation, often nonconsciously, some films

explicitly depict mental images as a theme in cooperation with higher levels of consciousness and self-awareness. A recent example of this is *The Number 23* (Schlesinger, 2007) and one sequence in particular, where the main character (Jim Carrey) is reading the book, *The Number 23*. The character sees himself as the author having a flashback. This flashback is the staging of a

sequence of mental images structured as a series of frames, windows-in-windows, through which we penetrate revealing moments of the author's past. Also on display is the reader's imagining as he sees himself in the role suggested by the author.<sup>4</sup> The frames-in-frames shown as part of the film's unfolding anticipate trajectories and stages of mental envisaging, but they also reference the medium of film, the frames of its hidden substrate. It is this very structuring of the *mise-en-scène* with the frame-in-the-frame that allows the feedback loop between viewer and world to operate. At times, the film viewer can appear to find in her visual field a character that is depicted engaging in the same activity as she is. This is a common scene in art where an artist is shown painting a picture:

[T]he represented perceptual activity at work in pictorially representing our artist interpenetrates (*Durchdringt*) the perceptual activity that is actually performed with regard to the thinglike picture. (Marbach 1992, 140)


The viewer engages in both mental image formation and optical processing, but the difference here is that this engagement appears to be mirrored by the depiction. Husserl might have described this as a situation where the film viewer is looking "straightforward *and* reflexively" (Husserl 1983, 148), but I would add that the viewer is looking straightforward and reflexively at a character in the film who is also looking straightforward and reflexively. In such circumstances, simply to assume that our perceptual activity amounts to an internal, mentalistic attitude sealed off from the wider world in which it is situated seems to be a woefully inadequate way to describe the nuanced experience involved in viewing scenes of this kind.

### **Husserl's Dresden Gallery Picture**

In terms of philosophy of mind, Husserlian phenomenology has much to offer in helping us to understand the intersubjective experience that bridges image production and reception. Despite Husserl's interest in image consciousness, and subsequent research on this subject (Marbach 1993),<sup>5</sup> the philosopher has not made as much of an impact on our understanding of art or film as could be expected (Di Pinto 1978; Sepp 1988; Uzelac 1998; Lotz 2007; and for film, Casebier 1991). Husserl attempted to provide an account of how consciousness is connected to objects in the

world beyond internalism and externalism. For Husserl, a picture in the Dresden Gallery, a painting by David Teniers the Younger (1610-1690), articulates just such a relationship.

Teniers painted the scene of a gallery with around fifty paintings crammed into it. The painting presents a monadic arrangement where, within the matrix of the painting is implied the larger, physical environment of the gallery. This inside-out/outside-in structure allows Husserl to argue against the essentialist binary of external physical world and internal mentalism. The structure of the painting mirrors the structure of consciousness attending the painting, and this symmetry illustrates how consciousness is part of the world which is reflected back to it.<sup>6</sup> We are dealing here with levels of representation and their relations, and levels of consciousness and their relations. The Teniers picture is not a simple representation of a gallery, but an object containing within it many levels of representation, analogous with the series of conscious (and sometimes unconscious) mental states processing these different levels. The real, external space of the gallery is depicted inside the internal space of the painting, and within this internal space there are more paintings. It is a visual diagram that questions simplistic internalist and externalist epistemological claims. The following diagram attempts to explain and supplement Husserl's Dresden Gallery example, elaborating the relation between consciousness and intentional objects in the visual field:



**Fig. 1** Schematic of picture consciousness extrapolated from Husserlian formulations.

(A) is a picture-in-a-picture, similar to the Teniers picture in the Dresden Gallery, which Husserl evokes in us; it also suggests physical immersion in a gallery environment by appearing to duplicate what is going on around it and in front it, with someone

shown looking at it. In Husserlian terms, it is an image of the picture thing as seen by B, an image of the *Bildding*, the picture's material substratum, paint on canvas for example. The *Bildding* is only part of a composite structure, for there is also present here the picture object, or *Bildobjekt*, the picture identified as a possibly meaningful object before its meaning is extracted. Then there is also the subject, *sujet*, the thing the picture represents within its matrix. The *sujet* is seen through both the *Bildobjekt* and the *Bildding*, the latter two becoming apperceptions, and these three interpenetrating aspects are repeated by D, the whole image reproduced here. Note that these stages of the image are not fixed, the *Bildobjekt* can become the *sujet* for example, from the point of view of D.

These different kinds of seeing are distinct mental states which appear to converge in the visual experience when we try to hold in our minds the picture as a composite whole. Note that the series of frames marks each stage of consciousness of the *Bildding*, *Bildobjekt* and *sujet*, stages which we experience while watching this experience represented as happening before us.

(B) Husserl does not mention this and going beyond him, B denotes the viewer and her physical, inverted retinal image, deflected light shining in upon the fovea; it is a reflection of the object, literally internal to the perceiving body. Something of this is happening with our own retinal image when we look at the diagram. B references us, viewers of the diagram.

(C) This is the mental image which has no existence as an image. It is an image in name only, produced by mechanisms of memory or imagination which we see in our 'mind's eye' without a retinal image, as we might imagine how something feels to the touch without touching it. C reflects B's relationship to A, and gives the depicted viewer an image of how he must look, from somebody else's perspective (ours), standing in front of the painting. It also reflects what we are seeing or 'seeing' as viewers of D.

(D) The letter D denotes the material substrate of the picture thing, framed to highlight the picture thing (the material substrate, in this case, a digitally scanned image of a drawing of pen and ink on paper, the *Bildding*). A distancing effect emphasised by the framing allows the picture thing to be presented to consciousness. This also indicates the physical context in which the picture is found (the

room or gallery) and makes us aware of the surrounding space of D (the space surrounding Figure 1, the page on our computer screens and the rooms in which they may be situated). Both spaces index each other, as well as the space inside A, to create a serial, recursive effect. The image just inside the frame of D appears to reflect the macroconsciousness of the viewer, cooperative with her peripheral vision, representing these external referents pictorially. We have a 'reversible monadic' arrangement where one external reality, the place in which the representation is placed, is indexed internally in the representation; the representation is external to us yet also indexes us and our mental envisioning. This also happens when we watch film, and is precisely one of the ways in which we have an experience that spans the internalist-externalist divide.

The cinematic experience is the site where physical sight and mental images appear to co-emerge and interact, forming an interconnected series in order to constitute experience. The viewer's series of states seems to track and be tracked by the reversible monadic exposition of frames, views, windows, doorways in film. I could just as easily visualise the relation between the mental images *I* am having while watching a film's presentation of *its* images, as two walls either side of a staircase. Both walls have pictures on them. The pictures are not the same on each side of the stairs but the pattern of their seriality and unfolding provides us with a conscious experience of a seriality or optic flow in two places at the same time. The image of the staircase shares structural similarities with Husserl's use of the Dresden Gallery image

as hierarchically intelligible, reflecting an organisation of conscious states with levels and appearances of the object continually refreshed by the framing devices of cinematography. But Husserl's model of phenomenology engaged with the Teniers picture is not the only example we can use to reevaluate internalism and externalism. There are other models that extend and deepen these perceptions. I believe that Sartre's description of a man looking through a keyhole does just that, and provides ways to think about our connectedness with the world of images.

### **Sartre's Keyhole**

In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre conjures up a mental image of a man who looks through a keyhole (Sartre 1956, 261-2). He is taken up by a scene on the other side of the door and immersed



in it at the expense of all else. His consciousness is 'through there' in the world, his self-awareness a background hum, as is ours in the mental envisioning of this act, reading Sartre's text, a 'keyhole' onto the philosopher's mental imagery. The viewer looking through the keyhole exists not as a duality, a self who perceives a spectacle, but as losing himself in the world. Yet this involvement is

interrupted when the peeping Tom suddenly hears footsteps, causing his attention to shift away from the scene in the keyhole towards the unknown figure behind him. The self is split between what the peeping Tom sees with his eyes and the mental image of the other person approaching. For a moment, he imagines himself seen from behind as a voyeur and he becomes aware of himself as an object of the Other's gaze, whom he presumes to be looking over his shoulder (as the reader is doing, in a sense). He is conscious of himself through the consciousness of the Other, looking at himself

through the Other's eyes, feeling shame, but nevertheless remaining to look through the keyhole. While his sight is directed through the keyhole, he is formulating a mental image of himself looking, as seen through the eyes of the person looking at him.

The peeping Tom feels as if the Other is in his head (another framing device) or that he is in the head of the Other looking at himself (another play on interpenetration). The peeping Tom is now painfully aware of his looking, possibly even the shape of the keyhole which until recently was invisible to him in his prereflexive state. As the peeping Tom is split off from the scene of his desire, he is also split off from himself while looking at himself (being conscious of himself). He is both subject and object, which reside in him in a double sense, whether he pays attention to the scene ahead of him (visually) or to what the Other is seeing behind him (a mental projection). As with Husserl's Dresden Gallery, this seeing through keyholes while having mental images of oneself doing the same demonstrates a cooperation of processes of consciousness, straightforward and reflectively. It is through the keyhole of the Other's consciousness that the peeping Tom is conscious of his own consciousness. The gaze, imagined or real, of the Other distances the peeping Tom from himself and this is another way of saying that the gaze

distances consciousness from conscious mental states in order that they come into view, and so that Sartre can write about them. Sartre's thoughts about the transpositions of consciousness are organised by a series of frames-in-frames. The keyhole scene is a system of frames: the eye of the Other, the peeping Tom's eye, the keyhole, the scene through the door. Each frame is linked to the other spatially in terms of embedding; the peeping Tom internalises what is externally behind him (a mental image of the Other's eye) to 'look' at (become conscious of) himself looking at (being conscious of) what he sees with his eyes through the keyhole:

1. Consciousness is to eye, as eye is to keyhole. A conscious mental state becomes a framing device from the vantage point of another conscious mental state.
2. The Other's eye is to peeping Tom, as peeping Tom is to keyhole scene.
3. The Other's gaze is to peeping Tom, as peeping Tom's gaze is to himself.
4. The peeping Tom is a keyhole for the Other to look through, which also references the reader of Sartre's text.
5. The peeping Tom looks through the Other's gaze, as a keyhole through which he can see himself caught in the act.
6. Consciousness of his facticity as voyeur is the constriction of freedom caused by the Other's gaze; the constriction of the gaze is like the constriction of the keyhole.<sup>7</sup>

The scene through the keyhole is both external in the world and 'inside' the keyhole, but the scene 'out there' is merged in experience with what is going on 'in here' (implying, also, the reader).

It is as if consciousness travels, sheathed in several gazes, and these gazes are embedded one in the other: the gaze of the Other is carried inside the gaze of the peeping Tom gazing at himself, gazing at the scene. Another way of expressing this is to imagine a series of arrows shot in the same trajectory at intervals, the arrow behind pierces the one ahead of it, turning it into a receptacle, a threshold or a frame through which it passes but the trajectory is ultimately circular and reflexive. The eye of the Other, the eye of the peeping Tom, the eye of the keyhole, the eyes of people on the other side of the door are signals that mark

the direction of consciousness. Each gaze, each framing device of the keyhole/iris/edge, marks a distinction between mental states, but it is possible to look through all these frames at once and at oneself. The implicit sexual nature of Sartre's construct functions as a key which opens the door of the text. The gaze goes through the keyhole and cooperates with the phallus. The keyhole is an outward visible expression of the peeping Tom's anticipation of coitus through the keyhole. Kneeling down before the keyhole to launch the gaze is a form of outward ritual which instantiates desire. The gaze through the keyhole mimics penetrative sex (which is what Sartre's fascination, and feelings of jealousy and shame imply may be happening on the other side of the door). The footsteps allude to rhythms approaching climax, yet also to the beating of the heart, the passing of time, the element of things in flux. The footsteps are not only the approach of the unknown lodged in the consciousness of the moment, the approach of consciousness of the series of conscious mental states that Sartre begins to describe, but they also take him away from his keyhole scene. The footsteps mark the distance of alienation, they take him away from his engagement while he is being approached by them, as he withdraws from the keyhole. But there is also the fear of a series of penetrations from behind. At the base of this is the logic of the frame-in-the-frame, the logic of the interpenetration of the levels of consciousness of conscious states. In Sartre's mental imagery and structural logic emerges a consciousness that penetrates and is penetrated, views and is viewed, their overlapping creating intensities of various kinds.



**Fig. 2** Still from Hitchcock's *Psycho*

### Hitchcock

In *Psycho* (1960), Norman Bates (Anthony Perkins) looks through a hole in the wall, watching his guest (Janet Leigh) undress. While looking at the character, seen here in the dark, we are watching him watch his guest and we become aware of our own watching through his. The scene appears as a visualisation of Sartre's keyhole description, but we are split between being the Other gazing at the target and the target receiving the gaze. The glazed frames of pictures displaying birds on the back wall of the guest's room into which he peers, are on the periphery of our vision (and his) and they are a reminder that the peeping Tom, Norman Bates, is associated with a hunter, a bird of prey, for we have already seen his room replete with stuffed birds which signify trophies as well as corpses. The gaze is thus Eros and Thanatos. The bird's eye view is re-presented to us as the hole in the wall through which the gaze is launched; as in the case of Sartre's keyhole, this doubles as an aperture for both the eye and coitus. This is made more complex when we realise (on a second viewing of the film) that Norman Bates has a split-personality disorder and that his 'mother' may be a cowatcher during this peeping Tom sequence, looking over his shoulder, as we

do. The viewing audience is implicated in the act of voyeurism as well, not just by looking but also in thinking. We are thinking about what the characters may be thinking, stepping back into what we consider to be our own thought-although, of course, it is all our own thought-strangely visualised for us by the director's use of props and editing.

The sequence not only references the nature of film production-eye, through camera aperture, through to picture and subject (the Husserlian stages of *Bildding*, *Bildobjekt* and *sujet* shown in Figure 1)-but also stages the nature of our enactive vision: we are both viewer and viewer-of-our-ownviewing and this should tell us about our own ability to shift our consciousness from one vantage point to another, as does Sartre's keyhole imagery. As in Husserl's Teniers picture that captures something of the space it occupies, we seem to share the intimacy of the darkness ensconcing Norman Bates, which is somehow contiguous with the dim ambience of the cinema hall in which we are present. He

is an image of me watching the film: do I have a mental image of myself watching? As in a mirror reflection where we are both viewer and viewed, we are in the same position as one who looks at his or her own body. The sequence thus cooperates with important mechanisms of reflexive consciousness of the body as a viewing subject and as viewed object. This chiasmus is extended by the montage of the voyeur's gaze and its object, the guest's body. Viewing the scene of the woman

undressing, we feel as if we are looking through his eyes, yet we subsist as a solitary consciousness inside his gaze that seems to surround us while we look, his consciousness looks over our shoulders while we view her body; we are viewing while being viewed. We are looking through the eyes of the voyeur at ourselves (entirely consistent with Sartre's perceptions). This is, of course, not a simple optical experience of looking with the eyes. We are aware of our embodied experience; we can have a mental image of ourselves as a vantage point from which the gaze is launched and as a target for that gaze, and it just so happens that this mental image is found in the world and in the film.

Hitchcock seems to get inside our head, to turn the camera on our own looking, thereby framing our gaze, but we also take up the director's gaze and see through it, as in Sartre's keyhole example. The camera aperture through which the director 'sees', which is the edge of the cinema screen, can also be 'tried on' for size by any viewer. The framing devices in the film- peephole, window, picture frame-play with the viewer's consciousness of viewing. All this may sound ponderous but the visual process is, in fact, subtle and immediate, rapidly effected by a series of saccades back and forth, saccades which are sent into further stimulation by the quick editing of the film, adding further levels of curiosity and concern. The series of unresolved conflicts between capture and flight, self-awareness, awareness of being in someone else's gaze (Hitchcock, Norman Bates), the actor's gaze at her own body, and our ability to step back and escape are used by the director to create a claustrophobic viewing experience, not of film *per se* but of the anatomy of consciousness as a visual experience. The film sequence is a diagram of conscious processes and their relations, but one which is being drawn by those very processes.

In Hitchcock's *Rear Window* (1954), the audience looks 'through' a character's eyes into a window which is also a cinema screen. The frame functions psychologically in many ways. It puts us in the position of being a voyeur and seeing through the eyes of a voyeur. Yet we are also external to this viewing: there is a switchback effect here of distance and involvement, of continually stepping back from watching people and watching through their eyes, feeling what they are feeling, but being aware also of a skilfully constructed fiction. In the same way, the frame of the screen is complemented by the frame of the rear window, but the frame of the cinema screen is also the frame of the lens, our eyes (the extent of our peripheral vision), the character's eyes and Hitchcock's eyes. These are all stages of the frame, their plurality alluded to in the image itself, in the plurality of its frames.

We apprehend a person watching or a person watching another person watching, and this suggests being conscious of another's mental state, which may be about yet another person's mental state as deduced from the visual evidence. Such a chain of relations is visually represented in both film and art as a framed picture representing a mental state in which there is another picture, depicting another mental state, *et cetera*. We go through a series of spaces which represent changes in the vantage points of consciousness. The compulsion and release inherent in film find their vehicle in scopophilia, which both compels and releases the appearance and disappearance of

frames. James Stewart's character in *Rear Window*, a photographer immobilised by a broken foot and through whose eyes we are supposed to see through the telescopic lens and window frames, is of course an allusion to film, its freedoms and compulsions, its constrictions of the gaze upon the fetish. The photographer's subtly signalled obsession with the visual in cooperation with his immobility mirrors the audience's, and so, again, the *mise-en-scène* is similar to Husserl's Dresden Gallery image because it is an inner reflection of the world which surrounds and contains it.<sup>7</sup> The *mise-enscène* 'is about' the audience's viewing or, more correctly, what it means to be an audience who has consented to have its freedom, its ability to intervene, curtailed and its consciousness directed to look straightforward and reflexively. The consciousness attendant upon this double sense is brought into sharp focus when, through

the telephoto camera (the film-asaperture/ eye and keyhole<sup>8</sup>), the photographer sees the murderer look back at him from the window across the courtyard. Raymond Burr, the actor who plays the murderer, eyes crisply demarcated with round spectacles, is looking directly at Hitchcock's camera, a gaze which magically reverses the photographer's gaze and, by proxy, our own. This rare cinematically powerful confrontation shrinks distances, reverses gazes, and brings what previously seemed to be discrete and mobile moments of consciousness into a compellingly frank and inescapable chill. The seriality of seeing-in is reversed, collapsed, pierced by the shared gaze. If one were to isolate the still, we would have a picture of a man looking at us from the pictorial space, but that gaze is pregnant with many other gazes in the context of the film. The actor, Raymond Burr, is looking into the camera aperture, which is being looked through by Hitchcock or the cameraman, but he is represented as looking at the peeping Tom photographer (James Stewart) through whose camera I, the cinemagoer, peer. Hitchcock must have had a mental image of the audience; he launches his intentional thought through the imagery of the gaze of his actor looking straight at the camera. Never let it be said that Hitchcock took the gaze lightly. Indeed, through it and through its representations in the eyes of his actors, his power over the stream of consciousness seems total. A momentary escape from this grip is offered by critical engagement, when the viewer becomes conscious of the devices and techniques used by the director to achieve his ends and begins to enjoy their deployment as part of the experience of the film.

### **Buñuel**

Husserlian and Sartrean principles of consciousness help us to unpack other iconic images in the history of cinema. Vermeer's *The Lacemaker* (1669-70), as seen below, is framed by the margin of a book inside a frame from Buñuel's film *Un Chien Andalou* (1929), and further framed by a browser frame. We are readers (of the book) as well as viewers of the film, the printed picture and the digital image. We are looking through the reader/viewer/filmmaker's eyes. The film still is a visual display of a structure of consciousness, not a frozen structure but one which changes with an everincreasing seriality of frames and transpositions.



Fig. 3 Digital image from *Un Chien Andalou* (1929) in browser window

The image from *Un Chien Andalou* exemplifies the paradox central to cinematic consciousness: the camera shot appears to zoom in on a still object, to fix on one image, but the film frame, the frame of the book and the painting's frame allow for the idea of movement, the gaze into the space or withdrawal from it. Meanwhile, the book and its turning pages form a horizontal movement which cooperates with the frames-in-frames of the film reel and the frames-in-frames of the image. This is an intersection of horizontal and penetrative projections through frames.<sup>9</sup> But this multiple motion also causes us to look straightforward and reflexively. As with Husserl's Dresden Gallery image and my extension of it in Figure 1, what is signalled here is a seriality of appearances: multiple visualisations of the object-image compacted into one image, which shows us something of our own ways of seeing.<sup>10</sup> It reflects back to us our ability to have a series of mental images of the object. Not only do we see the image from *Un Chien Andalou* as singular but we also see it through the lens of various mental images, from 'original' work of art to photograph of painting, film of book, and web browser. A series of mental states is produced, through which the idea of the original identity is veiled and continually translated. The series of frames-in-frames is structurally analogous with Husserl's Dresden Gallery device and Sartre's keyhole example, which also trigger a series of adjustments of focus in cooperation with various mental images. Not only is the image transparently serial, structured by various apertures, frames, windows or edges through which we can continually re-



enact 'seeing-in', but so are the conscious mental states which track these distinct demarcations of the visual field; consciousness 'sees through' its own seriality of mental states.

*The Lacemaker* has been given several different guises. We seem to inhabit a new conscious state every time we see through one of these guises, and we are also able to conceptualise them together as a series. Every time we consciously consider the frame, we at once become aware of another level of representation. This awareness is a new conscious moment, where one frame is left behind for a new, 'penetrated' space and a new consciousness of the next or last level of representation. Cooperating with the frames-inframes are re-presentations of the surface. The surface of the printed image in the book appears to dissolve into the surface of celluloid (a moving surface),

which transmutes into the surface of the image on the computer screen, the browser window. This dissolving and merging movement is also a cooperation between mental and physical vision, for when I identify the image as a film still but also keep in mind that it is a painting or a book, this 'keeping in mind' is a mental image which I sustain while looking at the image as a film still which cooperates with my mental envisioning. One can be conscious of seeing through all of these surfaces as different transformations of materiality, where I see the image not as an image but as a principle of seriality which I can keep in my mind as a mental image while I optically inspect the film still. I have an image of consciousness that 'transverberates' the series of appearances and views.<sup>11</sup> Consciousness of extrication from framing and embodiment is also possible. The mental image here is of a consciousness which withdraws, with each backward step, from the frame covering over the image with a new surface: painting, photograph, celluloid, browser, computer monitor, digitised image. This may restore the initial conscious mental state of beholding the image, before the processing of frames-in-frames occurs, but this revisited conscious state is enriched with knowledge of the possible series of thoughts accompanying each appearance. With this film image we see the picture's material substratum (*Bildding*) and the picture object (*Bildobjekt*) in order to regard the picture subject (*sujet*) but this tripartite division is repeated each time we take as our intention

the painting, photograph, film still or digital image. The virtue of having a series of frames and surfaces presented in this way is that it suggests both the motion of a stream (going through the frames) and static moments, iterations, ruptures and particulars of time and materials that are experienced while passing beyond them.

Consciousness constructs the mental image of a series of frames-in-frames folding in or unfolding out of space, or changing over time, engaging with the (in real life) flat image of the still from *Un Chien Andalou*. When one becomes conscious of this mental construct of the principle of seriality occupying space, flatness returns. Yet one cannot shake off the notion of being able to see one through the other, aware of both a plurality of distinctions and the single image.

The image from *Un Chien Andalou* incorporates two sets of values: an ontology of states of an 'original' image, which in some sense lies 'underneath' its iterations; and a phenomenology of conscious states that, like the image itself, is both one and many, representing one moment in which many other previous moments subsist. The visual and the mental coemerge in the experience of film. The film still suggests various principles of seriality not only as an extendable and dynamic unfolding of frames in time and space, but also as a folding back in the reverse direction. Yet there is also possible a radical folding/unfolding of seriality which never moves or diverges from the point of its initiation. The image in the actual running film, *Un Chien Andalou*, looks still (it looks like a film still and a still photograph/painting) and appears to freeze time but is actually a series of frames rapidly passing before the eye. In the next few frames in *Un Chien Andalou*, the pages of the book are turned to reveal other pages, and this conjures up the mental image of a running film and the passing of time. The scene encourages us to become aware of the paradox of a still image produced by the dynamic seriality of film frames. This paradox has its counterpart in our mental envisioning. We can have a mental image of *The Lacemaker* which we maintain in our minds (the still image) while envisaging its transformations into photograph, film still and digital image. I can visualise the varieties of *Bildding* (the sheen of oil on canvas, the matt surface of a printed illustration in a book, the pixels of a digitised image)

but I can also create mental images of the *Bildobjekt* and *sujet*. Our mental image of *The Lacemaker* may appear to be still in the sense that we maintain it as a reference point, an identity through transformations and changes, but in fact it is continually refreshed by other mental images which wash over it to change its identity from painting to photograph to digital image, and yet it shines through these changes. There is a stillness within dynamism and identity through difference—a convergence of opposites that William James characterised as pails of water standing in the stream of consciousness. The mechanics of film and mental processes seem to index each other: while the film still appears fixed and our consciousness appears fixed upon it, both are non-inertial processes that reference each other.<sup>12</sup> This is not surprising given that film sequences are the products of conscious processes that we re-enact while watching them.

### **Conclusion**

The frame-in-the-frame enjoins us to engage straightforward and reflexively *at the same time* when we look through a series of transpositions with the lightning reactions of our visual thinking. But when we explain this spontaneous process of visual knowledge with words, they seem to separate out the two terms 'straightforward' and 'reflexively' with a series of steps between them, the kind the man looking through the keyhole hears when approached from behind in Sartre's example. As soon as we become conscious of our immersion, we seem to step outside of it. But this immersion can be recaptured. In Hitchcock's films, our immersion is reflected back to make us conscious of it and this further increases our involvement. Our connectedness does not hinge solely on emotional appeal but on how Hitchcock skilfully lays the trap and the audacity of his address. This is not critical distance but critical involvement as a kind of immersion in the director's precise intricacy. Hitchcock often structured his films with a series of frames-in-frames which both take us forward and make us aware of going forward. They ensnare us but we go in eyes wide open, willingly, partly because of our desire for emotional reward and partly because they anticipate and engage our mental envisioning.

I have tried to translate into words my own experience of viewing film as somehow 'in here' in my world yet 'out there' happening in the world for me to see. It seems important to give some account of this feeling of profound and meaningful continuity that bridges these worlds and harmonises the polarised views of externalism and internalism. During film experience, 'my world' is an adjunct of the world around me. There is something of me in it and something of it in me, and there are all sorts of causal paradoxes about what this means and who I am. Film reflects part of myself back to me while I am investing it with part of me, both emotionally and with my mental envisioning. This is also due to the reciprocal nature of film, which encourages intersubjective processes of empathy and mental image sharing between individuals. Another way to see film questioning the externalism/internalism divide is to see it as an extension of our consciousness. Recent work on cognitive extension argues against the view that the activity of thinking is something that happens solely in our heads.

Cognition extends beyond the body to the tools, symbols, notebooks or other artefacts like film, for example, which depict character's lives and emotions as well as our own. These objects are, in a sense, extensions of our mind:

[T]he actual local operations that realise certain forms of human cognising include inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward, and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the *boundaries* of brain, body, and world. The local mechanisms of mind, if this is correct, are not all in the head. Cognition leaks out into body and world. (Clark 2008, xxviii, my italics).

I would like to add that the mental imagery I have focused on in this essay also 'leaks out into body and world' and is stored and reflected back to us by film. The boundaries mentioned above are a series of frames through which cognitive continuities flow. I have used the cognitive markers of the edge of the eye, the camera aperture, the frame of the cinema screen, the depiction of the keyhole, the page margin to extend this series. As we have seen in the still from *Un Chien Andalou*, these sequences can be shown as monadic, as a series of frames in linear or horizontal extension, as a multiplicity of views in one scene, or as appearances which seem to self-generate out of each other, moving nowhere. This kind of

seriality can be experienced in an ecstatic instant with both mental imagery and visual inspection, or it can be unpacked and extended in time using words. Although consciousness is not itself a seriality, we can and often do experience self-consciousness as various mental images of seriality and most often in cooperation with our physical sight involved in finding serialities in the world, of which film is a rapid and compacted experience. A film's seriality of images appears to interlock with the seriality of our mental images, sometimes confirming, sometimes enriching the latter, and this is what allows us immediately to feel at one with what we are watching.

### Endnotes:

1. The duality has its roots deep in Western philosophy but its recent manifestation comes in the form of philosophers identified with the externalist view: Armstrong (1981), Dretske (1983), Goldman (1986), Platinga (1993) and Putnam (1975); in this vein there is an interesting theory of cognitive extension in Clark (2008) (and countered by Bartlett, 2008). For internalism, see Chisholm (1977), BonJour (1985), Lehrer (1990), Pollock (1986), Conee and Feldman (2001) and, more recently, a defence by Farkas (2008).

2. Recent cognitive research has revealed that seeing relies on at least two kinds of vision, this is called the dual visual systems (DVS) model, see Milner and Goodale (1995). Vision relying on the ventral stream with strong connection to memory, is more active analysing the abstract, spatial and locational dynamics of the visual field while the dorsal stream is occupied with coordinating sensorimotor actions or registering those of others. Cooperation between these two streams may be also necessary for sustaining what we call mental images, bridging the action between mirror neurons, memories and image schemas (of disputable complexity), all of which would be involved during the rapid succession of images in the film experience. See Clark (2009) for an incisive overview of developments on the subject of DVS.

3. There is no singular mental faculty responsible for their activation or storage. Against crude representationalism, it is likely that there are combined processes (analogue or propositional) by which different formats of mental images are enactively engaged in the world of which the mind is part. For an overview of mental imagery, see Thomas (2008).

4. In the film's dénouement, we discover that the reader is suffering from amnesia and is, in fact, the author reading his own book, and so his mental projections are not imaginary but are really his own. In this way, the film parodies the authorship of mental envisioning and our tendency to personalise film characters' flashbacks.

5. I would like to thank Firuza Pastakia, Dr. David Angluin, and Professor Eduard Marbach, Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern, for reading this paper and for providing insightful comments.

6. For supporting arguments that it was Husserl's intention to question the dualism of externalism and internalism, see Zahavi 2004.

7. There is a very similar *mise-en-scène* in *Vertigo* (Hitchcock 1958) where Madeleine (Kim Novak) is shown sitting in a gallery in front of a picture of Carlotta (her 'previous life'). She looks forward and reflexively, while the private detective (Jimmy Stewart) is shown watching her from what he believes is a concealed position. The scene duplicates the film viewer's looking forward and reflexively. For further discussion on framing device in *Vertigo* and elsewhere, see Minissale (2009).

8. As if to underline the logic that links Sartre's keyhole with the camera aperture, in *Rear Window* one of the characters tells Jeff the photographer that his telephoto camera, which he uses to study the lives of others, is 'a portable keyhole'.

9. Similarly, Barthes' analysis of Eisenstein's film stills, as opposed to the motion of film sequences, focuses on a vertical or paradigmatic reading of correspondences superimposed upon a horizontal or syntagmatic chain of events (Barthes 1977, 54- 57).

10. Similarly art (or film): 'gives us not merely an object but a perception of that object; a world and a way of seeing that world at once' (Danto 1989, 231).

11. Husserl writes, 'the glance penetrates through the noemata of the series of levels, reaching the object of the last level, and there holding it steady, whilst no longer penetrating through and beyond it' (Husserl 1982, 271).

12. Warhol's *Empire* frames the monumental stillness of the Empire State Building without changing the shot for hours. While our bodies are immobile and our eyes fixed on this still image, there is a kind of symmetry. Yet the film's invisible, dynamic substructure of rapidly passing frames seems to mirror the dynamism of our conscious thoughts attending the film. In such a way, the film allows us to envision the flow of our consciousness.

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# Aesthetic Expression and the Expressiveness of Language

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## **Abstract**

*The aim of this paper is to remark and isolate one direction aesthetic theory has taken in contemporary aesthetics. This will be approached through the Hegelian-Crocean axiom explaining that works of art express what is possible to be expressed only in terms of a given medium. Reviewing objections to this axiom, it will be indicated what phenomena in art and in psychoanalysis may be taken as support for a new theoretical insight.*

**Keywords:** *aesthetic theory, art, psychoanalysis, aesthetic expression, expressiveness of language, language of art.*

## **Expression: Aesthetics and Language**

One of the consequences of Hegel's aesthetic doctrine can be neatly summarized into a paradox, that art expresses the inexpressible. (Hegel 1975, vol.1, part 3, 299ff; also see: Croce 2008, 61-68, 247) But the use of paradox may be deemed by some to defeat the aesthetician's theoretical purpose; his language may do no more than shock us into thinking that theoreticians of art, if not artists themselves, ought to be able to express more clearly what is clearly expressible. To point out that the aesthetician's locution harbors a contradiction in terms, however, may do nothing more than expose our own insensitivity to the expressiveness of language.<sup>1</sup> For the paradox remains profoundly true if given the proper interpretation; so true, in fact, as to state in as succinct a manner as possible the very Hegelian axiom of aesthetic inquiry, that works of art express what is possible to be expressed only in terms of a given medium.

Two immediate objections to our interpretation of this "axiom" must be met. The first is that no test of the statement can be made when one starts out to investigate just what is expressed in a given artistic context. If I am reading a poem and ask the question "What does it mean?", the tools of verbal analysis can yield only a paraphrase, and not the poem; what is expressed in poetic structures cannot be reduced to a simple verbal equivalent. A fortiori, then,

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a picture, statue, or building. A poem does not mean; it *is*, as the poet might have said. In the same vein, a picture as a work of art does not picture; it is. How can we ever be sure, then, that art-works express anything? This objection is based upon a logical point of inquiry, and must be evaluated in the same terms.

In answer, let us consider a point of logic itself. Certain logicians insist upon the distinction between the meaning of a sentence, called a "proposition," and its physical occurrence, the sentence itself as written or stated. And the reason for this insistence is that the same proposition may be expressed by two different sentences either in different languages or in the same language. But there are others who insist upon talking only about sentences or statements, defining the logician's business as dealing with the structure of formulae and their transformations; any addition of the problem of meaning to this task could, in their eyes, only confuse the strictly logical issue. Which approach is valid for the artistic language?

It is clear that statements are statements because they mean, and that in order to mean they must be well constructed according to clearly defined rules of semantics. Thus, behind the meaning of any logical statement there will be found a vocabulary (supplied by a dictionary), rules of grammar (supplied by usage), and, as a test, a requirement of translatability (supplied by an understanding). When we apply these criteria to the language of art, we find that nothing corresponds to the first two. (Langer 1979) There is no dictionary meaning assignable to the elements of an artistic construct, and no rules the application of which will assure a "meaningful" statement. If this is true for the first two criteria, why should one continue to look for authentication in the third? Thus, without taking sides in the logical dispute noted above, we may merely answer the objection by saying that the rules of verbal expression apply only to verbal expressions, and not to art-works. But in so answering have we given satisfaction to those who pointed out the original difficulty? Hardly. A test there must be. But where to find it, if not in a "counter-statement?" The answer to this query is so obvious that it is rarely recognized. The only possible test for the meaning of an art-work is the experience of it, and a qualified, viewer of the work is the man who has had the experience. It is for this reason that artists and critics, in

answer to the question "What does it mean?" usually retort with a dry "Look again, read again; the work means itself." And in so doing, they merely state what their experience tells them is axiomatic for any inquiry into the facts of aesthetic experience. Art is to be enjoyed; its meaning is its enjoyment.

The second objection is to question the nature of this "axiom." To refer again to the logical model, an axiom is composed in part of indefinable notions, constitutes as a whole an undemonstrable proposition, and is itself used to demonstrate the truth of other propositions, which constitute the theorems of the system defined by the set of axioms selected. All attempts to prove the axioms are bootless; by trying, one could only reason in a circle. Once again it is clear that the analogy with logical procedure is of limited utility. Aesthetic inquiry can never be of the nature of a formal linguistic system; in purporting to give a reasoned explanation of facts, it must be empirical and yield no "proofs." In what sense, then, is this axiom an axiom?

In answer, consider an artist's usual statement, "My work speaks for itself; no comment is necessary." By answering in this way the artist merely states our axiom in another form. But what is being claimed? What, indeed, but the self-sufficiency of the pictorial? Anyone possessing normal visual receptors is capable of "understanding" the painting without a set of verbal footnotes, including perhaps the title. A portrait is meaningful even when the person being painted remains unknown. The experience is, and by rights ought to be, entirely visual. As a painter, speaking about paintings, the man is claiming what seems to him self-evidently true: a painting is a visual experience, and is not to be judged as if it were a verbal expression. This is, of course, no proof of the axiom, but an interpretation of it, and serves merely to state the ground for judging the success of a painting. To judge a painting as if it were a logical disquisition seems decidedly unfair both to the painter in question and to logicians in general. To each his own form of expression.

We may concede the artist his claim, and admit that the language of painting is the "language of vision." The only task remaining would be to examine the psychological theory and practice that may tend to yield independent support for the artist's contention. Is there any psychological phenomenon that can be taken as evidence

for nonverbal communication? If there is, and if its mechanism may be made clear, psychologists will have been found to be extremely helpful in sharpening aesthetic theory, which, we are told, tends to be rather dull.

### **The Case of Psychoanalysis**

In an effort to determine the contribution, if any, made by psychoanalytic practice to aesthetic theory, the distinction drawn by Read between the process, governed by psychology, and the product of art, which is the domain of aesthetics proper, may be denied on the grounds that any "inspiration" having its source in the subconscious mind of the author is more properly considered a part of the art object than a mere source of motivation for the artist's activity. (Read 1951) The inspired idea is one that comes to fruition in expression.

But theories of inspiration are various and complex. Plato, espousing a theory of external inspiration, linked the activities of artists, prophets, lovers, and madmen, and subsumed them under the rubric of the irrational; each of these classes of individuals is composed of men "beside themselves." The theory of external inspiration, having a specious application to art considered imitative, is obviously inadequate to describe the movements in contemporary art, becoming more and more subjective.

Contemporary artists appeal, in the main, to a theory of internal inspiration, making reference to the subconscious processes of the creative mind. (see: Ghiselin 1985) Ehrenzweig, writing as a psychoanalytical aesthete, explains this preference of contemporary artists by referring to a pan-genital crisis provoked by the erect posture of the human species which hid from view the female genitalia. (Ehrenzweig 1949)

The artist is thus said to invent forms disguising the subconscious wishes of his libido, which, following the upright walking habit of the human species, could no longer be freely expressed in social contacts. Such disguise is necessitated by the action of the super-ego, or censor.

Similar assumptions have been made by two movements in painting. Max Ernst adopted the dadaist slogan, *épater le bourgeois*, to shock a predominantly middle-class audience into a realization of its basic sexuality, giving a not-so-hidden portrayal

of the libido in such works as *La Phallustrade* and *L'effet d'attouchement*. The surrealists, creating an impression of a super-real world by amalgamating images of veridical perceptions with dream fantasy, likewise reduced the action of the censor to lay bare man's underlying sexual motivation. The weaknesses of both these movements as attempts to marry psychoanalysis and aesthetics are their obvious unfairness to psychoanalytical theory; the gestures and actions most meaningful to the analyst are the *unconsciously* expressed desires, and not those consciously exploited for an aesthetic effect. Interesting as these schools may be, they lack the essential connection we seek between psychoanalytic and aesthetic theory.

It has always been the bane of aesthetics to have suffered from a plethora of theories and a dearth of facts. Aestheticians have for the most part proceeded rationalistically from a more or less fruitful intuition to the deduction of what must be the case in the experience of particular works of art. The more successful approach would seem to be the empirical method of inducing the generalizations of aesthetic theory from a clearly defined set of aesthetic facts. For these, clearly, we are confronted with the work of artists and critics. Képes is the artist who defines his work as the development of a "language of vision." And this contention is supported by art educators, who maintain that the meaning of a work in the visual arts cannot be reduced to a literal linguistic statement. (Képes 1995)

But it would be a mistake to limit this concept of a nonverbal language to painting alone. Poets likewise maintain that their work cannot be limited to a literal statement, or paraphrase; the manner of phrasing is as important as what is phrased to the message of the poem. In a recent trial seeking to determine the status of a poem by a member of the "Beat Generation," novelist and critic Mark Shorer claimed to understand the import of the poem, *Howl*, by Allen Ginsberg, but refused to translate a line of it into prose, claiming that if this could be done, the poem would not be a poem. Even poetry is communication that may be properly described as non-verbal, since the effect of poetry is only in part a function of the referral property of words.

To generalize, it may be stated that nonverbal communication is the primary aesthetic fact. To the aestheticians, then, goes the

job of explaining how this fact takes place. Various explanations have been given.

(Alain 1953) and Valery (Valery 1938) likened an art-work to a primitive sign that signifies "absolutely" rather than "relatively." The primitive signs of art differ from the conventional ones of ordinary languages in that they have no fixed or assigned meanings, and no fixed rules to govern any combinations into which they may enter; their meaning is established by individual reaction or interpretation of the context in which they occur. More recently Malraux tried to show the similarity in the ways poetry and paintings communicate, finding the "form" or "style" the significant element, as opposed to recognizable images or assigned meanings. (Malraux 1951) He is obviously working in the tradition of Alain and Valery. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, an existentialist aesthetician, agrees in essence with Malraux, although he denies that the purpose of an art-work is merely to exhibit the "style" of the author. (Merleau-Ponty 1996) For him, art is an indirect language, an expression, in which the individual elements have perhaps no assignable meaning, but gain a meaning by entering into the particular relations they do within context. And a representative "content" may very well be considered as one of the elements of the total form of the art-work. The proper way to read a poem or view a picture, then, is to unite what is said directly and what is said indirectly; one must read the words of the poem to understand what is said, and "read" the spaces between the words to interpret the indirect meaning of the poem. In literary criticism this phenomenon is given the name of "oblique reference," or "obliquity," and the same phenomenon can be explained by making a similar distinction in kinds of symbols: ordinary languages are discursive media, and art-works are non-discursive, or presentational symbols. The meaning of a symbol of the latter sort is presented within the structure of the symbol and is "understood" when the art-work is perceived. (Langer 1979, 52 ff; also see: Langer 1977) Ballard describes the mechanism of this meaning relation as the elaboration of analogies; (Ballard 1957) and Ruesch and Kees (Ruesch and Kees 1956; also see Hide 1972, Ellgring 2008) use a similar concept to differentiate discursive thought (digital computation) from the non-discursive (analogic computation).

But the question remains, "By what process or mechanism do nonverbal expressions become communicative?" Here is the contribution of the psychoanalyst to aesthetic theory. After all, nonverbal communication takes place each time a verbally blocked patient is led to recovery by a psychotherapist, whether through free drawing, through successful Rorschach or TAT projective testing. Moreover, if one examines closely the nature of the objects used in both Rorschach and the TAT tests, one will be able to see the grounds for the uniqueness of artistic expression.

Consider, first, the use of free drawing. Naumburg described a cure wrought exclusively by this means. (Naumburg 1953) At the beginning of therapy the patient was ignorant of the "meaning" of her works; she was led to it by the analyst. And the society that evolved between the patient and the therapist-this first act of communication-was a necessary condition for the appearance of that meaning. Next: the Rorschach technique. A series of ambiguous images are presented for interpretation, as in modern "abstract" art. The images are what they are; their meaning is "read into" them. Finally, the TAT technique: unambiguous images are interpreted. Recognizable content remains constant; its meaning shifts from subject to subject, as may the meaning of a more traditional painting. In short, the meaning of the images used in projective techniques varies from one patient to another, even when the form perceived is relatively constant. Meaning accrues to an art-work in similar fashion, if Alain and Valery are correct. And for it to accrue, there must be this intimate society between the artist and his audience. In answer to still another question, "What is the ultimate worth of aesthetic expressions?" it could be answered that social community is the ultimate value subserved by even the most antisocial of artists, and that an artist may succeed, where a propagandist fails, in molding public opinion.

### **Conclusion**

The propensity of aestheticians to proceed on theoretical grounds alone has led to a profusion of conflicting theories and produced little agreement on what constitutes the facts of their discipline. Nor have the theoreticians of art succeeded in isolating the mechanism by which the essential fact, nonverbal communication, takes place.



It seems appropriate therefore to suggest that aesthetics be conceived as the descriptive study of the area in which nonverbal communication does take place by means of the perception of an art-work. Then a study of successful psychoanalytical cures achieved by the use of similar objects of perception in therapy should yield further information concerning the manner in which such communication comes about.

Finally, if this account is fruitful, aestheticians may be led to abandon the model of significant speech to explain artistic communication. The meaning of the art-work cannot be claimed to be understood first in the artist's mind, and then translated by means of technical aptitude into some physical medium. The artist does not mean; his work does. Like the verbally blocked patient, or autistic personality, he may very well not know what he wants to say, except in the very vague sense of having an impulse (which is verbally blocked) to say something. His creation is a means of discovering what is meant. In other words, the physical act of creation usually precedes the artist's understanding of his art-work's significance. Communication will then have taken place nonverbally when artist and audience respond to the work in similar ways. Society grows from this interplay, along with the mutual understanding of the art object. Since the meaning of the work cannot be described, but only shown, the task, for critics, is restricted to an analysis of the object presented for appreciation. They must work in the hope that this society may develop. Such is the practical consequence of Hegel's (as well as Croce's) assertion that art expresses what cannot otherwise be expressed.

To go beyond the data of this paper, it might be speculated that religious communities have grown up around the production of art-works, as is attested by the religious significance of the prehistoric cave paintings. In this process, the so-called mystery of communication has become endowed with the quality of the sacred. In contemporary continental philosophy, the claims of classical psychoanalysis have been challenged. Since a small group of philosophers of this trend have been successful artists and critics as well as exponents of the newer psychological trend, it behoves us to look at their testimony on the function of art in the working out of human existence. One may move, then, from art

considered as any form of nonverbal expression in which a creative personality achieves ego fulfillment to an explanation of the ways in which human existence establishes itself as both creative and personal by introducing novel significance into our common world.

### **Endnote:**

1. Concerning the expressiveness of language in art see Dufrenne M., 1968, *Language & Philosophy*, Greenwood Press; and his *Estetique et Philosophie*, Klincksieck, 1967 pp.73 ff. Also see his *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, trans. E. Casey, Northen University Press 1979, pp. 126 ff.; also see translator's introduction, pp.xli.

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# **Modernity and its Other: The Logic of “Inclusive Exclusion”**

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## ***Abstract***

*This paper aims to examine the question, “Does the term ‘Modernity’ refer to a specific culture, or can it be employed more broadly?” Beginning with a conceptual clarification of modernity, modernization and tradition, I will challenge Habermas’s unfinished project of modernity by introducing the concept of a “plurality of modernities.” Referring to Habermas’s implicitly Eurocentric claim of the universality of modernity, based in an “Occidental understanding of the world,” I will argue that universalization cannot be achieved on the basis of a specific world-interpretation. Arguing against the feasibility of completing “the project of modernity” once and for all, I suggest that there are not only numerous paths to modernity, but that diverse historical conditions and sociocultural environments give rise to varied forms of modernity in different parts of the world. I argue that an emancipatory theory, which is what Habermas’s is believed to be, ought to address itself toward an understanding of the transformation of culture rather than simply the logic of communication, and, consequently, it should address cultural as well as cross-cultural conflicts in various societies, including non-western ones.*

**Keywords:** *Modernity, Universality, Eurocentrism, Occidental Rationality, plurality of modernities, cross-cultural approach.*

## **Modernity and its Other: The Logic of “Inclusive Exclusion.”**

### **I. Introduction**

In order to pursue the discussions that the title suggests, this paper has been organized into three very brief sections. Beginning with a conceptual clarification of tradition, modernity and modernization, the first section of this paper identifies the adapted definitions of the words in this paper on one hand, and articulates the connections between tradition, modernity and modernization on the other.

In the second part of the paper, by referring to Jürgen Habermas’s claim to the universality of modernity with the “Occidental understanding of the world” which is somewhat Eurocentric, I

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\will argue against Habermas's claim to the universality of modernity by first criticizing the link he establishes between Occidental Rationality and the claim to universality of modernity; second, his theory of "communicative action", as a generalist and abstract metanarrative of the claim to universality of modernity, third, his fear of particularity; and fourth, the problem of Eurocentrism itself and the issue of cultural diversities .

In the third part of my paper, which has been entitled "The Quest for the Plurality of Modernities", I will argue that in sociological and philosophical writing, the notion of modernity has often been criticized for its forcefully Eurocentric essence. As a critique of modernity or as a viewpoint on a supposed "new modernity," Postmodernity led some witnesses to pay renewed attention to modernity's current phase.

The desire for a re-evaluation of modernity came with the fundamental postmodernist criticism, appearing at the beginning of the 1970s, which has newly been adopted into non-European intellectual debates. Consequently, the all-too-familiar dissimilarity between Western and non-Western civilization, which was in the end based on the assignation of modernity to "the West" and tradition to "the East," vanished.

The critical point I will concentrated upon, relates to an essential limitation in the ability of Habermas's claim to universality of modernity to address cultural problems. According to universalization theory, there is a general underlying model of socio-cultural development which has effects in each of the different value-spheres that separate out in the course of the development of modernity. Crudely speaking, the universality thesis is supposed to grasp that general phenomenon. Accordingly, I address some critics of Habermas's lack of attention of cultural diversities. I conclude that the best approach to overcome the shortcomings of Habermas's account is a cross-cultural approach.

## **II. The synchronized construction of tradition and modernity**

Since in the discussion on the theme "plurality of modernities," which will be discussed in the last part of this paper, tradition plays an essential function, it appears then suitable to examine this concept more closely. Here, I want to refer to a fascinating

argument articulated by Peter Wagner, who shows that Europe at a certain point “had to adopt a *discourse of tradition* for its self-description. A traditional discourse about Europe and at the same time a discourse on the modern tradition, as Jacques Derrida has called it, had emerged.” (Wagner, 1999:45) Wagner introduces two main images of America and a counter-image of Europe widespread in European social theory and intellectual discourse: the first image “depicts America as a country that shows more advanced regions of the world a picture of their own past; the second presents America as uncontaminated realization of the modernist principles of autonomy and rationality, as *pure modernity*.” (Wagner, 1999:46) Wagner adds that there is also a *third image* here, but this is not an image of America, it is a counter-image, developed by Europeans for their own social world, in the light of their perceptions of America: where Americans emphasize presence, European life is rooted in history; Americans are individual atoms, Europeans are members of a community; Americans are driven by purposes, Europeans receive their orientations from values; Americans worship instrumental rationality, Europeans have a sense of spirit and spirituality. (Wagner, 1999:45)

This change, according to Wagner, “had bore a consequence for the whole intellectual edifice devoted to providing self-understanding by locating one’s own position in the world.” (Wagner, 1999:46) In earlier proposals, Europe gains a new position in the world. For instance, “Europe had often been set off against the rest of the world, as that the one region of the spirit in which myth had been dethroned and where reflection reigned.” (Wagner, 1999:46) Europe now holds a balance between mythical Asia and modernist America.

Two conclusions can be grasped from Wagner’s argument. First, if western modernity is distinguished by a dual logic: one, general, universal and dynamic; the other, authentic, particular and rooted. Subsequently, western modernity itself can be considered as an example in the debate on multiple modernities:

The deterritorialization of this conception after the Second World War did not overcome the idea of a dual logic of modernity, one formal, universal and dynamic, the other

authentic-original, particular and rooted; or, one possibly should rather say, the idea of a logic of modernity constantly exposed to a resistance from tradition. This dualistic view is doubly reductionist: it reduces one of its components, sometimes called modernity *tout court*, to rationalism without any substance; and it confines the other side, the resistance to modernity, to a static, responsive mode. (Wagner, 1999:49)

Second, if Europe itself has not defeated tradition but is founded on tradition or, putting it differently, has productively built a traditional modernity or a modern tradition, the western paradigm loses its exceptional character. "Instead it gives proof of the *inevitable interaction* between traditional' legacies and 'modern' elements in the process of constituting a particular modernity." (Linkenbach, 2000:46)

Arnason has stressed this interactive process, in which both parts are affected by mutual influence:

... the contributions of diverse traditions to the patterns of modernity can only be understood if both sides of the relationship are taken into account, i.e. not only the shaping of modernity by tradition, but also the re-shaping of tradition by the modernizing process. The latter aspect is sometimes described as 'an invention of tradition', but this is a needlessly extremist formulation; it would be more appropriate to speak about a selective reactivation and reinterpretation, and this process affects different levels of traditions in different ways. (Arnason, 1993:15, in Linkenbach, 2000:46)

In the scholarly and social development of reflecting on, negotiating and generating distinct modernities, the notion of tradition has become a vital element in Indian and African, Islamic or East Asian postcolonial discourse. In India, one of the most fundamental and significant questions in this framework refers to the way in which tradition has been understood and interpreted by political intellectuals and the manner it has been applied in politics of power.

Similarly, While the question "What is Modernity?" seems to be relatively uncomplicated, the respond is not. A quick look at some of the countless books available on the explication of modernity shows an uneven division into three groups. Each

group highlights a certain set of factors for defining modernity and its foundations: first, the development of modernity can be traced to the opening stages of modern philosophy and the formation of the freedom of subjectivity; second, a change in the structure of society from feudalism to capitalism, third and last, there is a group who defines modernity chiefly in terms of political developments, such as the formation of the nation state, civil society, and liberal democracy.

Modernization, on the other hand, can be understood as a development of social transformation, defined by Max Weber as a radical social change in terms of a set of historical processes connected with industrialization and democratization. Accordingly, the last two previously mentioned groups who explain modernity in terms of social and political developments are indeed defining modernization not modernity. According to Habermas, the most prominent modernist committed to the ideals of the Enlightenment, the "philosophical discourse of modernity", has its origins in the Enlightenment faith that a social order could be rationally defended, in terms of the claims of reason only. This was a fundamental motive of the Enlightenment as a whole, and is essential to a philosophical conception of modernity. Accordingly, modernity is a new philosophical epoch with an emancipatory potential. Habermas' idea of modernity as an unfinished universal project refers to this conception of modernity.

The question, however, that needs to be discussed here is: Can, as Habermas claims, the project of modernity be universalized, or have modernity's metanarratives of progress and freedom failed and Western rationality exhausted, as Lyotard argues? Here, I will argue against Habermas' claim to universality of modernity by means of first criticizing the link he establishes between Occidental Rationality and the claim to universality: and second, the problem of Eurocentrism.

### **III. Habermas's claim to the universality of modernity with the "Occidental understanding of the world"**

In the Habermasian logic, rationality is a form of communicative action projected to achieve agreement with others in an "ideal speech situation" where people justify and defend moral and political claims based on communicative rationality. However,



despite the remarkable criteria Habermas applied “to expound the universality of the concept of communicative rationality,” (Habermas 1984:138) his theory does not reflect an attempt on his part to realize or analyze the non-Western philosophical thought concerning action and rationality and cross-cultural dialogue. This is because he prefers to pursue a claim to universality by following the pathway of Occidental sociological approaches to a theory of societal rationalization. (Habermas 1984:139)

It is a fact that the whole “project of modernity” and connected discourses of rationality and progress have historically sided with the “West over the rest.” Enlightenment philosophizing was a Western-based project that presumed, in part, Eastern cultures to be inferior to that of Western. While Eastern intellectuals do acknowledge that Habermas’s notion of emancipation is significant for seeking a normative theory of liberation, they keep criticizing Habermas’s claim to universality, which is based on Occidental rationality.

That which Habermas does make a claim of universality for the structures and norms of communicative action is unquestionable. The following is his clearest response to Max Weber’s question of whether or not rationalization is a phenomenon restricted to the West:

[The three validity-claims of communicative action] form a system—however fraught with internal tensions—that did indeed first appear in the form of Occidental rationalism but that, beyond the peculiarity of this specific culture, lays a claim to a universal validity binding on all “civilized men.” (Habermas, 1984:184)

Habermas’ claim is that communicative action, with its validity-claims, is essential not only to social theories presently available within the modern life world, but to all “civilized” human beings. “This strong universality-claim raises two questions: can Habermas justify it? In addition, why would he make it? The question of justification has generated an enormous literature. But it can be answered with suspicious ease.” (McCumber, 2000:91) Habermas, as, John McCumber argues, distinguishes three possible strategies for justifying the kind of universality-claim he has advanced without appealing to metaphysical or transcendental support:

1. The account of validity claims can be formulated out of speaker's intuitions, and then be empirically tested against as varied a sample of speakers as can be found. This can, at least, render the account "plausible."
2. We can try to assess the empirical usefulness of formal-pragmatic insights in various fields.
3. We can examine critically the history of social theory, to see what problems are present in it and how those theories could be improved when supplemented by the concept of communicative rationality. (Habermas, 1984:137-141 in McCumber, 2000:92)

These three possible approaches can be pursued with the help of the "language – communication" framework. Habermas describes communicative action as "that form of social interaction in which the plans of action of different actors are co-coordinated through an exchange of communicative acts, that is, through a use of language orientated towards reaching understanding." (Habermas, 1987b:44)

Accordingly, Habermas understands the "language – communication" framework as a new way of reaffirming the project of modernity. Habermas wants to show how the transformation from traditional society to modernity involved a progressive secularization of normative behavior reconstructed through communicative action. Illustrating his evaluation of the communicative competence of social actors, Habermas differentiates between "action oriented to success" and "action oriented to understanding", and also between the social and non-social contexts of action. Action orientated to success is measured by rules of rational choice, at the same time as action orientated to understanding takes place through "communicative action." (Moody, 2003:1)

Given the centrality of this distinction to Habermas's theory of communicative action, it is not surprising that this aspect of his work has sparked substantial debate. (Cooke, 1997:17) David Rasmussen writes:

This thesis regarding the primacy of the communicative mode constitutes the major theoretical insight sustaining the entire edifice Habermas has built... If one can show that communicative forms are by nature prior to instrumental or

strategic forms, then the earlier interpretation of rationality as represented by Weber and others can be dismissed as false. (Rasmussen, 1990:37)

Rasmussen describes that implicit in this distinction Habermas places an interior connection between participation in communicative action and a “positive” and non-defeatist emancipatory potential which can resist Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s totalizing critique of reason.<sup>1</sup>

At the end of *TCA*, Habermas returns to the subject of the dissimilarity between what he calls the “strongly universalistic claim” of the theory of communicative action, and the merely “hypothetical” and only “indirectly examinable” status of that claim. (Habermas, 1987b:399) “It seems that he is attempting, here, not to prove his universality claim but only to advance it as a hypothesis plausible enough for discussion: he takes it not as a report of established fact, but precisely as a *claim*.” (McCumber, 2000:93) John McCumber in his book *Philosophy and Freedom: Derrida, Rorty, Habermas, Foucault*, suggests that

This would explain the sketchy nature of his earlier discussion of how to justify that claim: he needs to validate it only as a topic for discussion, not as actually true. And it would mean that the crucial question concerning Habermasian universality changes from one concerning what can *justify* it into one concerning what can *motivate* it. (McCumber, 2000:93)

There are, McCumber suggests, at least four possible motives. Two of them, he argues, “are dubious: assigning them to Habermas conflicts with what he says elsewhere. The other two, though they can be attributed to Habermas with more confidence, will turn out to be problematic in nature. The result will be an enhanced suspicion that Habermas does not really need his universality-claim at all.” (McCumber, 2000:94) Here, I summarize these four motives from McCumber’s book, followed by some clarifications. (McCumber, 2000:94-96)

First, McCumber quotes a passage from the *TCA*’s introduction, to show that the universality-claim is motivated by social science’s claim to objectivity:

Theory formation is in danger of being limited from the start to a particular, culturally or historically bound perspective unless

fundamental concepts are constructed in such a way that the concept of rationality they implicitly posit is encompassing and general, that is, satisfies universalistic claims...We cannot expect objectivity in social/theoretical knowledge if the corresponding concepts of communicative action express a merely particular perspective on rationality, one interwoven with a particular cultural tradition. (Habermas, 1984: 94 in Mccumber, 2000:91)

Universality is, therefore, claimed in the "objectivity" expected for social/theoretical knowledge. However, "as a motivation for his own universality claim, such an appeal to objectivity has a problem of which Habermas is clearly aware." For it presumes that the hopes involved are themselves justifiable. Possibly the propensity of "social scientists to make aim truth claims is itself, like neopositivistic understandings of science in general, a fit object for critique." (Mccumber, 2000:94) Therefore, we may presume that, regardless of appearances, "he is not merely taking over the current self-interpretation of social science in making his universality-claim." (Mccumber, 2000:94)

The second possible motivation "is similarly dubious, but somewhat more pressing in terms of the current investigation." Advancing universality claims in the service of objectivity means advancing them in the name of the most rigorous form of truth—and, it follows, of presence. When Habermas's overt linking of objectivity with universality (and so, tacitly, with presence) is combined with the fact that many of his criticisms of thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault, and Heidegger center on their (supposed) inability to make truth-claims,<sup>2</sup> he seems to be motivated by the "domination of presence" associated by Derrida with the metaphysical tradition.

In fact, however, he is not. For one of Habermas's main targets, early and late, is precisely the view that truth is the single paramount goal or telos of speech and inquiry in general. In "A Return to Metaphysics?" he puts this point in almost the form of a lament:

The Occidental deference towards logos reduces reason to something that language performs in only one of its functions, in representing states of affairs. Ultimately, methodically pursuing

questions of truth is the only thing that still counts as rational. Questions of justice and questions of taste, as well as questions regarding the truthful presentation of self, are all excluded from the sphere of the rational. Whatever surrounds and borders on the scientific culture that specializes in questions of truth, every context in which this culture is embedded and rooted, then appears to be irrational as such. (Habermas, 1992: 50 in Mccumber, 2000:94)

In opposition to this, Habermas seeks to maintain what he calls “the equiprimordiality and equal value of the three fundamental linguistic functions,” (Habermas, 1987a:311 &363) for communicative action is oriented not just to truth (the excellence of presence), but to appropriateness and truthfulness as well.<sup>3</sup> Habermas does not, in the passages just referred to, shrink from calling the Occidental deference to logos by the name of “logocentrism.” If he is under its spell, it is in no simple or direct way.

Habermas’ desire, already mentioned, to give his theory of communicative action critical thrust provides a third, and more plausible, motivation for his universality-claim. Critical or self-critical potential is for Habermas primarily unlocked through dialogue with others. What brings such dialogue about is pre-eminently, for him, the making of a validity-claim, which transcends the location of its utterance: as Kant pointed out, an assertion which only claims validity for me (or us) here and now is not open to criticism by others,<sup>4</sup> or as Misgeld argues:

The Kantian slogan “dare to know” [from “What is Enlightenment?”], practice your own reason, was formulated as universally inclusive. He did not say only one group or class, be it priest or rulers, can think critically. So there is a democratizing impulse in this. (Misgeld, Forthcoming 2011:98)

The incentive for Habermas’ universality-claim now seems to be pragmatic rather than theoretical. If such is the case, those claims are not, in Austin’s language, constative speech acts at all. They are made in order to achieve an elocutionary effect: to draw as many interlocutors as possible into the field of discussion. Their illocutionary status is similar to that of an

invitation or summons. (Austin, 1965: 99-101 in Mccumber, 2000:95)<sup>5</sup> But this motive, as Mccumber argues,

at the same time as ... it can reliably be assigned to Habermas, has problems of its own. For such an invitation need not be couched in the form of a universality-claim. If the point of making a universality-claim is to issue an invitation, why not simply issue one? If provocation is needed, why will the centrality-claim not suffice? If the radical separation of subsystems of rationality is truly a feature of most views of the modern world, the claim that a single form of reason is central to them all should be incitement enough. Why take the risk—no small one, in light of the Habermas literature—that one's universality-claim will be discussed only to be refuted? From this point of view, Habermas's advancing of his universality-claim as a topic for discussion appears to be misleading and even damaging. (Mccumber, 2000:95)

A fourth and final possibility is suggested by the passage Mccumber adduced above from the end of *TCA*. There, Habermas's motivation lies not in the nature of social science but in that of communicative action itself:

The theory of communicative action aims at that moment of unconditionedness which is built into the conditions of consensus-formation by criticizable validity claims—as claims these transcend all spatial and temporal, all provincial limitations of the context of the moment. (Habermas, 1987a: 399 in Mccumber, 2000:95)

The "aiming at", as referred to here, means "that the theory of communicative action is itself advanced as a case of communicative action. So it carries with it the kind of unconditional validity-claim that it attributes to communicative action in general." (Mccumber, 2000:95-96) Habermas therefore makes his universality-claim because "his own general theory has it that he must. Like the third motivation above, this one can plausibly be assigned to Habermas. But if my previous argumentation is correct, it is circular." For, according to Mccumber, the theory of communicative action can also be seen as claiming only centrality. If so, then it is not itself an instance of communicative action. Why does Habermas think that it is?

The answer, presumably, is that all rational discourse must in his view make universality-claims. Only if his own universality-claim has previously been accepted, then, does it follow that the theory of communicative action itself must be advanced in a case of communicative action. (Mccumber, 2000:96)

Habermas indeed shows that the theory of communicative action is central to modern social theories. Then it becomes indirectly plausible for it to also be central to the modern life world itself, which those theories explain in important ways. Yet he goes on to make a “universality-claim for his theory which he cannot begin to show and that, on several accounts of its possible motivation, is unnecessary or even problematic.” (Mccumber, 2000:96)

Dieter Misgeld, however, has another and more reasonable interpretation of Habermas’ motivation of the claim to universality. In an interview conducted with Misgeld in 2006, two of his students asked the following:

Modernity has always laid claim to universal certainty—which meant assigning a different and lesser significance to anything deemed purely local, non-Western, or lacking universal expression. We also know that Habermas is a defender of the universality of modernity. Do you regard this part of Habermas’s thought as superficial? (*Misgeld, Forthcoming 2011:101*)

To this question, Misgeld responded, “No, I don’t regard it as superficial. Wrong-headed. He’s stubbornly defending this view.” Misgeld continues that Habermas “never thought that something like postmodernism would happen that there would be respectable philosophies, arguing against universality”. (*Misgeld, Forthcoming 2011:98*)

All the interlocutors that Habermas has had, up to Foucault and Derrida, were all thinking in universal terms. It was the more inclusive vision of the dialectic of universality and particularity that the more complex vision that he had that was in question, that he wanted to defend. That would be an all-out attack, and replicating features of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics which really bothered him. Of course, from Nietzsche to

Heidegger, that constellation which to Habermas always was German ideology in the worst way, anti-Enlightenment, that would come not from Germany, and in a radical Leftist form which he didn't expect. That drove him into more pigheaded responses... There's so much substance to what he does, but when he gets to argue for the universality of argumentative discourse in the abstract, it gets to sound a bit like preaching. I think that's just because somehow he's heavily invested in this.<sup>6</sup> (*Misgeld, Forthcoming 2011:98*)

After providing these necessary backgrounds for Habermas's claim to universality, Misgeld addresses the motivation behind Habermas's theoretical approach:

For him Nazism meant particularism. What does this mean? It means racism. It means your particular heritage, your particular hair, skin colour, whatever. Anything idiotic about us, like 'roots', like what the Nazis called "blood and soil." You cannot have that ideology if you think in universal concepts. If you have something like universal norms, you cannot privilege race, you cannot privilege something that you don't share with all of humanity. That's why he is so militant and so engaged at that point. (*Misgeld, Forthcoming 2011:107*)

The experience of the Second World War, and more specifically the occurrence of the Holocaust, made a lasting impact on the intellectual career of Jürgen Habermas. As a young student, after these events, he had to find his way out of the physical and spiritual ruins of Germany. In an interview, he describes his reaction to the Nüremberg trials as one of shock: "Our own history was suddenly cast in a light that made all its essential elements appear radically different. All at once we saw that we had been living in a political criminal system. I had never imagined that before." (Horster, 1979: 31)

And that is why Misgeld respects Habermas "profoundly." Misgeld doesn't think "the concepts are right." However, he believes "many good thoughts, repeated too often, become bad thoughts. They certainly lose people, they don't engage them." (Horster, 1979: 32) According to Misgeld, when Habermas gives modernity much profile, "he is driven, sometimes obsessively, by trying to undo the conditions that led to Nazism." (*Misgeld,*



Forthcoming 2011:108) By referring to the notion of solidarity and its relationship with justice, Habermas himself explains this point as follow:

As a component of a universalistic morality, of course, solidarity loses its merely particular meaning, in which it is limited to the internal relationships of a collectivity that is ethnocentrically isolated from other groups — that character of forced willingness to sacrifice oneself for a collective system of self-assertion that is always present in pre-modern forms of solidarity. The formula “Command us, Fuehrer, we will follow you” goes perfectly with the formula “All for one and one for all” — as we saw in the posters of Nazi Germany in my youth — because fellowship is entwined with followership in every traditionalist sense of solidarity. Justice conceived in postconventional terms can converge with solidarity as its reverse side only when solidarity has been transformed in the light of the idea of a general discursive will formation. (Habermas, 1990: 245)

Accordingly, Misgeld is right to say that when Habermas thinks of modernity he thinks of universal structures, such as universal human rights, some sort of moral prescription that has a universal form. He thinks of communication structures that can be spread all around the globe. He thinks of types of discourse,; scientific, artistic and so on, which as he puts it; imply or include at least a possibility of raising universal claims to validity:

If you include in particularism a preoccupation with exclusive ethnic identity or religious exclusion (although that was not a part of Nazism) or racism, the kind that Nazism propagated, then one understands what is meant. So he sees liberation in the emergence of the universal structures of consciousness, universal normative systems institutions that can accommodate them, in proper balance with other kinds of institution, and he works very hard to explain this and often does so very well. (Misgeld, Forthcoming 2011:110)

Misgeld argues that the emphasis Habermas puts on universality “has been successfully shown to be exaggerated by people like Rorty,” however, this exaggeration comes from “a fear of any

kind of particularism." Misgeld concludes his argument that "for me universality is first of all a practical construct."<sup>7</sup> There is no universal philosophy which could serve for all human societies. That's what we would need if we were to look for philosophical foundations of human rights, which we don't have:

Just as we don't have one religion, we don't have one philosophy. Nor do all societies even distinguish between philosophy and religion. There are many difficulties involved in that. Universality practically constructed simply means that the vast majority, if not all, States of the world have committed themselves to, in some way, endorsing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Universality consists in the totality of all human societies represented by States being signatories to the Universal Declaration. That's all that means. (*Misgeld, Forthcoming 2011:111*)

According to Misgeld, one should be careful and allow for the fact that we really haven't had the kind of inclusive communication between societies and cultures in the world which would lead to a sense of Human Rights,<sup>8</sup> or norms for all which would reverberate with different histories. "We don't have that yet. So we're at step one, not at the end of the road but the beginning of the road." (*Misgeld, Forthcoming 2011:110*) The problem with Habermas, according to Misgeld, is that, "he is a rationalist," And the problem with being a rationalist, as Dallmayr reminds Habermas, is that reason, at the same time as universal in its claims, is always contextual in its existence. Dallmayr, who in the words of Habermas, "For decades...has commented upon my publications<sup>9</sup> not uncritically, but rather with great sensitivity and a comprehensive knowledge of the German discussion and its context," (Habermas, 2004: 320) urges Habermas "to replace or supplement formal analysis with non-possessive and substantive types of reasoning" and treat "the life-world as a substantive experiential realm." (Dallmayr, 1991: 150-151) Although Habermas argues that there are various universalisms, his attempt to accommodate these important insights (which have mostly been made in the context of interviews and short essays) cannot be met by his strong claim to universality.

Dallmayr, accordingly, redefines the relationship between the everyday experiential life-world and human reason. This involves moving away from the modernist formula whereby legislative reason appropriates and organizes the life-world, toward a postmodern formula whereby the life-world informs a type of human reasoning. This idea of a postmodern critical ontology places Dallmayr in opposition to the modernist critical theory of Habermas, which is deontological, cognitivist, formalistic, and universalist. (Dallmayr, 1991:109-110 in Wayne, 2001: 50)

<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=109762475>Dallmayr regards this model of rationality as a “truncated version of reason” narrowly tailored to meet the criteria of both empirical science and argumentative speech. (Dallmayr, 1991:109-110 in Wayne, 2001: 50) The result is a systematic devaluation of the ontological context from which reason emerges. As with Kant, Habermas’s reconstruction of Enlightenment reason yields an abstract, formalistic rationality purged of the substantive content and diversity of lived human experience: (Dallmayr, 1991:109-110 in Wayne, 2001: 50)

Habermas’s outlook...can with some legitimacy be described as a “humanism”-where this term stands for a more or less man- or subject-focused orientation. The distinctions between empiricism and hermeneutics, system and lifeworld and propositional and reflexive speech can, without undue violence, be reconciled with the Cartesian and Kantian subject-object bifurcation [and thus with the basic framework of metaphysics]. (Dallmayr, 1984: 158 in Habermas, 2004:321)

Similarly, but in another context, Seyla Benhabib, whose “model of discursive and communitarian ethics draws strongly on Jürgen Habermas,” (Boler, 1995: 138) argues that Habermas’s discourse ethic- which is “closely tied to the tradition of republican or civic virtue, and which extends from Aristotle to Machiavelli, to the Renaissance humanists, to Jefferson, Rousseau, and Hannah Arendt,” (Boler, 1995: 139 & Benhabib, 1992 :82) - of rational argumentation cannot be so easily universalized<sup>10</sup> and applied to non-Western cultures without concessions to a more “non-

evaluative mode of hermeneutical understanding than his theory allows him." (Benhabib, 1986:272-4) At the same time as this does not imply rejecting the basic presuppositions of the theory, (Benhabib, 1986:309) she argues it will require a stronger role for the "concrete other" as opposed to the "generalized other." (Benhabib, 1986:340-2) Benhabib, in fact, believes that Habermas's model is defensible, largely because of the lack of a competing model. Strangely, however, her defense reflects an Occidental slant, for:

I still believe, therefore, that the minimal claim of Habermasian universalism, namely, that there is a fundamental link between the practices of the rational justification of belief and the commitment to a community of free and equal dialogue partners in a just society, articulates the Utopian core of the Western philosophical tradition. (Benhabib, 1996:94)

Axel Honneth also argues along these lines in making the case for a struggle for recognition which refers more to the expression of pre-discursive norms such as human dignity and esteem than to conflict resolution.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, critics such as Seyla Benhabib, Jean Cohen, and Thomas McCarthy, at the same time as operating from an immanent Habermasian perspective, "have made major criticisms of Habermas's neglect of culture and identity. The problem is that Habermas underestimates the role of conflict in society, and in particular cultural conflict, there is a realistic limit over what it can be discursively agreed upon." (Delanty, 1997:42) As Alain Touraine, who himself desires to defend the theory of modernity, says:

Habermas underestimates the conflictual dimension of society, as he defends the independence of actors against the logic of systems in the hope that the particularity of their lived world can be incorporated into the world of the Enlightenment and its universalism. (Touraine, 1995:341 in Delanty, 1997:43)

The problem with particularity, however, as Misgeld argues, is that its defenders consider cultures as if they are mutually exclusive, non-interactive, and stagnant; whereas, cultures have largely been mutually sharing, interactive and dynamic. This is particularly evident in multi-cultural societies like India. For instance, the Islamic and Hindu cultures did not remain mutually

exclusive during the last millennium. Rather they influenced each other -- Sufism, which has emerged as a confluence of both cultures during the Moghul period, is a striking example. In fact, interaction of cultures has been an important source of internal critique and change.

The most fundamental challenge of the particularity approach, however, from the claim to universality lies in its persistence that there is no transcendental sameness to humanity. Rather, the diversity argument persists that humanity is recognizable by difference and diversity. In the dead-lock between the hegemonic universality and resistant particularity, there seem to be some rays of hope which can, in part, be grasped in postmodern theories.

To critique Habermas' claim to universality, one also could raise the question of Eurocentricism. According to one critic, social theory is unable to comprehend and interpret the project of the Enlightenment without comprehending the periphery: that is, the world beyond Europe. (Gilroy, 1992: 17) The heritages of slavery and colonialism, for example, must be employed to challenge the universalistic hopes of Western modernity, including Habermas' own theory. Indeed, while Habermas' theory of communicative action is deeply critical of all forms of ethnocentrism insofar as it proposes a discursive concept of universality which transcends culture, it still suffers from Eurocentrism. Paradoxically, by virtue of wanting to step outside culture, Habermas's theory succumbs to Eurocentrism at that very point, since the critique of tradition, as Habermas rightly recognizes, is itself part of modernity. But this modernity is Occidental and Eurocentric, not universal.

Indeed, Modernity founds itself by excluding what is other to it, and nevertheless discovers that it must include for a second time what it has excluded. This skeptical logic, in which the pre-modern Other is first excluded or superseded by rationality's development, merely to be included again since it is a fundamental element of modernity and rationality. (Li, 2005:83)

Habermas's prominent narrative is a process of rationalization that not only defines modernity's Other as everything that modernity is not, but it also progressively excludes the pre-

modern from the modern realm. At the same time, however, having established his narrative of rationalization, Habermas acknowledges the need to redress the problem of imbalance inflicted on the life-world by rationalization. A process of managed inclusion thus begins as the excluded pre-modern elements are allowed to appear again in his work. (Li, 2005:83)

In consequence of its Enlightenment partiality, Habermas's theory of Occidental rationality, which assumes a rationalized life world, has major trouble in answering new cross-cultural confronts, such as the dilemma of identity, and the politics of reconciliation in severely divided societies. Habermas's theory is too rooted in the Enlightenment tradition of universal reason and is unable to address the complex problems that are integral to both multicultural societies and to the interrelations of worldviews on the global level. Given that cultural conflicts are frequently those between cultures rather than within cultures, it is not easy to observe how Habermas can actually suggest a normative explanation for dissimilarities, given that the preservation of those differentiations is repeatedly what the conflict is about.

## **II. The Quest for the Plurality of Modernities**

Accordingly, there is a need to shift the emphasis Habermas puts on normative conceptions of communication rooted in Occidental rationalism towards a cognitive model of contemporary cultural transformation. This shift can help us include the Oriental visions of modernity as well. Essential to that obligation is a weaker conception of rationality which realizes that the issue of universality is not just a normative dilemma, but also a cognitive-cultural issue. Accordingly, in place of searching for a universalistic proposal based on an abstract idea placed outside culture, attention should be paid to the cognitive structures inherent in cultural traditions and the processes of identification. I believe that the concept of the plurality of modernities, which emerged in sociology to conceptualize the contemporary world, can suggest an alternative approach to Habermas's claim to universalization of Western modernity.

Indeed, the perspective of a "plurality of modernities" is able to show that modernity may no longer be considered an unailing

progress towards final integration. Modernity should be understood as a phenomenon open to interpretations and definitions. Once modernity is viewed to be unable to unify a single society, the “universalization” of human societies under conditions of modernity must be distrusted. In the following outline, some of the most essential aspects of the concept of a “plurality of modernities” will be considered.

First, a “plurality of modernities”, challenges the universalistic perspectives of history, most significantly by referring to the plurality of histories. Most philosophers and theorists of modernity have been Westerners, simply because social theory is a product of the Western experience of modernity. (Eisenstadt,1973:11) For the same reason, modernity has been linked with the advent of “Reason.” Viewing modernity as identical to Reason gave rise to exclusively Western-based ethnocentric social theorizings.( Lauer , 1987:77) Rationality, as an essential foundation of modernity, was seen as exceptional to the West; therefore, what seemed to be assumed was the weakness of the East in giving shape to history. In brief, a study of the “plurality of modernities” is essentially a comparative-historical investigation of modernity with a rejection of universalistic presuppositions of history.

Second, the concept of a “plurality of modernities” is able to consider modernity as a civilizational phenomenon. “The civilizational perspective necessarily questions the idea of civilization in the singular form, so it is also necessary to argue for a plurality of civilizations.” (Kaya, 2004: 16-17)

Applying the theme of a “plurality of modernities” to the discourses of Modernity in Iran, it can be said that in the intellectual and social process of creating distinct modernities, the concept of “tradition” has become an essential element in the discourse on modernity in Iran. Headings like “Iran between tradition and modernity” have been used in many publications.<sup>12</sup> Metaphors related to the two terms bring together the world of the observer with that of the observed. At the same time, the cultural relationship of modernity and tradition was established within the modernization theories: tradition was explained as the reality of non-European societies; modernity as that which

existed in the West. Thus we are told that the problem in Iran nowadays, lies in its having experienced only one half of modernity. Iran is not an expression of modernity, the argument continues, thus Iranians today live a schizoid life: half modern and half traditional. (Shayegan, 1992: 6)

Based on the theme of a "plurality of modernities," however, both tradition and modernity can and should be understood as open to interpretation. This has not yet been done so far: existing studies<sup>13</sup> of the relations between tradition and modernity have a tendency to see tradition as either completely incompatible or fully compatible with Western modernity. (Sayyid, 1997:101)

The main dilemma in these studies is that both tradition and modernity are taken to be coherent visions of life (Gellner,1981:64) – two different, equally totalizing world-interpretations which are therefore seen as either compatible or incompatible.<sup>14</sup> Modernity is taken to be differentiated, reflexive and universal whereas the tradition is seen to be holistic, prereflexive and ethnocentric.

There is, however, a radical honesty to interpretation in both tradition and modernity. Therefore, they can both be lived according to various configurations. Just as the theme of a "plurality of modernities" could open up plausible ways for social theory to review itself, so the theme of the varieties of tradition could shed light on the understanding of non western cultures.

## **V. Conclusion**

To conclude, discussions of tradition, modernity, and the "plurality of modernities" should perhaps take the following assertions as their point of departure (,) if they are to reflect the present condition of criticism. First, modernity should be understood as a historical period in which a distinction was made between tradition and modernity within the structure of a specific discursive formation. Second, this historical discursive formation should be seen to have legitimacy in all places. The historiography of modernity must recognize that there are no foundations for treating modernity as a European privilege: the



basis for a tradition/modernity dichotomy appears to have existed in all societies and cultures.

Third and last, the dichotomy of tradition and modernity should not be directed to either universalism or cultural relativism. Western universalism ignores non-Western cultures, and cultural relativism can be grasped to legitimate any cultural practice. Accordingly, not only the perspectives of the universalization of modernity, but also those of relativism, need to be questioned. It is important to insist that the distinctions between modernities do not necessarily mean that there are fundamentally incompatible modernities; rather, they mean that there are numerous formations of modernity and various answers to questions that arise during modern experiences.

#### **End Notes:**

1. It cannot be denied that postmodernism, in the last few decades, has played a great part in the development of social theories of modernity, critical or advocative.
2. Rasmussen's reading here, however, appears to remain overly tied to the strong claim Habermas makes in his inaugural address as Director of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt (1971).
3. PDM: 136, 154, 162, 163, 182, 192, 255, 299 against Heidegger; : 166, 188 197, 222 against Derrida; : 270, 279 , 317, 328 against Foucault; and the discussion of Richard Rorty in Habermas, *pMT*, trans. William Mark Hohengarten Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992, p. 135.
4. Consequently, the bonds of cultural and historical perspectives are broken for him not merely by truth but by any of the three validity-claims; see, e.g., *TCA*, vol. 2: 399; *PDM*, p. 322; *PMT*, p. 224.
5. Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Critique of Judgment*, trans. James Creed Meredith Oxford: Clarendon Press, from PDM, p322. argued in Mccumber, John, *philosophy and Freedom: Derrida, Rorty, Habermas. Foucault*, p. 94.
6. For a reading of Habermas along these lines, see David Couzens Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, *Critical Theory* Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, p. 77.
7. Misgeld emphasizes that "the worst thing, Habermas did the greatest disservice to himself when he wrote, in *The Philosophic Discourse of Modernity*, the chapter on Heidegger. It is a disaster from the point of view of Heidegger scholarship .Very sloppily done, and without patience." Ibid.
8. It seems to me that there is a parallel between Misgeld's perspective on universality as practical construct and Habermas's 'Universal Pragmatic Justification'. As some commentators of Habermas's works have argued, by the late 1980s, Habermas signals a significant shift in his works and attempts to articulate a kind of "Universal Pragmatic Justification." What remained

constant was his claim to demonstrate that the universalist content of modern morality is buttressed by their universal validity. However, in two recent essays dealing with human rights and political legitimacy, Habermas tries to avoid any claim to justification. In "Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights", he offers human rights as "the answer to a problem that once confronted Europeans - when they had to overcome the political consequences of confessional fragmentation - and now confronts other cultures in a similar fashion." Habermas Jürgen . "Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights", In *The Postnational Constellation*, trans. M. Pensky Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, See 113-29, p. 128 He does not point to the universal justifiability of human rights, but offers them instead as a solution that worked well for Europe and that others would do well to imitate when they confront a similar problem. Similarly, in "Constitutional Democracy: a Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles", he interprets constitution-making as a way of putting into words the project of "bringing forth a self-determining community of free and equal citizens." Habermas, Jürgen . "Constitutional Democracy: a Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles", *Political Theory* 29:6 December 2001: 766-81, p. 775 Habermas explains in detail how a full system of liberal and participatory rights is implicit in such a project. At no point in this essay, however, does he point to a justification of the project itself. Instead, he seems content to let human rights and constitutional democracy be contingent upon the desire among a group of free and equal persons to self-legislate. With these two essays Habermas signals a significant shift in his work. He seems to have abandoned his long-standing claim to justify human rights and universalist morality.

9. Misgeld emphasizes that "Human Rights documents are clearly based in a liberal philosophy." (*Misgeld*, Forthcoming 2011:111).

10. Here, Habermas refers to Dallmayr, Fred. *Beyond Dogma and Despair*, Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 220. and 246.; Dallmayr, Fred. *Twilight of Subjectivity*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981, p. 179. and 279.

11. Megan Boler argues that Benhabib's form of "interactive" universalism parts company from the Enlightenment tradition, and draws on Habermas and Peirce, in her emphasis on discursive construction of truths, for a "discursive, communicative concept of rationality." In her chapter "Models of Public Space," she lucidly contrasts the agonistic, liberal, and discursive models, and indeed the discursive model provides a provocative way of thinking through participatory political process. Leading up to this comparison, in the chapter "Autonomy, Modernity, and Community," she emphasizes Habermas's contributions to the reconciliation of participatory politics with modernity as he, unlike Arendt, doesn't see market interests as inherently opposed to participatory politics. The second central feature of Benhabib's revised universalism is her insistence that the subject of reason is finite, unlike Descartes's notion of the reasoning self. She emphasizes instead a valuable model of the narrative self, defined as the "narrative structure of actions and personal identity." From this decidedly embodied and social self issues "interactive rationality." As a result, "The moral point of view is not

an Archimedean center from which the moral philosopher pretends to be able to move the world. The moral point of view articulates rather a certain stage in the development of linguistically socialized human beings when they start to reason about general rules governing their mutual existence from the standpoint of a hypothetical questioning: under what conditions can we say that these general rules of action are valid not simply because it is what you and I have been brought up to believe or because my parents, the synagogue, my neighbors, my tribe say so, but because they are fair, just, impartial, in the mutual interest of all?" Benhabib, Seyla. *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p. 6 cited and argued in Boler, Megan. Review of : *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*. by Benhabib, Seyla. *Hypatia* v10.n4 (Fall 1995): pp130(13), p. 138.

12. See Honneth. Axel. *Struggle for Recognition*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.

13. See for example: Malik, Jamal. "Muslim Identities Suspended between Tradition and Modernity." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 2,1996..pp. 1-9. : Milne, Robert Stephen, and Diane K. Mauzy. *Malaysia: Tradition, Modernity and Islam*. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1986. ;Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. *Traditional Islam in the Modern World*. London/New York: Keagan Paul International. 1987.

14. For example, Fethullah Gulen, an important Islamic thinker, searches for a middle way between modernity and Muslim tradition. Gülen tries to establish a relationship between the four features of modernity and the Muslim tradition: a) modern science and Islamic knowledge; b) reason and revelation; c) the idea of progress and conservation of tradition, and d) free will of modern man and Muslim understanding of destiny. See: Gulen, M. Fethullah. *A Comparative Approach to Islam and Democracy*. Translated by Elvan Ceylan. *SAIS Review* 21, 2: 133-38.2001

15. See :Nasr, S. Hossein, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World*. London: KPI. 1987.

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## **BookReview**

Clayton Philip, *The Problem of God in Modern Thought*, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2000; 516 pp.; hb. \$ 39.00; ISBN: 0-8028-3885-5

This book is not for the fainthearted. It is an ambitious exploration of different concepts (or 'models,' to use Clayton's preferred term) of God in the modern era. Clayton's constructive and critical views are laced into his detailed analyses of works by Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Lessing, Fichte, Schelling, Tillich, and others. This book is best not read at a hurried place; one needs patience and care in reconstructing Clayton's constructive contribution to our thinking about God today and to follow his commentary on modern philosophy.

Clayton's metaphysic is pantheistic, a post in-between pantheism and the classical theistic traditions. In philosophical theology he also demarcates a middle position. I quote him at length:

The great break for philosophical theology-and it continues to be the great divide-can be expressed by the opposition 'Kant versus Hegel.' Hegel undoubtedly made an advance over earlier rationalists when he proclaimed *Sein als Subjekt*, "being as subject." But like them (and perhaps even more strongly) he held that reality was fully knowable, that there are no limits to what human reason can attain. Kant is, by contrast, the great advocate of a philosophy of limits-the limits on what reason can know of God. The standpoint from which I defend a modified form of Schelling's later philosophy seeks to retain the strengths of Hegel's metaphysics of the self-unfolding subject while preserving the Kantian insistence that not all is (or can be) known, that no place would remain for freedom if everything were deductible from theoretical reason. I presuppose that some such synthesis of Hegel and Kant is both necessary and possible (p. 469).

Like many such middle positions, Clayton's work will be deemed attractive by opposing camps as well as unsatisfactory. There is an apocryphal story about a soldier in the American Civil War who was sympathetic with both sides and thus wore the military uniforms of both armies with the result that he was shot by all parties. My aim in this review is not to shoot Clayton, though I will raise several questions about the success of Clayton's project.

Chapter One opens with this claim: ‘Not to put too fine a point on it: The context for treating the question of God today must be scepticism’ (p. 3). This charge is never, in my reading, vindicated. Citing theologians like Gordon Kaufman or polemicists like Kai Nielson hardly secures the certainty of scepticism among mainline philosophers. Clayton refers to A.J. Ayer’s charge that language about God is meaningless (p. 5, p. 47) but, as Clayton notes in the Preface, the last vestiges of positivism have disappeared (p. xi). I do not think it is hard to find vestiges of positivism, but given the inadequacy of positivism (even acknowledged, in the end, by Ayer himself) and its ilk, there seems little ongoing threat to theism from the Vienna Circle. And we are currently in the greatest revival of philosophical theism in modern times.

As a whole, I did not find the opening chapter very useful in clarifying the modern debate over what Clayton refers to as ‘the God problem today’ (p. 12). His very characterisation of theism seems unconventional. ‘The concept of God refers to a reality that is in some essential sense transcendent of, and thus not locatable within, experience’ (p. 3). I am not sure what he means here. Yes, classical Jewish, Christian, and Muslim thinkers hold that God transcends human experience in the sense that God’s reality is not some mode of human life. But many but not all philosophers and theologians in these traditions allow that humans may experience God. It would be absurd (presumably) for a Christian to claim that Jesus Christ is God and man, and to claim that no one can experience Jesus Christ.

Chapter Two contains a trenchant account of Descartes’ Cogito and his ontological argument. I think Clayton rightly underscores Descartes’ reliance on intuition.

Chapter Three contains a modest criticism of perfect being theology. Clayton does not advance any decisive objections. Largely he simply identifies the need for further work by William Alston, T.V. Morris and others in the Anselmian camp.

He [Morris] also admits at one point that the understanding of God as perfect emerged rather late in the history of religions. How did it emerge, and what are the problems inherent in the idea of moral perfection? Is the notion of a perfect being coherent, or does it (like Thomas’s fourth way) depend on assumptions we can no longer make? Detailed historical work (below, and chapter 4), as well as adequate responses to the difficulties raised, will be required to establish this position (p. 133).

I believe that such a bigger picture can readily be filled in which locates the concept of the divine at the very heart of human values. Much of the work in the last half to two thirds of the book contribute to the divine attributes of infinity and perfection. Clayton defends the legitimacy of a cognitive, realist form of theism, over against Kantian strictures.

In the post-Kantian context we must acknowledge the regulation functions of theistic language-its role, for example, in grounding knowledge claims and creating meaning. Yet God-language can also be part of constitutive theories, theories that make claims to truth and can be examined accordingly (p. 275).

The discussion of Kant's late philosophy of God is very useful. As Clayton moves through a discussion of German idealism he constructively builds his case for viewing God and the world as inextricably bound together. 'The basic starting point for modern theistic metaphysics-the understanding of God as infinite-points unmistakably to a particular ontological position: the world cannot be fully separate or different from God' (p. 477).

It would require more space than I can use in a review to pinpoint all the junctures where I believe Clayton underestimates the integrative nature of classical theism. I sometimes wonder whether William James was right about the role of temperament in philosophy. Perhaps Hegel had the sort of personality which made him (literally) unhappy when he entertained the prospects of dualism and theism, a spectre he characterised in terms of an 'unhappy consciousness.' But I end this review by bracketing such speculation about temperament and the broader matters of my disagreement with Clayton over pantheism. Overall, Clayton has achieved something which all branches of theism ('pan' or 'en' or deistic) may appreciate. He has demonstrated that God is at the heart of the Western tradition. And he has wrestled with God philosophically and theologically in this sustained, masterful work.

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*Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy of Religion*, Edited by Harriet A. Harris and Christopher J. Insole (Heythrop Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Religion and Theology), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, viii + 201 pp., pb £ 16.99; isbn: 0-7645-3144-3.



[1] In this highly stimulating collection, a range of authors take the pulse of analytical philosophy of religion. The contributors were asked to reflect on the history and social context of analytical philosophy of religion and, as the editors acknowledge, there is a particular emphasis on the roots of the discipline in British universities, particularly Oxford. This is hardly a surprise given that of eleven contributors, all but two teach at British universities (or did so until retirement), and more than half are linked to Oxford, either as teachers or students. The editors point out, correctly, that the contributors acknowledge the importance of American influences in analytical philosophy of religion, and there are two contributors who teach in the USA. However, there is no acknowledgement of the thriving tradition of analytical philosophy of religion in Europe-not even a word of regret at the impossibility of including it. Still, the limited scope of the collection provides for a unity of focus, and the editors make no claim to present a comprehensive over-view of analytical philosophy: rather it constitutes a series of reflections on a very specific movement that originated in Oxford in the 1950's.

[2] In the first paper, Basil Mitchell, a former Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at Oxford, and one of the founding figures of the movement, describes its origin. At a time when a generation of philosophers was emerging who, under the influence of logical positivism, simply refused to take religious claims seriously, Mitchell joined forces with other philosophers and theologians to form a group known as 'the Metaphysicals'. Of course, in order to make their defence of religion convincing, Mitchell and his allies had to adopt methods of argument that would win the respect of their opponents, that is the respect of analytical philosophers, and thus was (British) analytical philosophy of religion born.

[3] Judging by the evidence of this book, the tables have turned since those days. All of the contributors take for granted that philosophers should address religious questions, what is disputed is whether analytical philosophy provides the appropriate tools for doing so, with a strong suggestion that if the tools it provides are not up to the job, there is little point in learning how to use them.

[4] Of course, that is partly a reflection of the kind of philosophers who were invited to contribute; I am sure that there are still many analytical philosophers who are content to ignore religious questions, but such philosophers would hardly take the trouble to contribute to a collection such as this. However, I think it also reflects a turning of the

tide. One can no longer take for granted the hegemonic status of analytical philosophy in British and American universities. For example, G.W. Kimura's paper, 'Analytical Thought and the Myth of Anglo-American Philosophy', brashly depicts analytical philosophy as a movement whose time has come and gone: 'Analytical philosophy did hold sway on both sides of the Atlantic, if only for a slice of the twentieth century, but that time is now past.' (p. 133) Giles Fraser's paper, 'Modernism and the Minimal God' examines the cultural context in which analytical philosophers of religion, (as he argues), learned to make the mistake of ignoring the messy history of religion in order to concentrate on a supposed common core of beliefs shared by all religions. Fraser draws an analogy between analytical philosophy and modern art, suggesting, (as I understand his paper), that these were both movements that played a positive role in his own life, that made sense in a certain context, and that have left behind their masterpieces, but also that the time has come for artists and philosophers to move on.

[5] The editors see a certain lack of respect for tradition as characteristic of analytical philosophy (p. 7), and one of them, Christopher Insole, expands on this in his paper, 'The Forgetting of History', where he recalls being upbraided for his excessively historical approach to the subject in his first graduate tutorial with Richard Swinburne, who told him '...we are interested in truth, not who said it.' (p. 161) Given what has been noted about the geographical focus of this collection, it is hardly surprising that Swinburne emerges as the dominant figure within the discipline. He is the best representative of analytical philosophy of religion at its most analytical, defending the truth of Christianity using the same standards of rationality that prevail in the natural sciences.

[6] It is interesting to note then that, in defending the analytical approach, both Insole and Swinburne use historical arguments. Swinburne sketches the history of apologetics from the Old Testament through to the present day, legitimising his approach by placing himself within a venerable tradition. Insole argues that the most charitable reading of analytical philosophers' deliberate forgetfulness of history (that is, the insistence on starting discussions from scratch, rather than from what must be said after Kant, or after Hegel), is loyalty to the political ideals of John Locke: by making writing accessible to any reader, whatever their historical background and commitments, we make a liberal society possible.

[7] It might seem paradoxical that Insole invokes history in order to defend an ahistorical approach, but such an objection would be frivolous. It is clear from his paper that what he finds objectionable is when a position is made to seem inevitable because it is the culmination of a historical process, particularly when this is presented in terms that are opaque to anyone who has not studied the history in question. However, taken together, his paper and Swinburne's establish that there is a legitimate use for historical arguments in philosophical theology, if only because establishing one's relation to history is a way of establishing one's identity, and theology is a discipline that, by its nature, cannot ignore questions of identity.

[8] This perhaps explains why there has been a recent trend towards studying the history of analytical philosophy itself. Insole charitably ascribes the analytical neglect of history to a desire for a democratic philosophy. However, there is another explanation that is less charitable but perhaps more credible. Analytical philosophy began with a revolutionary fervour and, as in so many revolutions, what happened before the year zero was of no interest unless, perhaps, it could be seen as an anticipation of the revolution. Studying the history of philosophy became a matter of searching through ancient ruins trying to find stones that might be useful for the urgent building requirements of the present. However, the current generation of analytical philosophers was born long after the revolution. They are bound to its history because it was presented as a *fait accompli*, but they never took a conscious decision to participate in it, and have no particular reason to be committed to its ideals-particularly since one of those ideals was to be suspicious of commitment to maintaining traditions. So, they are studying their own history, looking to see what it was their revolutionary ancestors were committed to, so as to decide whether, and in what sense, they should maintain their fidelity. After a century of analytical philosophy, it takes some effort to sort through the past of analytical philosophy and find a shared sense of purpose; for example, Michael Dummett's *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* [1] can be read as an attempt to rally the troops around the slogan 'Language is the vehicle of thought!'

[9] In this book, by contrast, no such rallying cry emerges. The defenders of analytical philosophy stand for clarity, respect for science, intellectual humility and taking the trouble to anticipate objections, but none of them claim that analytical philosophers were the first to discover these virtues. The paper by the late Cyril

Barrett (to whom the book is dedicated) might seem to be an exception. Its title, 'The Wittgensteinian Revolution' leaves one in no doubt who was the great leader to whom we should look for inspiration, providing the opportunity to escape from the Cartesian search for certainty that has plagued modern philosophy, and to learn to value faith without falling into a simplistic fideism. Barrett's writing has an elegiac tone however, as he recognises that few philosophers these days are willing to adopt the Wittgensteinian approach, and he is left to reflect on the reasons why the world chooses to remain in darkness even though the saviour has come to cure the blind.

[10] Two of the other writers are more positive about new directions that analytical philosophy of religion could take. Elizabeth Burns argues that Iris Murdoch's work can be read as a successful contribution to a project associated with analytical philosophers such as Braithwaite and Kee, that of re-interpreting religious language for a new era. Murdoch is best known as a writer of philosophical novels, and novels are hardly the preferred medium of analytical philosophy, which has always aligned itself with natural sciences rather than the arts. So, Burns is right to point out that Murdoch does not, at first, seem to be an analytical philosopher. However, she belongs to the same cultural milieu- Mitchell points out that she attended the first meeting of the Metaphysicals- and Burns argues that Murdoch only rejected the task of philosophical analysis because 'the task of analysis has been too narrowly conceived.' (p. 57) So reading Murdoch as an analytical philosopher is a matter of broadening our idea of what analytical philosophy can do.

[11] Harriet Harris asks 'Does Analytical Philosophy Clip Our Wings?' Students turn to philosophy of religion for spiritual succour, only to find that analytical philosophers typically have more modest goals. But need this be so? Harris discusses Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff as representatives of reformed epistemology, who argue that belief in God need not be based upon rational arguments, because God has equipped us with a *sensus divinitatis* that enables us to acknowledge the truth of his existence. As she notes, Wolterstorff has also written movingly about how the loss of his son shaped his understanding of God, [2] and has argued that a life of contemplation, or a life spent fighting injustice could also yield a deeper understanding of God. (p. 109) Harris calls upon religious epistemologists to consider such themes further, examining how a religious life (in many senses of that term) can enable us to be

more perceptive of truth. Like Burns, Harris broadens our conception of what analytical philosophy of religion can be.

[12] But as we broaden the conception of analytical philosophy of religion, does anything remain that is distinctively analytical? The blurring of the boundaries is particularly evident in the papers of Charles Taliaferro and Pamela Sue Anderson. Taliaferro defends the proposition that the goal of philosophy is to obtain a God's eye view, and Anderson disagrees on feminist grounds. Within the context of a collection such as this, one might be tempted to bill this debate as Analytical Philosophy versus Feminist Philosophy, but those hoping for a good knockabout will be disappointed: Taliaferro and Anderson are talking to each other rather than past each other, and seem to be on the way towards achieving mutual understanding. Certainly there is a disagreement, but from the way that disagreement is pursued, it is apparent that we do not have two totally different and incompatible conceptions of what philosophy is. In the famous conclusion of George Orwell's allegory, *Animal Farm*, everyone looks from humans to pigs and pigs to humans, but nobody is able to tell the difference: man and beast share the same moral corruption. I would say the same about Taliaferro and Anderson, with the important difference that the traits they share are positive rather than negative. But if analytical philosophy of religion can no longer be sharply separated from other ways of doing philosophy, does it still exist as a distinct entity?

[13] The movement that is being studied here began as an attempt to battle a strongly anti-religious form of philosophy with its own tools. That battle is over now, and the tools can be turned to other uses, or discarded as no longer necessary. The veterans of the battle have important lessons to teach the next generation, and there are plenty who are willing to learn, but if they choose to fight battles, they will be different ones. A reader who is new to the subject would discover more about analytical philosophy of the 1950s, than about non-religious analytical philosophy of the present day. Insole, it is true, surveys the contemporary analytical scene, but he does so in order to indicate the diversity rather than to find a shared agenda. If this book is to be believed, A.J. Ayer's thought dominated Oxford in the 1950's not in that everyone accepted it, but that nobody could ignore it. If any single philosopher has dominated the agenda in Oxford in recent times, it is Donald Davidson, but although he merits inclusion in Insole's survey, there is no sense that he, or any other analytical philosopher, is someone

religious thinkers have to reckon with rather than one of many thinkers they might choose to engage with. In this sense, analytical philosophy of religion no longer seems to be defined by its relationship to analytical philosophy as such, although that is not to suggest that all links has been severed.

[14] If the aim of the collection is to take the pulse of analytical philosophy, it seems to me that it emerges as a child that has come of age: alive, healthy and with a new set of friends.

**Endnotes:**

[1] Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (Cambridge Massachusetts 1996).

[2] Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Lament For A Son* (London 1997).